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# CORDAID SPLA PROGRAMME END TERM EVALUATION REPORT

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Prepared by



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## **LIST OF ACRONYMS**

AU:	African Union
CAR:	Central African Republic
CSOs:	Civil Society Organisation
DRC:	Democratic Republic of Congo
EKII:	Electronic Key Informant Interview
GBV:	Gender Based Violence
HYPREP:	Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project
IATI:	International Aid Transparency Initiative
ICT:	Information Communication Technology
IGAD:	Inter Governmental Authority on Development
L&A:	Lobby and Advocacy
M&E:	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDAs:	Ministries, Departments, Agencies
MoF:	Ministry of Finance
MoFA:	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MoPH:	Ministry of Public Health
MTR:	Mid Term Review
NOSDRA:	National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency
OECD DAC:	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development - Development Assistance Committee Criteria
PMEL:	Programme Monitoring Evaluation and Learning
RNE:	Royal Netherlands Embassy
SP:	Strategic Partnership
ToA:	Theory of Action
ToC:	Theory of Change
UHC:	Universal Health Care
UNEP:	United Nations Environmental Program

## SECTION ONE - INTRODUCTION

### 1.0. Background to SP Programme

Cordaid, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), 45 local Civil Society Organisation (CSO) partners and five international NGOs entered a Strategic Partnership (SP) for the implementation of 'Capacitating change, restoring the social contract in fragile contexts' programme. This is one of 25 strategic partnerships under the Ministry during the period 2016–2020. Through developing capacities of partners, as well as national and international Lobby and Advocacy (L&A) strategies, the programme aimed to strengthen the social contract, by enhancing interaction between governments and their citizens, in six countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria and South Sudan. It covered four thematic trajectories in these countries; i) inclusive and engendered peace, ii) security and access to justice, iii) inclusive health services and iv) extractives. The L&A work in the six countries where the programme was implemented, was supported internationally across all trajectories. Additionally, there was international L&A focused on expanding civil society space and led by the Cordaid Global Office.

### 1.1. The Programme's Theory of Change

Cordaid's Theory of Change (ToC) was contributing towards strengthening the social contract in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, by driving change in key thematic areas. According to the programme, a strengthened social contract in fragile contexts would happen:

- **IF** CSOs at local, national and international level legitimately represent the people – with emphasis on voices and leadership of women and youth – on whose behalf they lobby and advocate, and are capacitated with knowledge, tools to build evidence, and capacities to negotiate with, and influence, power holders
- **AND** the enabling environment for CSOs in fragile contexts is strengthened
- **THEN** CSOs will effectively engage in L&A on behalf of the populations they represent to influence policies, systems and practices
- **Resulting in** power holders' enhanced awareness of needs and priorities of communities; acknowledgement by all stakeholders of the importance to seriously engage CSOs in policy processes and multi-stakeholder dialogue and cooperation; and better laws, policies and regulations, monitoring implementation and improved public and private sector resource allocation and investments in fragile areas
- **BECAUSE** legitimate and representative CSOs are best placed to put needs and rights of communities on the political agenda, influence policy processes, and hold state and private sector actors accountable locally, nationally and internationally, by sharing evidence-based knowledge, and advocating on behalf of all people including marginalized groups.

The ToC was implemented in partnership with, and supporting, CSO actors to ensure that communities and their legitimate representatives have a voice and participate in decision-making. To achieve a strengthened social contract, the programme distinguished three main intervention domains that described the L&A approach employed:

1. Capacity Development: enabling CSOs and communities to carry out L&A activities.
2. Enabling Environment: creating openings for CSOs and communities to influence decision-making.
3. Policy Influencing: enabling CSOs and communities to impact policy reform processes, policy formulation and implementation.

## 1.2. Objectives of the End of Programme Evaluation

The evaluation was carried out for accountability and learning purposes. For accountability to MoFA, the evaluation assessed how effectively Cordaid and partners achieved the programme's objectives within the ToC of the SP Programme. The learning purpose of the evaluation was to provide insights for the SP to build on, as it intends to continue implementing the programme after the current subsidy ends. Specifically, the evaluation objectives were as follows:

1. Results of L&A: Assess effectiveness of the SP Programme in achieving L&A results at local, national and international level.
2. Contextualising: Put into perspective the nature of achieved successes given the context (fragility and civic space) and contribution to social contract.
3. Learning capacity and adaptability: Assess progress made during the programme on improving implementation of L&A, capacity development and monitoring, evaluation and learning.
4. Partnership: Assess appreciation of programme partners (local and international partners, Cordaid and MoFA) of the collaboration in the partnership towards the programme objectives.

## 1.3. Scope of the Evaluation

1. The evaluation covered the programme implementation period, from January 2016 to March 2020. It examined programme activities in the six implementation countries, in the international arena, covering sub-national, national, and international contexts.
2. Due to the prevailing Covid-19 pandemic, the evaluation utilized electronic data collection to review all programme results and do justice to the variety of country contexts in which the programme was implemented. Substantive time was allocated to each country to allow for more fact-finding and in-depth sense-making, covering each trajectory.
3. As part of the substantiation of results, a selection of other stakeholders, including local community representatives, media, academia, experts and representatives of international institutions were consulted on specific programme activities and results.
4. The country evaluations concluded with validation workshops that congregated staff in the respective Cordaid country offices together with partners in each country to reflect on the evaluation's findings on key outcomes of the programme.

## 1.4. Structure of the Report

**Section 1** is an introduction, outlining the background of the SP Programme, objectives and conduct of the evaluation. **Section 2** describes overall approach to evaluation, detailing the evaluation criteria, approaches to handling evaluation data, sampling criteria, data analysis and limitations of the evaluation. **Section 3** outlines results of the programme. It also discusses key strategies that influenced the nature of outcomes and implications of context on L&A results. **Section 4** focuses on learning capacity and adaptability – discussing frameworks for planning, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, space for learning, the Mid-Term review and capacity for gender-sensitive programming. **Section 5** interrogates the programme's ToC, highlighting findings on the capacity of partners to work with ToCs, efficacy of the bottom-up approach in developing ToCs, and implications of strategies and assumptions in the ToC on outcomes. **Section 6** discusses findings on the nature of partnership in the SP Programme – covering impact of the programme on CSOs' L&A capacities and partnership with the Dutch MoFA, synergies, and mechanisms for accountability and sustainability. **Section 7** concludes the report with some critical lessons drawn from the evaluation to inform future programming. The **Annex** includes detailed substantiated programme outcome and evaluation criteria.

## SECTION TWO - METHODOLOGY


### 2.0. Introduction

This section describes the overall approach to the End Term Evaluation of the SP Programme. It describes the evaluation criteria, as well as sampling, sources and methods utilised to collect and analyse evaluation data. It also reflects succinctly on some of the evaluation's limitations.

### 2.1. How We Did It - Evaluation Approach

The End-Term Evaluation of the Cordaid SP Programme adopted an exploratory approach. This entailed use of three major mechanisms: i) Evaluation questions provided by Cordaid in the ToR, enriched by reference to the OECD evaluation criteria, ii) the ToC, and iii) an analytical framework for attributing and weighting outcomes developed by the evaluation team. These mechanisms jointly informed development of a comprehensive evaluation criteria that provided questions that guided the entire evaluation process. The figure below shows the evaluation criteria, which is also detailed in Annex 2.

Figure 1: Cordaid SP Programme Evaluation Criteria



### 2.2. How we Collected Evaluation Data - Methods

The evaluation employed a mixed method approach to collecting and handling data relied upon for the analysis and conclusions presented in this report. This entailed i) desk research and ii) new data collected using participatory data collection methods.

Desk research involved analysis of existing relevant programme documents for an understanding of the design of the programme and outcomes achieved. Documents consulted included: mid-term report and mid-term review management response, annual narrative planning reports, annual progress reports and outcome harvesting documents.

In collecting the new data, the evaluation relied on i) Electronic Key Informant Interviews (EKIIs) and ii) Outcome Validation Forums (OVFs). Outcome Validation Forums were workshop-style events conducted via Zoom congregating partners in each of the six implementation countries to reflect on draft findings from the analysis of programme documents, harvested outcomes and insights from EKIIs.

The participatory data collection methods documented perspectives on conduct of the programme and outcomes from those involved in implementation and external stakeholders who provided useful insights for attribution and substantiation of programme's results. New data was critical for ensuring that the evaluation obtained first-hand accounts of the programme to substantiate claims made during outcome harvesting and also for weighting and determining the most important outcomes. It also served to reduce bias and increase reliability of the data because the evaluators were able to balance perspectives of internal stakeholders with those of others outside the programme. Also, because the evaluation was done more than a year after the outcome harvesting processes, the KIIs and OVFs provided an opportunity to check, confirm or balance claims made regarding the quality of outcomes and overall conduct of the programme.



### **2.3. Who we consulted – Sampling and Data Sources**

To assure collection of reliable data, reduce bias and to consult a variety of respondents to provide a balanced account of the programme, the evaluation utilised a multistage sampling criterion to identify respondents. Also, considering the contexts of fragility and the challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic, the evaluation utilised purposive and convenient sampling techniques to ensure the most relevant and suitable respondents were consulted and that the evaluation got as many different views as possible.

