Cordaid, also a member of the Dutch Relief Alliance, actively promotes more equitable relations between international and local actors, for example, by localising humanitarian assistance. What progress are we making, and what are the barriers? We asked aid workers from Yemen and DR Congo for answers and recommendations.
Giving local humanitarian actors a stronger role and more leadership, both in the design, planning, and implementation of responses, is not only a matter of equitability. It also makes humanitarian assistance more effective and efficient.
“I have seen it many times: INGOs come with lists of criteria and items we need to distribute. Even if sometimes the criteria or timelines make no sense, you cannot change it.”
As one of our colleagues in DR Congo said in 2020: “In the first days and weeks of a humanitarian crisis when people are dying or trying to survive, we can’t just always wait for international aid agencies to come and act. Local aid workers already do most of the work. But they need the tools and the funding to act faster and more effectively.”
Two years later, we took the opportunity to discuss localisation progress and barriers with two members of the recently established Local Advisory Group of the Dutch Relief Alliance: Hasan Hajar from the Yemeni NGO Yamaan and Paulin Bishakabalya from the Congolese NGO CODEVAH, based in South Kivu.
Localising humanitarian assistance covers equitable resource-sharing, risks and responsibilities between international NGOs (INGOs) and local NGOs (LNGOs), and addressing power imbalances. In today’s narrative, we could even say it’s about decolonizing the humanitarian system. What is the essence of localisation in your view?
Paulin: “Localisation is about accountability towards the persons you are serving. The ones affected by adversity. Their assessment of needs, contextual knowledge, and capacities must lead in any response. It involves them in the whole cycle of humanitarian responses by closely working with their representational structures, like civil society, community-based organisations, and local leaders.”
Hasan: “I agree but prefer to use a different terminology. It’s about equity and equality. For that, you need measurable indicators. For example, the number of local staff in senior management of INGO offices in Yemen. Currently, there are hardly any. Major decisions of INGOs in Yemen are made by foreigners, not Yemenis. If INGOs take equality seriously, they must do more than only mandating local NGOs with certain tasks. Treat them like true partners. Or take funding. Most international funding is allocated according to the themes and priorities of INGOs and international donors. It is not tailored to the local context. Projecting INGO frameworks on the local realities can be very sensitive, sometimes senseless.”
Can you give an example?
Hasan: “Take the issues of rape, gender-based violence or child abuse. These are big topics, and INGOs have a lot of funding to address them. They tell local Yemeni NGOs to spend time addressing these issues directly. This will not work in Yemeni culture. You’ll have to act less insensitive and dig deeper. If you want to address child violence effectively, you have to address the root causes. Without diminishing the poverty of parents, for example, you will never rule out child violence. Just to remind you, many people haven’t received their salaries for years in Yemen. But unfortunately, digging deeper and considering the historical, social, cultural and political realities doesn’t fit into the frameworks and timelines of many INGOs.”
And from the DRC?
Paulin: “There are many! Take food security. I have seen it many times: INGOs come with lists of criteria and items we need to distribute. For example, certain seeds, food items, certain agricultural tools, quantities per household, and dates for distribution. Even if the criteria or timelines sometimes make no sense or are not in sync with the agricultural season, you cannot change them. This creates nonsensical situations. For example, in an area where people grow a lot of cassava, LNGOs are forced to distribute cassava. This happens. In the end, certain humanitarian activities do not address what they were supposed to address, in this case, malnutrition. In short, we need more flexibility, less rigidity and a bigger say in designing responses.”
Are local humanitarians able to change these INGO conditions, frameworks and timelines?
Hasan: “Usually not. Only recently, with the DRA, have we really started co-designing responses with INGOs. First, we sit together and agree on what needs to be done and the terminology. INGOs then move forward with their funding, and then we, local actors, can start doing what we are good at.”
“INGOs and donors provide us with tools and policies that help us to address and minimise risks, and to run our operations in a safer way.”