The sampling criteria involved selecting respondents based on the programme's implementation countries, thematic trajectories in the different contexts, and other stakeholder categories. The sample was thus designed to include people involved in implementation of the programme and external stakeholders that influenced the nature of outcomes achieved. These included: i) internal respondents from Dutch MoFA, Cordaid (Global and Country offices), partner CSOs (at national, community and international levels); and ii) external respondents from relevant institutions of government, other CSOs, media, and observers.

Using this criterion, the evaluation targeted to consult at least 131 respondents. It however reached and documented perspectives of 140 respondents. These were distributed as follows: Burundi – 17; CAR – 22; DRC – 24; Nigeria – 17; South Sudan – 23; Afghanistan – 18; International – 19. Looking at stakeholder categories; the evaluation reached: i) 82 partner CSOs (at sub-national, national and international levels); ii) 10 respondents from institutions of government (across all six countries); iii) 23 Cordaid staffs and technical/thematic experts; and iv) another 26 responded representing media, CSOs outside the programme. Also looking at themes: the evaluation consulted: 29 respondents for Security and Access to Justice for all; 38 for inclusive and engendered peace; 12 for Accountable and responsive health services; and 34 for Extractives/Inclusive economic growth.

Ultimately, reaching **140** respondents meant that the evaluation considered and depended on a rich and elaborate portfolio of data. Moreover, respondents were spread effectively across all themes, countries and categories of partners ensuring a balance of perspectives. Also, the fact that the evaluation consulted 34 external stakeholders (representing 26% of total respondents) was useful for substantiation, eliminating bias and ensuring reliability of the findings and conclusions presented in this report.

Tables 1 and 2 give a detailed summary of the stakeholders the evaluation sampled and the response rate achieved per country, thematic area and stakeholder category.


### **2.4. What We Did with the Data - Analysis and Presentation of Findings**

The main approach used to analyse evaluation data was thematic/content analysis. Audio recordings from the interviews were transcribed with the text transcripts forming the core portfolio of the new evaluation data. Data analysis was guided by questions in the Evaluation Criteria (Annex 2). Analysis was first done at country level (per trajectory) and then stepped up to programme level analyses, where all outcomes and reflections on conduct of the programme were considered. Findings are presented according to the evaluation questions highlighted in the ToR, and further illustrated along themes, categories of outcomes, trajectories, specific countries and level of implementation. The evaluation team first developed country reports with preliminary findings as a basis of the outcome validation workshops. These, together with feedback from the workshops, were used to synthesise and develop an overall programme-wide report of the end term evaluation. Findings are presented in the form of descriptive text, tables, figures, and verbatim quotes.

## 2.5. How Outcomes were Analysed – Attribution and Weighting

To effectively analyse data produced from the outcome harvesting and from interviews with stakeholders, the evaluation team used a framework for attribution and weighting informed by the objectives of the evaluation, and developed in close consultation with Cordaid during inception. To do this, we applied the framework, considering all the 754 harvested outcomes as reported by partners across all the six countries and at international level along all the five trajectories implemented by the programme. This was considered alongside emerging themes on key results from as documented from the 140 Key informant interviews. The process is depicted on the schema on Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Outcome Clustering, Validation and Substantiation Process



1. **Clustering outcomes into high-level results:** The analysis began by considering outcomes per country and clustering them to arrive at strong high-level results. At this stage, the evaluation team coalesced outcomes that appeared to reflect the same results and arrived at a few strong outcomes guided by partners' reflections of their contribution to the overall goal of strengthening the social contract. The evaluation utilised the ToC to identify where the high-level outcomes fell along the key strategies in the ToC (capacity development, enabling environment and policy influencing). This facilitated interrogation of the outcomes to identify the ones that strongly linked to or contributed to strengthening the social contract.
2. **Qualitative ranking of outcomes based on their significance:** The evaluation qualitatively ranked the outcomes from the most significant to least significant based on partners' understanding of their level of significance to the achievement of the goals of the programme as per the ToC. Partners provided a numerical percentage to each outcome in the outcome harvesting documents but also gave indications in the KIs on significance of the outcomes and degree of attribution of the SP programme to their attainment. This culminated into a refined compendium of key outcomes for each country that were presented at outcome validation workshops in all six countries.
3. **Contextualisation and substantiation at outcome validation forums:** The workshops included reflection on the strength and relevance of the synthesised outcomes and further review of contribution and attribution for the outcomes to the programme. During the validation workshops, partners also were offered a chance to reflect on the most significant changes/outcomes and to gauge the importance of the outcomes considering the varying contexts of fragility and civic space. The evaluation thus ended up with country specific lists of outcomes organised by trajectory; triangulated and substantiated by different stakeholders (partners and external stakeholders). The evaluation team then embarked on final synthesis; coalescing all outcomes per trajectory to arrive at a list of programme-wide outcomes.

## 2.6. Limitations of the Evaluation – Some Challenges

The evaluation encountered some challenges that may have influenced the quality of data relied upon for analysis and conclusions drawn. The most notable and consequential challenge was the Covid-19 pandemic. The prevalence of the pandemic throughout the evaluation period prevented the evaluation team from travelling to the six implementation countries for physical data collection as planned during inception. This meant that there were respondents that could not be reached especially external ones like government officers and other stakeholders that were not significantly involved in the programme during implementation. This category of respondents was however necessary to balance the data and increase the validity of information utilised to conduct the evaluation. Notably, the evaluation was unable to consult sufficient number of external respondents, particularly from government – the evaluation reached 58.8% of targeted government respondents as shown in table 1.

## 2.7. Mechanisms for Verification and Reducing bias

This being a largely qualitative research work, depending on perspectives of partners and other stakeholders, normally susceptible to bias, there was need for reduction of bias. The evaluation therefore employed the following mechanisms to ensure verification, substantiation and overall dependability of information relied upon for analyses and conclusions presented in this report.

- **The high number of interviews:** The evaluation pursued and reached a considerably high number of respondents (140). This ensured that it considered and depended on a rich and elaborate portfolio of data. Moreover, respondents were spread effectively across all themes, countries and categories of partners ensuring a balance of perspectives.
- **Clustering of Outcomes:** During analysis, the evaluation effectively clustered outcomes – to arrive at high level outcomes, hence not necessarily relying on outcomes directly documented or perceived by individual respondents. As such, the clustering helped to highlight major/key results perceived by respondents across the board. These were further confirmed in the interviews and validation forums.
- **Variety of Stakeholders consulted:** The evaluation designed a sample of respondents rich with a variety of stakeholders. This included CSOs (at sub-national, national and international levels), Cordaid Staffs and thematic experts, external stakeholders (like government officials, media and other observers) and the Dutch MoFA officials. The fact that this constellation of stakeholders confirmed tendencies, not only repeating the same results, but also showing consistency over time with older documented results still highlighted, assured reliability of the data.
- **Triangulation:** The evaluation consulted and utilised different types and sets of information – both existing data, put together by programme partners and Cordaid staffs, and new data collected through in-depth interviews. Using these various data sources facilitated verification and substantiation.
- **Validation by external stakeholders:** The evaluation included and consulted a substantive proportion of external stakeholders in the sample - drawn from government, media and CSOs not involved in implementation of the SP programme. These accounted for 26% of total respondents consulted during the evaluation. Given the limited involvement of external stakeholders in the programme, the evaluation is confident that this provided sufficient information for triangulation and substantiation of outcomes collected using the Outcome Harvesting Technique.
- **Joint validation meetings.** There were also joint validation meetings to validate and query the key outcomes and findings of the evaluation. These happened in all six countries and also at global level (programme wide) involving all country offices and Cordaid staffs and experts.

Overall, the evaluation remains confident in the approaches employed in obtaining the portfolio of data consulted during the evaluation, upon which the findings outlined in this report are premised. Through triangulation – consulting multiple categories of stakeholders and different data types the evaluation ensured that the data consulted during the evaluation sufficed considering the circumstances.

Table 1: KII Sample computation and distribution by implementation context and category of stakeholders

Implementation context	Targeted					Reached					Response Rate				
	CSO Partners	Govt	Cordaid Technical Staff	Others (CSOs, Media, Academia)	Total	CSO Partners	Govt	Cordaid Technical Staff	Others (CSOs, Media, Academia)	Total	CSO Partners	Govt	Cordaid Technical Staff	Others (CSOs, Media, Academia)	Total
Burundi	9	2	2	3	16	11	3	2	2	17	111.1%	150.0%	100.0%	66.7%	106.3%
CAR	11	2	2	2	17	15	0	2	5	22	136.4%	0.0%	100.0%	250.0%	129.4%
DRC	18	4	2	5	29	15	2	1	6	24	83.3%	50.0%	50.0%	120.0%	82.8%
Nigeria	7	2	2	3	14	10	1	2	4	17	142.9%	50.0%	100.0%	133.3%	121.4%
South Sudan	14	3	2	4	23	15	1	3	4	23	107.1%	33.3%	150.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Afghanistan	10	4	2	2	18	7	3	3	5	18	70.0%	75.0%	150.0%	150.0%	100.0%
International	8	-	6	-	14	9	-	10	-	19	112.5%	0.0%	166.7%	0.0%	135.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>82</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>105.2%</b>	<b>58.8%</b>	<b>127.8%</b>	<b>136.8%</b>	<b>106.9%</b>

Table 2: KII Sample Computation and distribution by thematic areas and contexts

Thematic Area	Afghanistan		Burundi		CAR		DRC		Nigeria		South Sudan		International L&A		Total		
	Targeted	Reached	Targeted	Reached	Targeted	Reached	Targeted	Reached	Targeted	Reached	Targeted	Reached	Targeted	Reached	Targeted	Reached	Response Rate
Inclusive and engendered peace	4	1	7	8	9	11	8	4	-	-	7	4	1	1	36	29	81%
Security and Access to Justice for all	4	6	7	7	6	9	7	4	-	-	7	9	-	3	31	38	123%
Accountable and responsive health services	4	4	-	-	-	-	3	7	-	-	-	-	-	1	7	12	171%
Extractives/Inclusive economic growth	4	4	-	-	-	-	9	8	12	15	7	7	1	-	33	34	103%
Space for civil society	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	1	2	200%
Cordaid Technical Staffs	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	3	6	10	18	23	128%
Dutch MoFA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	2	5	2	40%
<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>107%</b>


## SECTION THREE - RESULTS OF L&A

### 3.0. Introduction

The evaluation was tasked to present results in the areas where the programme could be construed to have contributed to strengthening of the social contract in all the implementation contexts. In this section, we highlight the key outcomes of the programme across all five trajectories as implemented both in the six countries and at international level by three CSO partners and international lobbyists. This is guided by two key questions - which reported results are most significant considering situations of limited civic space, levels of fragility, and political economy contexts? Which of the results (based on a selection of most significant results) are substantiated by other stakeholders? In this section, we begin with establishing an understanding of the concept of the social contract to provide the basis for discussion of the key outcomes. This is done to put into context the results and to effectively indicate how they relate to the overall goal of the programme – strengthening the social contract.

### 3.1. Establishing the concept of the Social Contract

At the core of “responsive” state-building especially for fragile contexts is the idea of the - social contract understood in terms of an effective political process through which citizens and the state can negotiate mutual demands, obligations, and expectations ([Jones et al., 2008](#); [Whaites, 2008](#)). According to the [UNDP \(2012\)](#), successful peacebuilding and post conflict state-building processes must be transformative and create space for a wider set of actors – including, but not limited to, representatives of women, young people, victims and marginalized communities; community and religious leaders; civil society actors; and refugees and internally displaced persons – to participate in public decision-making on all aspects of post-conflict governance and recovery (UN, 2012:11).



The concept of the social contract is an old one. One of the first thinkers to address the concept of the social contract was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He viewed it in the context of creation of a political community predicated on an agreement to forfeit some rights in return for some other benefits; a conscious effort to achieve an egalitarian governance system, while still respecting and guaranteeing the most fundamental individual freedoms and rights. Understanding of the concept has since evolved and definitions of the concept of social contract continue to crystalise. The OECD DAC refers to the social contract as a process for bargaining, articulating and mediating society’s expectations of the state. According to UNDP, the social contract refers to processes by which everyone in a political community, either explicitly or tacitly, consents to state authority, thereby limiting some of her or his freedoms, in exchange for the state’s protection of their universal human rights and security and for the adequate provision of public goods and services. This agreement calls for individuals to comply with the state’s laws, rules, and practices in pursuit of broader common goals, such as security or protection, and basic services ([UNDP, 2016](#)).

### 3.2. Key Outcomes – Results of the SP programme

In order to highlight results of the programme, the evaluation interrogated its outcomes to identify areas where they linked significantly to strengthening of the social contract. The interrogation utilised the programme’s Theory of Change (ToC) considering how the three strategies - Capacity Development, Enabling Environment and Policy Influencing impacted delivery of the results.

Overall, the evaluation found evidence of many instances where the programme made substantive contributions to strengthening the social contract. In this section, we present these key results that represented the most significant contributions of the programme to strengthening the social contract. Table 1.4 below represents a summary of these top-line results succinctly discussed in the section.<sup>1</sup>

Table 3: Key Results of the SP Programme

ToC Strategies	Key Results of the SP programme
Capacity Development	1. A general improvement in capacities of CSOs to carry out L&A work was evident. This included improved capacity to do evidence-based advocacy that was considered to have promoted improvement of policies, laws, institutions and processes across all the trajectories.
	2. Increased coordination by CSOs to engage governments and other relevant stakeholders to implement policies and take action to respond to the needs of their communities and constituencies. This included collaborative arrangements and coalitions amongst CSOs for more sustainable efforts aimed at influencing government institutions and other stakeholders.
	3. Strengthened and increased engagement of grassroots CSOs and community groups. This increased opportunities for inclusion of voices of women and other vulnerable groups.
Enabling Environment	4. More coordination and inclusion of CSOs in policy-making processes facilitated improvement of security and access to justice; increased inclusion and active engagement of women and youth in policy-making and electoral processes; and promoted more openness and accountability in extractives sector across the relevant six countries involved in the SP programme.
	5. Establishment of mechanisms for community dialogue improved relations between citizens and security actors, as a result of L&A work and awareness creation by CSOs partners.
	6. More actions and commitment by government towards enabling peace and reconciliation processes in CAR, including involvement of victims and providing necessary support.
	7. SP programme partners (CSOs, Cordaid and Dutch MOFA) and policymakers and politicians in The Netherlands and other EU countries provided crucial support to CSOs and advocated for opening up of Civic Space and enabling environment for CSOs in many of the targeted countries.
Policy Influencing	8. Legislative reform and/or development. Partner CSOs contributed to: i) development of legislative mechanisms for promoting health financing (especially in Afghanistan and DRC); improvement of legal framework for governance in the extractives sector – including considerations on community development, transparency and accountability, and mining taxation; and iii) legal reforms that promoted access to justice especially for women and vulnerable groups.
	9. Substantive increases in financing for the health sector in DRC and Afghanistan, facilitated by L&A work led by CSO partners in the SP programme. This included capacity development for government agencies in DRC and Afghanistan on design and implementation of Universal Healthcare Coverage (UHC).
	10. Operationalisation of mobile courts, improving court procedures, providing legal aid and deploying more judges enhanced access to justice for women and the vulnerable.
	11. Policy and institutional reform facilitated by L&A work of SP partners increased access security through establishment of more mechanisms for policing - better mapping, deployment and funding of police, and iv) Feedback mechanisms established for receipt of complaints.
	12. Increased government initiative and commitment to promote participation of women and youth in peace and security processes.

<sup>1</sup> A detailed description and substantiation of all results of the programme is provided on Annex 2 for more rigorous appreciation of the outcomes of the programme.

### 3.2.1. Capacity Development

The programme's ToC, held that if CSOs are capacitated with knowledge, the tools to build evidence, and the capacities to negotiate with and influence power holders AND the enabling environment for civil society in fragile contexts is strengthened THEN civil society organisations will effectively engage in lobby and advocacy on behalf of the populations they represent to influence policies, systems and practices. As such, the evaluation assessed the extent to which outcomes/results indicated improvements in capacity of CSOs to carry out advocacy and lobby work towards influencing policy. This was considered a significant marker of progress towards strengthening the social contract. Notably, in the area of capacity development, the evaluation documented three major outcomes discussed as follows:

- 1. A general improvement in capacities of CSOs to carry out L&A work (both at national and international levels) was evident. This included improved capacity to do evidence-based advocacy – generating and infusing research/evidence to back L&A work. This was argued by respondents to have facilitated successes in improvement of policies, laws, institutions and processes across all the trajectories.** In South Sudan, improved capacity in L&A amongst partner CSOs increased commitment and action from government to address oil pollution and facilitate prudent sharing and management of oil revenues especially disbursement of 2% and 3% oil revenues to communities and States. It also contributed to more willingness by petroleum stakeholders to implement provisions of the Petroleum Act 2012 and address Oil pollution. In Nigeria, CSO partners conducted L&A activities and engaged local communities on keeping key players in the clean-up process of the Niger Delta accountable. This contributed to increased initiative and commitment from institutions of government responsible for implementation of the clean-up of the Niger Delta; led to more funding and operationalization of HYPREP a key institution in the clean-up. Also, partners in CAR and DRC improved their capacities in security sector reform, justice reform and conducting security and justice sector assessments through training facilitated by ASSN. In DRC, improved capacity for L&A amongst CSOs also facilitated enlisting of support from EU institutions for reasonable exit of MONUSCO. EU delegation and representation appreciated Congolese CSOs' call for phased exit of MONUSCO and prioritization of development and security support to the Congolese government. At international level, CSO partners conducted joint L&A work on conflict minerals targeting different stakeholder groups in Brussels. In Afghanistan, improvements in L&A capacities of CSO partners was augured to have facilitated push for increase in health sector financing and for inclusion of women in the peace process. CSOs lobbied MoF and MoPH, health and budget committees of parliament that lead to increase in 2020 health sector budget. **This outcome was important because it was at the core of the programme's ToC that aimed to work with CSOs at country level (both national and local) to improve their capacities to engage governments and other stakeholders to improve responsiveness to needs of relevant communities. Considering these very fragile contexts, having CSOs develop capability to organise, strategise, identify issues and duty bearers to engage was considered a significant outcome by most of the respondents.**
- 2. Increased coordination by CSOs to engage governments and other relevant stakeholders to implement policies and take action to respond to the needs of their communities and constituencies. This included creation of collaborative arrangements and coalitions amongst CSOs for more sustainable efforts aimed at influencing government institutions and other stakeholders.** In DRC, increased mobilization, coordination and engagements amongst CSOs and local communities (in Lubumbashi, Likasi, SAKANIA, Kolwezi and Fungurume) facilitated identification of issues discussed with mining companies and the management of funds for community development. In Afghanistan, a network of CSOs established in Parwan Province facilitated monitoring of deviations in labour, social and environmental conditions in the extractive