Paulin: “There’s another common INGO logic that must change. I mean the criteria and categories they often use to decide which LNGOs receive more or less funding. The general rule is that local actors with a high-risk assessment receive less funding than low-risk local NGOs. This logic will never promote local humanitarians’ and community-based structures’ growth and strength in dealing with risks. Essentially, humanitarian work supports communities in dealing with high and immediate risks. I am not talking about the DRA, but I see this thinking in many INGOs.”
What if instability, repression or other factors limit civil society organisations from co-designing and co-implementing international responses?
Paulin: “The whole point is, of course, that they can strengthen their capacities. Sure, that takes time. But even in the immediate term, there’s always a way to involve affected people in your response. If it’s not through civil society, then by involving communities directly in the structures of the humanitarian response. Myself, I am from South Kivu. I am part of the population that has known conflict, war and brutalities for decades. South Kivu has played a pioneering role in civil society for the whole DRC during these years. Regarding localisation, we were the first to organise ourselves as NGOs, raise our voices and claim more leadership in international responses. This exemplifies that in times of hardship, people stand up and organise themselves.”
Would the logic of localisation also mean that, ideally, INGOs need to step back completely and LNGOs take over?
Hasan: “Not at all. It is not about not having INGOs in the country. We seek a balance. Hence, equity and equality. We both have important and complementary roles and responsibilities to play.”
Paulin: “I agree; this is true for DRC as well.”
Is this balance a matter of 50/50, for example, regarding access to direct funding?
Hasan: “That depends. If local NGOs are in dire straits and cannot run bigger humanitarian operations, you must strengthen them. Once they are stronger, INGOs can step back. It’s gradual. True INGO-LNGO partnerships make local organisations grow stronger.”
The Grand Bargain Agreement of 2016 started increased localisation efforts in the international humanitarian community. Six years on, do you see any progress on the ground?
Hasan: “I do, though not a lot. Some INGOs have changed the way they work with us. However, as a sector, no real progress has been made. It’s not structural. There are no strict localisation indicators and guidelines applicable to all INGOs.”
Paulin: “In Congo, a lot has changed. Access and participation of local actors in international humanitarian coordination mechanisms, such as UNOCHA, have significantly improved. Before 2016, we were simply not represented. Today, we are not only providers of information but as decision-makers. This means that high-level decision-making is based on local realities and local voices. Access to direct funding has increased significantly. In South Kivu, direct UNOCHA pooled funding to local NGOs, which has gone up from 6% to 60% since 2016. Before, within the DRA, as a local NGO, we depended on what the INGO was willing to give us [in the DRA, every local NGO is associated with one of the Netherlands-based INGOs. Nowadays, in DR Congo, there is a DRA obligation to give us 35% of their funding for a joint response.”
Does more direct funding automatically mean more leadership for local actors, more equitable relations, and more control on the ground?
Hasan: “If, together with the funding, we are also meaningfully involved in designing the response, then yes, it is. That is now the case with the DRA.”
Paulin: “More direct funding is important, but it’s not solving all the problems. In fact, you can get direct funding, but international representatives, especially from UN agencies and some INGOs, can still treat you like a child. They ask you to account for the 15 dollars you spent by sending five emails to five persons. Financial transparency is hugely important, but this is something completely different. This focus on micromanagement is inefficient and sometimes disrespectful. Above all, it’s a lack of trust. Without trust, there’s no partnership.”
“External exposure and knowledge sharing [make] us wiser and stronger. We learn a lot from the experiences of colleagues in DRC, Somalia, and all the other countries.”
Hasan: “In Yemen, it is different because independent third-party agencies mostly do financial monitoring. This helps a lot. When the governance and monitoring, auditing, and annual reporting mechanisms are there and well taken care of, I feel that this hugely enhances trust between all parties and between LNGOs and INGOs. Yamaan doesn’t work with UN agencies, which might also explain the difference.”
Apart from sharing resources and responsibilities, localisation also entails sharing risks. As first responders living inside the conflict and not in the safe surroundings of most internationals, you run most of the risks that come with humanitarian work. Do you feel INGOs give you the time and the means to deal with those risks?