sector. Also, in Afghanistan, women advocates (through AWN) organized in a lobby network to share women concerns on peace talks with High Peace Council and advocate for role of women peace talk; Women representatives had consultation meetings with German, US, Turkey and Canada embassies to lobby for support. In Nigeria, this facilitated implementation of the clean-up process and strengthened work on alternative livelihoods for affected communities. In South Sudan, increased coordination amongst CSOs and communities facilitated mechanisms for addressing GBV – increasing reporting of cases; community awareness. CSO network on GBV in Wau developed an action plan to fight GBV that enabled SGBV survivors to share experiences and establish a survivors' network to engage the decision makers. In CAR, coordination and collaboration amongst education sector actors increased sensitization and capacity development on tackling GBV. This included creation of AFECA – a collaborative instrument for education sector GBV Actors. In New York, CSOs organized to work on common agenda on 1325 to influence implementation agenda and report by UN in 2020. 40 women human rights defenders and organizations from Burundi, CAR, DRC, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda convened and defined a creative common vision and agenda for feminist peacebuilding and collective action. The Grand Bargain Friends of Gender Group and UN Women convened a consultation to discuss how to influence outcome of the Africa regional conference through Work Stream on localisation, to ensure a gender-responsive localisation and participation. **This result was important because it represented improvement in ability of civil society to organise, coordinate and collaborate to increase their voice and capability to engage and negotiate with government and other stakeholders for their inclusion and participation in governance processes in the various countries involved in the programme. It represented empowerment of civil society that acts in legitimate interest of communities and constituencies. It evidenced significant progress towards strengthening relations between society and governments in the various contexts that respondents argued had strong implications on strengthening the social contract.**

- 3. Strengthened and increased engagement of grassroots CSOs and community groups. This increased opportunities for inclusion of voices of women and other vulnerable groups especially in the extractives sector.** In Nigeria, this increased awareness of communities in the Niger Delta on: impact of oil pipeline vandalism, bunkering and artisanal refining; alternative livelihoods, implementation and monitoring of emergency measures, conflict management, and integration of ESHRIA and biodiversity audits. In DRC, this contributed to increased awareness amongst communities on extractives sector processes – like mining cycle and facilitated local communities to develop development committees, harmonized Local Development Plans, and set up bank accounts for ETDs for managing resources from royalties. In South Sudan, this facilitated community groups in Melut to: engage Governor on establishment of community development Committee (CDC); dialogue on issues facing local communities as a result of oil exploitation; document disease cases related to oil pollution; and awareness raising on oil pollution and reporting community grievances to County and State Authorities (in unity and Upper Nile). **This outcome evidenced the contribution of the programme towards building capacities of CSOs to engage local communities and improve relations between communities and government. For many of the contexts where there was a history of disgruntled citizens (especially in extractives producing communities like in DRC and South Sudan), with little confidence in government, this represented a significant step towards strengthening the social contract.**



### 3.2.2. Enabling Environment

The programme's ToC also held that where enabling environment for civil society in fragile contexts is strengthened then civil society organisations will effectively engage in lobby and advocacy on behalf of the populations they represent to influence policies, systems and practices, resulting in raised awareness of power holders of the needs and priorities of communities, acknowledgement by all stakeholders of the importance of seriously engaging civil society in policy processes and multi stakeholder dialogue and cooperation and better laws, policies and regulations, monitoring of its implementation and improved public and private sector resource allocation and investments in fragile areas.

Congruently, the [UN Development report 2012](#), reviewed governance interventions in fragile settings and concurred that effective approaches to improving the social contract in fragile and conflict-affected contexts must include fostering resilient societies, primarily by promoting robust state–society and society–society relations. The evaluation thus interrogated results of the programme to identify and highlight outcomes that indicated contribution towards improved relations between government and civil society (assumed to be representing legitimate interests of communities). Whilst the evaluation noted several outcomes that related to fostering of conducive environment for CSO coordination and collaboration with governments across all six countries, it noted the following four high level outcomes as most relevant and worth highlighting.

- 1. More coordination and inclusion of CSOs in policy-making processes facilitated improvement of security and access to justice; increased inclusion and active engagement of women and youth in policy-making and electoral processes; and promoted more openness and accountability in extractives sector across the relevant six countries involved in the SP programme.** In Burundi, MDAs designated focal points to support CSOs in activities on youth and women empowerment, peace and security and decision-making processes based on resolutions 1325 and 2250. In South Sudan, there was inclusion of CSOs in the National Technical Committee for the fight against GBV, and establishment of the Joint Rapid Intervention and UMIRR that reinforced State-CSO partnership on handling GBV cases. Also, there were engagements between CSOs and the TGoNU that discussed review of laws (Police Act, National security Act, Prisons Act) and Law Review Commission pledged to incorporate civil society recommendations. In Afghanistan, a network/platform of CSOs facilitated more engagement of justice actors and CSOs for collaboration and sharing information on cases of human rights violations. In CAR, increased coordination and collaborative work amongst (CSOs and government) saw inclusion of SP partners – LCDH and victim associations – in the APPR-RCA Executive Monitoring Committee. This facilitated advocacy for redeployment of Défense and Security Forces in Alindao, Bambari and BRIA cities; and development of common working framework with Begoua community leaders and the 8 districts of Bangui to facilitate victim identification. In Nigeria, there was more joint collaborative work between CSOs and institutions of government around implementation of clean-up activities in such areas as creation of environmental desks in key MDAs, review of EIA Act and capacity development targeting government offices. In DRC, coordination and engagements between CSOs, artisanal miners, government in capacity building on development of cooperative companies, exposition of the mining law; establishment of register of cooperative societies; establishment of cooperative companies – Lugushwa, Kamituga; demand for commitment by mining companies on CSR, fair compensation and restoration of livelihoods, local development for Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining. **Overall, this was an indicator of improvement of the environment for CSOs to operate and increasing openness of institutions of government to include CSOs in important policy processes. It gave indications that the programme made contributions to improving relations between CSOs working on behalf of or in the interest of communities and willingness of governments to include citizens in policy making processes that was considered by many respondents as an indicator of strengthening of the social contract in these contexts.**

- 2. Establishment of mechanisms for community dialogue improved relations between citizens and security actors as a result of L&A work and awareness creation by CSOs partners.** In DRC, partners contributed to establishment of CLSPs (Local Council for Proximity Security); Joint operations between CLSP and security service; establishment of village forums - Kalehe, Uvira and Fizi; and commitment by Commissioners to implement CLSP plans that promote collaborative local dialogue among community members on security and justice issues. In South Sudan, local communities in Baselia, Bagari and Bazia became more confident in interacting with security actors - Major General Joshua with Division Five visited areas occupied by the army to prepare them for the return of IPDs; Free movement of Opposition in Wau Town and the Army to the opposition areas. Considering that these were areas that experienced significant tension with government security actors and non-state actors (like rebel groups), having mechanisms for increased dialogue was considered by many respondents as an important step in restoring trust in security sector institutions and building between relations with communities. **This was an important result as it represented easing of tensions and openness to dialogue that are tenets of the social contract.**
- 3. More actions and commitment by government towards enabling peace and reconciliation processes in CAR, including involvement of victims and providing necessary support.** This was evidenced by: participation of victims in mediation between government and 14 armed Groups – with CVJRR steering committee incorporating partner CSOs (LCDH) and victim associations (AVED and AVUG); and inclusion of victims in drafting memorandum to Minister of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation, calling on government to ensure security of property and persons in the provinces affected by the crisis in CAR. **This outcome evidenced the improvement in the environment for operations of CSOs. Despite the delicate security situation and ongoing processes in pursuit of peace, CSOs in the programme managed to insert and contribute to the crucial processes on peace and reconciliation. It evidenced willingness of government to work with civil society and other representatives of individuals and communities. This was considered by some respondents to have fostered inclusion and positive engagements that were argued to work towards strengthening the social contract in relevant areas in CAR.**
- 4. SP programme partners (CSOs, Cordaid and Dutch MOFA), and policymakers and politicians in The Netherlands and other EU countries provided crucial support to CSOs and contributed to joint advocacy for opening up of Civic Space and enabling environment for CSOs in many of the countries involved in the programme.** CSPPS continued to play a critical role in supporting CSO engagement in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations (FCAS). Cordaid was included in the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness (CPDE) steering committee. This facilitated sharpening of content of FCAS tailored monitoring framework, which provides evidence and accountability by development partners on progress in implementing effective development co-operation at country, regional and global level. Dutch MOFA, policymakers and politicians in The Netherlands and other EU countries provided crucial support to CSOs in Afghanistan, DRC and Burundi, CSO partners (Cordaid, Hivos and Open State Foundation) promoted awareness on open Government; open data. Developed data portal - <https://openstate.eu/nl/openmultilaterals> to increase accessibility of information on awarded contracts to the public. Together these outcomes played a critical role in providing support to CSOs in the relevant countries in advocating for more conducive environment and pushing back on laws and policies that sought to limit the space for civil society to operate.

### 3.2.3. Policy Influencing

Ultimately, the concept of social contract envisions the duty of the state to protect universal human rights and security of citizens and provide them adequate public goods and services in exchange for limiting some of their freedoms. Congruently, the SP programme ToC also held that legitimate and representative CSOs are best placed to put the needs and rights of communities on the political agenda, influencing policy processes and hold state and private sector actors accountable locally, nationally and internationally, by sharing evidence-based knowledge, advocating on behalf of all people including marginalized groups.

The evaluation thus reviewed the key outcomes to highlight results that evidenced successes of the programme in facilitating CSOs to influence public policy. It noted several instances where CSOs succeeded in contributing tangible relevant policy proposals and working with governments and other stakeholders to implement such policies. The following outcomes were highlighted and considered as some of the most significant in this category.

1. **Legislative reform and/or development. Partner CSOs contributed in many ways to: i) development of legislative mechanisms for promoting health financing (especially in Afghanistan and DRC); improvement of legal framework for governance in the extractives sector – including considerations on community development, transparency and accountability, and mining taxation; and iii) legal reforms that promoted access to justice especially for women and vulnerable groups.** These included: successful review of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act in Nigeria. Promulgation of Mining Code - Law No. 18/001 of 2018 in DRC, which involved substantive contributions by CSOs and a great deal of awareness creation for community members, miners by local media and prompted mining companies to start paying royalties directly to the provinces (25%) and decentralized territorial entities (15%) (ETDs) resources expected to fund community development projects. This also included review of draft law on health cooperatives (mutuelles de santé) and approval of Social Health Insurance Law in DRC; Promulgation of PPP law and approval Social Health Insurance in Afghanistan. Further, in security and justice trajectory, CSO partners in DRC contributed to promulgation of Decree N ° 13/041 of 2013 that facilitated creation of CLSP (Local Council for Proximity Security) and those in Burundi, pushed for enactment of law on the code of ethics of magistrates.
2. **Substantive increases in financing for the health sector in DRC and Afghanistan, facilitated by L&A work led by CSO partners in the SP programme. This included capacity development for government agencies in DRC and Afghanistan on design and implementation of Universal Healthcare Coverage (UHC).** In Afghanistan, CSOs lobbied MoF and MoPH, health and budget committees of parliament which lead to increased budget in 2020 health sector budget. In DRC, CSO partners contributed to significant increases in budget subsidies (in 2019 and pledges for 2020) for MUSA in Kivu. There was notable support by key government officials for calls to increase the budget allocated to social security. Commitment by development partners like Swiss Cooperation for MUSA; Establishment of committees and taskforces to advocate for and influence Provincial Commission in charge of sector budget analysis to include mutual health insurance in the 2020 budget; Lobby for reimbursement of blocked MUSA funds. Inclusion of multiple stakeholders and community members in mutual health insurance (MUSA) in DRC. This was augmented by international L&A work that promoted progress towards implementation of UHC in Afghanistan and DRC.
3. **Operationalisation of mobile courts, improving court procedures, providing legal aid and deploying more judges enhanced access to justice for women and the vulnerable.** In South Sudan, the programme contributed to operationalization of Mobile Courts, which contributed to increased access to justice for women and vulnerable groups in marginalised areas and supported

the justice system to handle more cases and reduce backlogs. In DRC, this included contribution to increase of budget (by 30%) for provision of legal aid for vulnerable groups in South Kivu; increase court hours; deployment of more judges/magistrates leading to faster delivery of judgements. In Burundi, MoJ signed the National Legal Aid Strategy with recommendations for the implementation of legal aid law; Increased budget takes into account legal aid and action plan; progress toward revival of Legal Aid Commission; MoJ implementing the National Legal Aid Strategy's & set up legal and judicial support structures for vulnerable groups. In Afghanistan, it contributed to enhanced capacity of judges to improve performance of court Procedures (in Balkh, Kunduz, Nangrahar, Kandahar and Khost); monitoring of court sessions by CSOs, media and community representatives to record human rights violations; and establishment of complaint boxes; inclusion of women judges and women prosecutors.

4. **Policy and institutional reform facilitated by L&A work of SP partners increased access to security through establishment of more mechanisms for policing - better mapping, deployment and funding of police, and feedback mechanisms established for receipt of complaints.** In DRC, this included: improved mapping, deployment and funding of police in Kadutu, Bagira, Ibanda, Kabare; Capacity development for police in drafting of victim hearing minutes; observance of legal police custody hours and faster delivery of judgements. In South Sudan, this contributed to establishment of a squad of informed police officers willing to address human rights violation, increased outreach through community policing (in Bor); improved documentation and reporting of cases for evidential (in Imatong); Commissioners, Chiefs and other officials drafted a bill on community mediation; establishment of more police posts in critical areas (Mururai, Ifanyak and Iluhum in Torit); passing of bill on small arms control to regulate illegal carrying, use and movement of fire arms in Jonglei state legislative assembly.
5. **Establishment and implementation of mechanisms to address Gender-Based Violence (GBV) in South Sudan and CAR.** In South Sudan, establishment of police Special Protection Unit in Juba worked to reduce GBV cases; Institutional changes for handling GBV initiated continuation of family courts and training (Paramount) chiefs in handling GBV cases (incl. child marriages and child compensation); In CAR, creation of Listening Centres provided opportunity for pursuing, reporting and handling of GBV cases. This facilitated increased access to crucial safe spaces for GBV victims and referral mechanism for dealing with GBV cases. In DRC, promulgation of a new law (N ° 18-195) that outlines role of key government departments charged with responsibility of GBV; Parliament discussing Legal Aid Bill to provide care for GBV victims.
6. **Increased government initiative and commitment to promote participation of women and youth in peace and security processes.** In DRC, the programme contributed to creation of synergies between government agencies for implementation of NAP on PAN/R 1325; collection and integration of grassroots women aspirations in NAP 1325; inclusion of needs of women with disabilities in PAN1325. In Burundi, MIPTLD integrated youths in Joint Commission of Human Security; National Assembly amended articles 173 and 213 of the Constitution to favour women participation and a gender-sensitive charter established by MC&M. In Afghanistan, government invited women to participate in peace negotiations with Taliban, US and international Peace actors in Doha, Islamabad and Moscow. In South Sudan, there was increased inclusion of women in peace process facilitated by Women Peace and Security Forums.

### 3.3. Categorising the outcomes (L&A results)

To better understand the results, the evaluation did an analysis to determine the categories (L&A capacity, enabling environment, policy influencing) within which the programme can claim to have contributed to change (towards restoration of the social contract). The key question here was: in which categories (L&A capacity, enabling environment, improved policies and policy implementation) can the programme claim to have contributed to results?

The SP Programme implemented five trajectories - inclusive and engendered peace, security & access to justice, inclusive health, extractives and civil society space across six country contexts and at international level. We utilised the refined compendium of harvested outcomes organised in terms of those related to; i) capacity development, ii) enabling environment or iii) policy influencing. The evaluation compiled a total of 754 harvested outcomes by partners in all six countries and international level partners. A framework for categorising Lobby & Advocacy developed by the programme's PMEL team guided this analysis. These were then further validated by partners in all the six countries through workshops.

The evaluation established that the programme contributed to outcomes across all the three categories giving the indication that the ToC was indeed relevant and also that implementation of the programme did well in executing all interventions to respond to all the categories. Nonetheless, it was notable that the programme's performance across the three categories (at least measured by outcomes) was varied. Using the number of outcomes alone, it was notable that most of the outcomes were related to promotion of an enabling environment for CSOs to operate (reporting 298 outcomes - 40% of total outcomes). This was followed by capacity development (reporting 242 outcomes - 32% of total outcomes) and policy influencing (reporting 214 – 28% of total outcomes). This is illustrated on table 4.

Table 4: Categorisation of outcomes based on categories and trajectories

Trajectory	Categories			
	Capacity Development	Enabling environment	Policy influencing	Total
Inclusive & engendered peace	96(36%)	117(44%)	52(20%)	<b>265</b>
Security & access to justice	57(25%)	103(45%)	69(30%)	<b>229</b>
Extractives	65(40%)	51(31%)	48(29%)	<b>164</b>
Inclusive health	19(30%)	18(28%)	27(42%)	<b>64</b>
Civil Society Space	5(16%)	9(28%)	18(56%)	<b>32</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>298</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>754</b>

The evaluation noted, from annual reports, that the programme emphasised on capacity development component of the ToC during the initial stages of implementation (especially 2016 and 2017). However, in subsequent years, there was increased attention to enabling environment to facilitate active participation of partners (and other CSOs) in influencing policy processes. Most of the respondents indicated that considering the realities of the fragile contexts, the programme did well in policy influencing as much as it returned the least number of outcomes. Some argued that in fact, for capacity development to translate into effective L&A that influences or promotes policy change, implementation requires time. As such, it was understandable that the category of policy influencing returned fewer outcomes than the rest.