Paulin: “I am responsible for what my team and myself are doing. I will never willingly put my team in difficulties. I assess the risks of field missions and will always try to avoid problems. If I make mistakes, my INGO partner can never be held responsible. They don’t have to.”
But do INGOs take those risks into account in their budgeting and timelines? Dealing with security risks means dealing with implementation delays, loss of property, pressure on staff, and even loss of life.
Paulin: “Discussing and negotiating these matters with INGOs take a lot of time and effort. Often, INGOs are not fully aware of the risks on the ground. Take purchasing an extra motorbike for staff to go into the field. This is also a security matter. It can take years before the INGO agrees – or not – to finance this. Mostly, that kind of discussion focuses on costs and finance. The INGO often overlooks the security aspect.”
The painful thing is that when internationals visit crisis areas, security is always the number one priority. Can we say that today’s international humanitarian responses, as well as those of the DRA, do not sufficiently consider the risks of local actors?
Paulin: “Not yet.”
Hasan: “Again, it’s different in Yemen. In the DRA joint responses in Yemen, I feel we have a joint INGO-LNGO understanding of risks. INGOs and donors provide us with tools and policies that help us to address and minimise risks and run our operations more safely. When there are project delays because of insecurity, they allow for grace periods. We are insured for theft of humanitarian goods and items.”
Paulin: “In Congo, this is not the case. When we get money, for example, from the UN, to implement a project, it’s hard enough to cover the expenses of all the activities. The amounts per allocation are set, even per health zone. They don’t give extra money for insurance.”
Hasan: “It is very much a matter of how you have negotiated these things with INGOs and donors and your contract with them.”
You often hear people say that localisation makes humanitarian responses more effective. It makes sense, of course. Why have strangers from far away come over and do what local responders can do better? Can you give me one example of increased effectiveness thanks to localisation?
Hasan: “In 2018, Yamaan and Dutch INGO Cordaid started a health project. It had a performance-based financing (PBF) approach. This was new in Yemen. Cordaid took the lead but shared all its PBF knowledge and expertise. There was extensive training. We continued improving healthcare services in Yemen together, but Yamaan then took the lead as the main implementor and even raised additional funding from different donors in 2020. Cordaid is still involved, but minimally, as a technical consultant. This is the empowerment of local actors, knowledge sharing and handing over responsibilities. This is localisation. It works and makes humanitarian and development work more efficient. There are other examples from other INGOs. And I can say that. Overall, the localisation of the past six years has resulted in a stronger civil society in Yemen.”
Paulin: “Now that local Congolese actors have a bigger say, humanitarian responses are implemented where it matters most, tailored to the needs and realities of those who suffer most. More so than before. We know where people suffer most; we know the routes of displacement. We have better access to isolated areas that are out of bounds to internationals. We share the culture, the language, we know the risks, sensitivities and the history of the communities we work for. We can quickly adapt to the volatility and instability of a crisis. This is our habitat as responders, personally and professionally.”
What are the localisation barriers you’d like to see tackled in the near future?
Paulin: “Localisation is still too dependent on individual INGO and donor representatives. Make it structural, not personal.”
“We need to link immediate relief and development a lot more. If you focus purely on immediate relief, without investing in structural development, humanitarian efforts are not creating a better future.”
Hasan: “We need clear localisation indicators. Both INGOs and LNGOs may have many ambitions to localise humanitarian assistance, but we need to be able to hold them accountable. Accountability mechanisms are lacking.”
Paulin: “The Grand Bargain agreements are very valuable but are statements of intention. We now need rules and indicators to which all parties contractually need to stick. In the DRC Joint Response, the DRA is now translating localisation ambitions into contractual obligations.”
Can you give examples from DRC and Yemen of how the DRA has contributed to more leadership for local NGOs?
Paulin: “In Congo, INGOs are obligated to contract one local partner, and 35% of the funding for a joint response now has to go directly to local NGOs. Not an intention, an obligation. It’s a good first step, at least things are moving forward. Localisation is a gradual process.