It is important to note that whilst the evaluation clustered and categorized outcomes, providing numbers and percentages across different categories, levels and trajectories, this analysis may have been affected by some intervening factors such as i) variances in effort and application of the strategies, and ii) capacity of reporting by implementing partners to code and categorise outcomes. Some argued that throughout implementation, some partners and stakeholders struggled with understanding the ToC and especially

categorisation of outcomes during outcome harvesting. As such, it is possible that some outcomes may have been categorised differently with improved capacity. Whilst this analysis may not be used to draw conclusions on the performance of the programme, it is illustrative and adds to the understanding of how each of the strategies may have played out in affecting the attainment of outcomes and overall conduct of the programme.

Along the five trajectories, the evaluation noted that inclusive and engendered peace reported most of the outcomes (265), followed by security and access to justice (229), extractives (164), inclusive health (64), and improved civil society space (32). According to most of the partners, the variance in number of outcomes per trajectory is attributable to varying levels of effort (interventions) invested by the programme into the five trajectories and processes of outcome harvesting and reporting. Some trajectories were implemented across all six countries while others like extractives and health in just two (DRC and Afghanistan).

As illustrated on figure 3, there was significant variance in terms of where the outcomes fell along the five trajectories. Under engendered peace, most outcomes were related to promotion of an enabling environment (44%), followed by capacity development (36%) and policy influencing (20%). In the security and access to justice trajectory, the programme achieved most outcomes in the enabling environment category (45%), followed by policy influencing (30%) and capacity development (25%).




Figure 3: Categorisation of outcomes per trajectory

In the extractives trajectory, most of the outcomes (40%) were related to capacity development, followed by promotion of an enabling environment (31%) and policy influencing (29%). A general improvement in capacities of CSOs to carry out L&A work towards improvement of extractives policy, laws and processes was recorded, especially at the sub-national/local levels. Improvements in L&A capacities of CSOs reportedly promoted increased coordination and engagement with institutions of government that contributed to progress in reform of laws (like review of the EIA in Nigeria), implementation of policies (like disbursement of 2% and 3% of oil revenues to States and communities in South Sudan) and led to more openness and accountability in the extractives sector (like in DRC with reform of the mining code and communities demanding payment of royalties and CSR from mining companies).

Notably, in the inclusive health trajectory, the programme achieved most outcomes in policy influencing category (with 42% of total outcomes), capacity development (30%) and enabling environment (28%). According to respondents, concerted L&A at national and international levels geared towards promoting inclusive health service provision led to substantive increases in health financing in Afghanistan and DRC. Also, policy and legislative mechanisms were established for promoting health financing in the two countries

that included development of national Strategy on Universal Health Coverage and legislation on mutual health insurance (*Mutuelles de sante*) in DRC.

Lastly, in the civil society space trajectory, the programme achieved most outcomes under policy influencing (56%), while 28% was attributable to promotion of an enabling environment for enhanced civil space, and 16% to capacity development in this trajectory. Most of the outcomes in this trajectory were achieved at international level though with substantive relevance to country situations (like in DRC, Afghanistan and Burundi).

### 3.4. Outcomes at local, national and international levels

The evaluation also explored the scope of L&A outcomes achieved by the programme in order to provide an understanding of the levels (local, national and international) of intervention the programme is better placed to focus on for more results, and some of the intrigues (challenges and opportunities) at play that may have impacted success at these levels. The key question here was – at which levels (local, national and international) can the programme claim to have contributed to results? For this analysis, the evaluation also utilised the data from the harvested outcomes and augmented this with feedback from key informant interviews with partners.

On this question, it emerged that, that majority of outcomes were achieved at or relevant at national level. Notably, 46% (347 outcomes) appeared to be attained at or benefiting stakeholders at national level followed by 42% (315 outcome) at subnational level (State, province, district or community) and 12% (92 outcomes) achieved at international level. This is illustrated on the figure below.




Figure 4: Categorisation of outcomes based on levels they were achieved

CSO partners at country levels were the main actors in the L&A interventions, while Cordaid led in international L&A by welcoming partner CSOs to join international networks for influencing international frameworks, actors, and policy spaces. According to respondents, this partly explains why most of the outcomes reflect benefits and progress at country level (national or subnational). Nonetheless, the fact that a substantive proportion (92 outcomes representing 12%) of the outcomes were reportedly achieved at international level or related to work done at international level underscores the mutually supportive and reinforcing nature of the programme’s national and international L&A work. This is especially because the programme’s international L&A included an overarching trajectory (space for civil society) through which it worked towards safeguarding the space for civil society to speak out and participate in public policy making processes. It was notable that effort went into linking national and international perspectives in order to strengthen capacity of national and local SP partners to understand the relevance of policy discussion at international level.

A substantive number of outcomes (315 representing 42% of total harvested outcomes) were also realised at the sub-national/local levels – linked directly to communities at the local levels, especially women and youth. There was evidence of substantive progress made by the programme on strengthening social contract at subnational levels (community, state, districts). For instance, in Nigeria, involvement of women and community leaders in the clean-up process in Niger Delta increased awareness and understanding of the role of government. Role of grassroots women’s organisations like Kebetkache showed that legitimate CSOs with strengthened lobby and advocacy capacities can become powerful forces of change. In South Sudan, reduction of tensions between army and civilians improved security and confidence in government, reinforcing the social contract. In DRC, development of mechanisms for Local dialogue (Local Council for Proximity Security) also improved security and contributed to better relations between citizens and security forces. Partners argued that evidence of outcomes achieved at local level lent credence to the programme’s assumption that the social contract can be strengthened on different levels: community level, district or provincial governance level, national level or international level. That in fragile contexts, the community level is often a good entry point when political space for civil society is limited and as such, legitimate CSOs with strengthened lobby and advocacy capacities can become powerful forces of change even in contexts where political space for civil society is limited.

This also evidenced the importance of establishing links between local, national, and international level L&A work. For instance, by strengthening capacity of local schools and teachers to combat GBV in school curricula the programme managed to get the Ministry of Education in CAR to change policy and increase national political will to fight GBV. It also strengthened the argument that in some cases, focusing on local level processes can provide an alternative strategy to circumvent political stagnation at the national level. In South Sudan, where there was little progress in the national peace dialogue and the IGAD-led process of revitalizing the peace process, one of the local CSO partners managed to successfully promote and strengthen local peace dialogues instead.



### 3.5. Implications of Context on L&A results

The evaluation endeavoured to establish how the political, social and economic contexts influenced attainment of programme outcomes. It also interrogated how the different contexts limited or fostered achievement of outcomes and how partners responded to changes within these contexts.

Given the fragility of the contexts in all the six implementation countries, the evaluation established that external issues had a significant influence on programme implementation on the whole. Such issues related to fluidity in the political environments, fragile peace processes, active conflict and diminished civic space had profound implications on when outcomes were achieved, the strength and durability of L&A achievements and amount of effort invested. Across the board, CSO partners indicated that whilst there were a lot of forces that emerged from the different contexts that they had no control over; they made adjustments in response in order to be effective and remain relevant. Below is a succinct discussion detailing the major contextual issues that impacted L&A results;

- **Weak social contract in the implementation contexts impacted programme activities and outcomes.** The SP Programme's objective of "capacitating change, restoring social contract in fragile contexts" informed contexts where it was implemented. The eroded social contract in the fragile contexts presented a major impediment to the implementation of the programme across the six countries. The six countries were characterised by mistrust between the people and the ruling governments. This was observable across all the countries. In Nigeria, historical injustices to the people in the Niger Delta region related to distribution of oil benefits and environmental pollution by oil companies resulted in mistrust of responsible government agencies by the people. In Burundi, historical differences between communities and the continued subjugation of CSOs and media by the government limited the effectiveness of activities of partners and effectiveness of programme interventions. In Afghanistan, mining communities are controlled by rebel groups who are intolerant to the government and any external parties, compounded with citizens who have long been alienated from the justice system. Similarly, such issues as mistrust between government and the people, political unrest and authoritarian governments, augmented with unaddressed socio-economic challenges greatly impacted the nature of activities by partners in the programme across the 6 countries. Nonetheless, the partners demonstrated ability to learn and adjust to adapt to the changing contexts. This included through complying with government regulations requiring MoUs and reports to relevant ministries; political context analyses and indirect lobby and advocacy strategies that allowed engagements even in the face of apathy or resistance from government. Further, through joint work and capacity development targeting institutions of government, partners gained inroads into policy making spaces and increased interactions with government agencies and the political class. Also, through active community sensitisations, media engagements and direct accountability to targeted beneficiary communities, partners managed in most cases to achieve buy-in, acceptance and ownership of some of the work and outcomes achieved.
- **The conflict and insecurity presented a threat to the safety of partners and execution of programme activities throughout the period of implementation.** Active and nascent conflict created humanitarian crises that limited programme activities since some areas were non-conducive for partners to operate in. For instance, in CAR, respondents noted that most of the activities were concentrated within or close to the capital Bangui. Other regions remained largely inaccessible due to insecurity. Similarly, in South Sudan, some States remained largely inaccessible due to active conflict and insecurity during programme implementation. Civil war of 2015 - 2016 led to a delay of commencement of the program. It also hindered freedom of movement making some areas inaccessible by partners. Frequent inter – community conflicts in areas outside Juba also presented a significant challenge in realization of outcomes, consequently more results were achieved at national level than at state level. In Bor, for example, programme activities had