Ten Congolese NGOs are now part of the DRA Joint Response. The INGOs we are working with are with us every step of the way, investing time and money in the monitoring and accountability capacities of all these NGOs, training staff, and sharing knowledge. Importantly, the DRA grants us money for capacity strengthening, and we can spend it as necessary. This is trust. This makes us stronger.”
Hasan: “When we started working with the DRA in Yemen in 2018, we were the only Yemeni NGO. Today, there are eight. As the partnership with the DRA is based on capacity strengthening and sharing knowledge and expertise, I can say the DRA has been instrumental in strengthening Yemeni civil society.”
Isn’t it odd, somehow, that it takes foreigners from a stable and safe environment to make Yemeni civil society responders stronger in dealing with acute instability and insecurity?
Hasan: “It’s not all about improving what we do on the ground. But external exposure and knowledge sharing make us wiser and stronger. We learn a lot from colleagues’ experiences in DRC, Somalia, and all the other countries. We learn a lot from the INGO perspectives. It strengthens us as colleagues, competitors in the international donor arena, and civil society organisations in our own countries.”
How could the DRA perform better when it comes to localisation?
Hasan: “In 2018 and 2019, the DRA worked with annual budgets and contracts. This is very stressful for us. We have requested a longer commitment, and they have now switched to bi-annual budgeting. Which is an improvement. Longer-term contracts, as do local NGO staff engagement, make a huge difference. How can you work on something sustainably, in health care, in food security, if aid workers never know whether they will still be working in a few months?
I wouldn’t call longer-term contracts only a matter of trust. Trust is built on performance. If you perform well, you will be contracted again. But it is also a matter of being able to train staff, retain them, and make good use of the increased capacities you have invested in. It’s also a matter of minimising staff stress in a setting that is already stressful in itself.”
Paulin: “I totally agree with this. I’d like to add another recommendation. If we have an equal relationship with INGOs based on trust, can the DRA not give us direct access to its funding? Sure, 35% of DRA funding goes to local NGOs. But we do not get this funding directly; it is transferred to us by the Dutch members of the DRA.”
Hasan: “This is how the DRA partnership is built: we are partners of INGOs based in the Netherlands and, through them, are part of the DRA. Regarding equality, it makes sense that the local NGOs in Yemen, DRC, and other countries where joint responses occur are direct partners of the Dutch Relief Alliance. From our perspective, this would be a step forward.”
Last question. Let’s think of the year 2030. What is the one fundamental change in the humanitarian system you’d like to see materialised by then?
Paulin: “I have three wishes. I’d love to see the government of Congo financing at least 50% of the humanitarian assistance in the country. This, too, is localisation: the financial contribution of national governments and their financial support to local humanitarian organisations. Currently, we do not have any financial support from that side. The money is there, but the political priorities aren’t. Seeing that change is my biggest wish. We have advocated for it strongly over the years. Unsuccessfully. Lobbying and advocacy support from the international community helps us stand stronger towards our government representatives.
My second wish for 2030 is that Congolese actors lead the coordination mechanisms of international humanitarian responses in DRC.
And lastly: to see a stronger connection between humanitarian responses and longer-term development efforts.”
Hasan: “I can relate to that. We need to build additional trust between government structures and civil society in Yemen. This will greatly harmonise all humanitarian work. And I also hope to see a less dependent government on the international community and local NGOs. We are actively working on that. For example, when Yamaan starts rehabilitating a hospital, we convince the government to provide and pay for staff. It takes time and effort from our side, but there is willingness from their side. It works. This kind of collaboration is the way forward.
We need to link immediate relief and development a lot more. If you focus purely on immediate relief without investing in structural development, humanitarian efforts, however important they are, will not create a better future. Linking relief and development creates a cycle. If you don’t do that, investments simply evaporate.”
Read the Grand Aspirations – Dutch Relief Alliance and the Grand Bargain 2.0 and the DRA 2022-2026 Strategy for more information about the DRA commitments and contributions to localising humanitarian assistance.
Interview by Frank van Lierde. This interview was previously published on the DRA website.