to be suspended due to violence. Additionally, conflict among different pastoral communities created a lot of mistrust. Rebel controlled areas created a lot of tension making it un conducive for partners to work in. Partners faced challenges including having to negotiate with rebel groups to be allowed to access some implementation sites like Wau and Yei. In DRC, political crisis specifically in 2018, resulted in 'dead cities' with people deciding to stay indoors, this meant that programme activities had to be put on hold. Existence of armed groups especially in the East of DRC often led to violence (for example in Beni Butembo area), this significantly affected schedule of activities as it resulted in delays. In South Sudan and in Afghanistan, the ongoing civil war, concentrated in some provinces, continued to hinder receptiveness and effectiveness of programme interventions. Respondents noted that rebel groups and mafia maintained a strong grip of some regions, rendering them inaccessible and unviable for programme interventions. For instance, the provinces of Panjshir and Badakhshan were characterised by a lot of tension as communities remain largely hostile. Similarly, in Nigeria, the Niger Delta region is frequented by clashes and violence and these created an unsafe environment for partners to work in thus sometimes hindering monitoring of activities and even realisation of outcomes. Even so, through lobbying and advocacy efforts, capacity building, synergies among partners and collaborations with responsible authorities, partners in the programme were able to navigate the security challenges and carry out many of their planned activities. As such, whilst the programme partners implemented mechanisms to deal with the issues of insecurity and mitigate their effects, they remained a challenge that in many cases appeared out of control of the programme. The outcomes and conduct of the programme must therefore be viewed in the context of these limitations.

[The peace process itself was delayed for months, which also impacted the timetable of the project. While they were debating on the establishment of a new government, we had also to wait because the security insurance officials, national authorities, the whole government, and the governance system will be changed, so there was no point to engage them as they were, like outgoing authorities.] – CSO Partner, International

- **Restricted civic space remained a constant threat to the realisation of programme activities across most of the implementation contexts.** Partners noted that the limited civic space presented a threat to the operations of the CSOs, consequently realisation of the programme objectives. This was particularly notable in Burundi and South Sudan. In Burundi, partners indicated that during the electioneering period, the government offered a directive limiting implementation of youth-related activities without consultation with stakeholders. Some partners also indicated that politicians and some actors linked to government mobilised local authorities and the population against actions of CSOs with the intention of controlling the message they deliver and the work they do. There were also punitive and restrictive actions taken against some CSOs – like OAG that were suspended for months. Also, some CSOs in the programme like Burundi Bar Association pointed out that at some point, they couldn't access files of prisoners' dues to persistent mistrust between government and CSOs. In South Sudan, partners noted that there was a lot of intimidation for CSOs by government. The government imposed various legal hurdles, including imposing a requirement for CSOs to sign MoUs and seek approvals from the government before undertaking activities. Similarly, in Afghanistan, partners had to sign MoUs with government before conducting any activities. Overall, the various legal restrictions and burdensome compliance requirements by government had significant impact on the scope and conduct of activities by partners. Nonetheless, partners demonstrated increased capacity to navigate these restrictions and realise a substantive number of outcomes. Compliance with government directives, accountability to government through reporting, engaging government officials and agencies, and aligning programme activities with government objectives proved effective in navigating the narrow civic space. Additionally, strategic backing of the Dutch MOFA and reputation of Cordaid as a recognised international

development organisation proved useful in navigating the difficult terrain, particularly in Afghanistan and Burundi. As such, whilst the programme went in well aware of the contexts of restricted civic space, in fact set objectives and strategies to deal with this, it remained a problem. Further concerted work towards improving the enabling environment for CSOs is necessary to sustain progress towards strengthening the social contract in these countries.

[These countries were also selected because they are fragile and difficult contexts, so you have to deal with a situation where context is that like, for instance, the civic space could be limited, communication could be poor, and sometimes there could be insecurity] – CSO Partner, International

[The challenge with Burundi is a closed space; the civic space is not open so we couldn't do much at the national level in Burundi as much as we did in other countries. I don't even think its opened by now. They were very strict in terms of engaging with civil society organizations and because of the way they were sending partners away including international partners, like Cordaid, everybody had to be careful with what they say and what they do, so that they don't send them away, or even close their offices] – CSO Partner, International

- **The fluid political environment presented substantive challenges in conducting L&A and contributed to further restrictions in civic space that impacted programme outcomes.** Many respondents indicated that the fluid political environment in their countries significantly impacted the nature of outcomes attained throughout the duration of the programme. In Nigeria, discordance between the political parties leading at the national level and at the state level was also a major hindrance to community buy-in on activities related to the clean-up process. Elected leaders at State level affiliated to the opposition were less receptive to policy direction from the Federal government. This was evident in Rivers State where the State government appeared to ignore directives from the Federal government purely because of politics. Additionally, leaders at the local level were left out in decision making despite them been a direct link to the community. This created challenges when doing advocacy. In Afghanistan, frequent changes in the Afghan political environment created setbacks for the programme resulting in delays for planned activities. There was a lot of uncertainty with frequent transitioning of government officials that significantly affected L&A, as partners had to take a step back whenever a new official took office. Also, heightened political activity in Burundi, including the political upheaval in 2015, constitutional referendum in 2018 and the general elections were notable events that contributed to delayed commencement of the programme and the narrowed civic space in the country. Similarly, in DRC, politics and power tussles among the political class and among government agencies impacted outcomes of programme interventions, particularly in L&A. A notable example was the Presidency taking over the processes for development of the UHC strategy from the Ministry of Health in May 2019. This move meant partners working in the inclusive health trajectory had to adjust strategy to identify and engage Office of the President alongside initial work with the Ministry of Health.
- **Discordance between priorities of government and programme objectives and interventions sometimes limited engagements and effectiveness of L&A work at country level:** It was notable that in many of the contexts, there were times when government priorities did not sufficiently align with objectives and outcomes that programme partners pursued. This sometimes made it difficult to conduct L&A. For instance, in South Sudan, partners indicated that they found it difficult to continue engaging government officers when they were focussed on dealing with the humanitarian crisis and peace process. In Afghanistan, some respondents indicated that years of focus on the military/security sector in budget allocations meant that L&A for increased resource allocation to the health sector and focusing on accountability in the extractives sector was lot harder. In Nigeria, government bureaucracies reportedly slowed down programme activities as they focused on election process that led to delays, which in the long run slowed down visibility of progress. To deal with the issue of discordance in priorities, partners indicated that they endeavoured to adjust plans to align and work with government priorities. For instance, in DRC,

they followed movement of UHC strategy development processes from the Ministry of Health to the Presidency. Also, some partners indicated that they benefited from strategic backing from international players especially Dutch embassies that helped to bridge priority gaps. The influence of linkages between national and international advocacy was useful in making government to take interest in some of the programme's thematic areas.

- **There were notable capacity gaps among partners in the programme that impacted the nature outcomes and effectiveness of interventions, particularly at the onset of the programme.** The evaluation established that some partners, especially in CAR and Afghanistan, lacked sufficient capacity needed to implement activities and thus had to be dropped off the programme. This was attributed largely to situations of fragility and closed or shrinking civic spaces in some of the contexts (like in CAR, Burundi and South Sudan) that arguably impacted the general capacity of CSOs. Weak organisational structures and limited capacities in such core functions as M&E were identified as some of the gaps within local partner organisations. Small partner organisations, for instance in South Sudan and Afghanistan, highlighted that they lacked sufficient capacity in PMEL. In Afghanistan, CSOs were relatively young and thus required capacity strengthening through trainings and support. This took time away from actual programme work. To offset this challenge, Cordaid conducted capacity strengthening trainings for partners; this substantially equipped them with relevant skills and knowledge for effective programme implementation. This was actualised through capacity assessments, trainings, capacity building workshops (by Cordaid and external consultants), technical support by in-country Cordaid staffs, collaborations and exchange programmes.
- **Religious, traditional and cultural beliefs deeply entrenched in communities targeted by the programme had significant influence on outcomes.** Influenced by tradition, culture and religion, partners found interventions related to some sensitive issues as GBV challenging as they regarded as social taboos and could not be outwardly spoken of. In CAR, for instance, partners experienced difficulties when working to get victims to speak out and when sensitizing the communities about the risks of GBV. Also, the prominence of patriarchy in many of the communities targeted presented challenges with the inclusion of women in components of the programme like peace and security, electoral and policy making processes. However, through targeted awareness creation, L&A (at country and international levels) the programme made efforts to increase appreciation of the value of inclusion of women. In Burundi, for instance, partners such as REJA, AFRABU and AFJO, worked with men to be more receptive of women leadership. In Afghanistan and Nigeria, partners like Salah Consortium and Kebetkache with grassroots presence, endeavoured to penetrate and engage local communities. The integration of GBV within the framework of national education curriculum facilitated the training of teachers, who taught students on the importance of non-violence. Partners within these fragile contexts put a lot of effort in changing of mindsets and were able to actualise some outcomes as was the case in Burundi, DRC, South Sudan where there was substantive progress in inclusion of women political, and peace and security processes.
- **The outbreak of the global Covid-19 pandemic affected implementation of crucial components of the programme planned for 2020 and limited outcomes especially those related to policy influencing.** Being the last year of the implementation period, a lot of pre-planned programme activities were put on hold and realisation of some outcomes was slowed down. Imposition of restrictions on movement and gatherings by governments to curb the spread of Covid-19 rendered partners unable to carryout interventions that required congregation. Further, advocacy efforts at international level were also substantively affected due to closure of international borders. Notably, Cordaid and partners were able to adapt to new working ways and reorient programme activities in line with government directives put in place to stop the spread of

the virus and some outcomes were able to be realised as was expected. Nonetheless, the pandemic dealt a substantive blow to the programme and in the view of partners, significantly limited outcomes especially in the area of policy influencing that they hoped to achieve after years of capacity development and engagement of institutions of government.

[Then COVID came so we have to wait also for lifting of the lockdown because initially the lockdown was supposed to be for months. Many people didn't know how much time this COVID would take. We were trying to measure and balance what we need to do in the context of COVID-19] – CSO Partner, International

[I think COVID-19 is a very obvious one. This year, not a lot of our face-to-face activities have happened, very understandably so. We still managed to do quite a number of things online, but it has been difficult]. – CSO Partner International

[COVID has impacted negatively because of restrictions in movement. Some L&A activities were planned to be conducted on the ground, but the situation didn't allow that, so we had to wait for some months whether the situation would improve.] – CSO Partner, International

Overall, the programme implementation period was characterised and influenced by a number of events as outlined above at global, national and local levels. These, in one way or another, took away time from actual programme work and resulted in time constraints when trying to actualise activities within set timelines. Consequently, the required focus and effort was not fully realised in some programme activities and outcomes. Nonetheless, the programme's ToC sufficiently provided room for response to the rapidly changing and unpredictable contexts. This enabled the partners and programme at large to realign and readjust accordingly in response to these contextual challenges. Additionally, identifying synergies with relevant local actors and linkages with international actors enabled the programme to palliate difficult and sensitive contextual issues. Working with local partners enriched the programme (in fact were essential for dealing with the challenges) with contextual knowledge that allowed partners to foresee and respond effectively and appropriately to challenges. The evaluation thus concluded that the programme responded positively to the different contexts considering the circumstances and quality of outcomes actualized.

### **3.6. Effective strategies employed by partners**

The evaluation was tasked to identify some of the major strategies that were employed during implementation by partners to develop understanding of some effective interventions that could be pursued in similar interventions or in the next phase. The key question was - What types of interventions (strategies) have contributed to the observed successes?

It noted that implementing CSOs employed a range of strategies to achieve observed successes that included: media engagement, direct and indirect L&A, research and knowledge development, capacity development, engagement and cross collaboration amongst stakeholders. These are succinctly discussed below.

#### **- Capacity Development & Awareness Creation**

The programme facilitated capacity development activities aimed at creating awareness among communities and improving capabilities of implementing partners (and other important stakeholders like government institutions) to carry out planned activities. Partner CSOs underwent frequent capacity development trainings from Cordaid on L&A strategies and on the use of ToC to enhance and improve planning, implementation and documentation of progress.

In Burundi, partners trained lawyers, magistrates and judges on case handling, case referrals and documentation of court procedures. The South Sudan Law Society also trained traditional leaders the Bill of Rights, and especially women rights. This enhanced their capacity to handle cases in family courts within the communities. Women, men, youth, chiefs and civil society members received legal

advice on how to access justice through the courts. In DRC, community members were trained to help them understand the mining sector in general and extractives sector reforms. In Burundi, programme partners conducted trainings on L&A techniques to create an enabling environment for programme implementation. For instance, AFRABU trained the community on L&A and communication techniques; AFJO built capacities of journalists in L&A techniques; and OAG trained judges of the Courts of Residence on L&A techniques to be able to run advocacy in difficult situations. With enhanced capacity for L&A, the programme was able to achieve substantive outcomes in the security and access to justice trajectory at the national level. In Afghanistan, youths and women were capacity-built on how to conduct advocacy for inclusion in peace process, identify and plan their advocacy opportunities, and get involved in conflict resolutions. As a result, communities became more aware about the extractive sector processes. Improved court procedures in the provinces of Balkh, Kunduz, Nangrahar, Kandahar and Khost for monitoring the justice system was also recorded in the security and access to justice trajectory as a result of capacity building. Table 5 below outlines some prominent examples of capacity building initiatives highlighted by respondents.

Table 5: Table of Capacity Development Strategies

<b>Country</b>	<b>Contribution of capacity development strategy on outcomes</b>
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– HYPREP trained women on livelihood skills; building their capacity to demand for their rights</li> <li>– Benchmarking with CSOs from South Sudan</li> <li>– The Forum of Ogoni Councillors was trained on understanding the UNEP report and managing conflict and fragility</li> </ul>
South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– 35 paralegals were trained in Torit on case handling, referral and good documentation</li> <li>– South Sudan Law Society taught traditional leaders the Bill of Rights, especially women rights</li> <li>– Lawyers, judges and magistrates were trained to support the mobile court system in Nimule and Magwi.</li> </ul>
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– ADISCO identified and trained youth-led CSOs on L&amp;A</li> <li>– Barreau de Bujumbura capacity-built community leaders to be community paralegals</li> <li>– AFJO built the capacity of journalists in L&amp;A techniques</li> </ul>
Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Increased awareness amongst communities and key stakeholders on the extractives sector processes</li> <li>– Youths and women were capacity-built on advocacy for inclusion in peace process</li> </ul>
DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Women were empowered by Resolution 1325</li> <li>– Slight increase in the number of women in parliament; 3 were elected as national and provincial deputies.</li> </ul>
CAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Creation of Listening Centres that provided opportunity for pursuing, reporting and handling GBV cases.</li> <li>– Increased awareness about GBV facilitated by outreach, capacity development and advocacy work.</li> </ul>

Overall, capacity building and awareness creation was identified as a prominent strategy employed in the programme that contributed significantly to the reported outcomes. Many respondents indicated that trainings, coaching and awareness creation paved the way for better engagements with government institutions.

These, in turn, opened doors for L&A. Partners also argued that capacity building targeting communities empowered them to engage government more effectively while demanding

accountability and service delivery. Nonetheless, whilst capacity development proved to be an effective strategy, it faced some challenges that included staff turnover (amongst partner CSOs) that undercut progress and financial constraints that limited scope and reach.

### - **Media Engagement**

Media was used mainly for awareness creation on issues affecting the communities such as GBV, oil pollution and engaging communities and other stakeholders involved in implementation of the programme. In Nigeria, media facilitated effective coverage of clean-up issues, awareness creation and advocacy around key processes implemented and key institutions of government responsible for the clean-up. In Burundi, media sensitisation through radio targeting communities, especially women and young people, enhanced their awareness and participation in local development; peace and security processes. CSOs, such as AFJO, trained journalists in L&A techniques and on Resolutions 1325 and 2250, while actors in the justice sector created awareness on legal matters among communities through radio shows. In Afghanistan, partner CSOs employed an array of media engagement strategies to encourage communities to use the formal system, especially for vulnerable groups like women. OFRD utilised social media to engage youths. In South Sudan, UNYDA engaged the media through radio and newspapers to deliberate on oil pollution and amplify the voice of communities. Research findings from SUDD Institute were disseminated through media – press briefings and report launches that were aired on live television. Further, media was utilised in DRC to advocate for women's access to justice and development of local communities, especially in the mining areas of Eastern Congo, where leaders, rebels, and armed groups threatened security in the different mining sites. In CAR, partners used press briefings, journals and other publications to enhance advocacy for needs of victims including their participation in peace and reconciliation process. The LISSORO newspaper, for instance, published a report on the most vulnerable GBV victims in CAR. RJDH also produced monthly newsletters to help amplify the voices of GBV victims.

Table 6: Table of Media Engagement Strategies

<b>Country</b>	<b>Contribution of Media Engagement strategy on outcomes</b>
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Kebetkache used media engagement to push HYPREP to integrate demands of women during the clean-up process</li> <li>– MacJim Foundation was offered additional weekly slots to anchor a phone-in programme to engage the public on environmental issues</li> </ul>
South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– UNYDA engaged the media through radio and newspapers to amplify the voice of communities through radio talk shows and other community awareness campaigns.</li> <li>– Media was used to disseminate research findings from the SUDD Institute.</li> </ul>
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– AFJO trained journalists in L&amp;A techniques and on Resolutions 1325 and 2250</li> <li>– MoJ through Radio Nderagakura reached out to communities on legal awareness.</li> </ul>
Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– OFRD published SPLA activities on their FB page.</li> <li>– AHDS developed television and print media excerpts on sin tax and health financing to create awareness among the Afghan people</li> </ul>
DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Allocation of media space on state media (TV and radio) for dissemination of PAN1325</li> </ul>
CAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Local radio journalists independently organized programs on the fight against GBV.</li> <li>– Victims' representatives (AVED and ASVI) participated in the KHARTOUM Dialogue following release of the victim journal.</li> </ul>

- **Direct & Indirect L&A**

As a strategy, L&A was used across all trajectories to gain the attention and interest of influential government officers and other relevant stakeholders necessary for achievement of some of the programme’s expected outcomes. Both direct and indirect L&A methods were employed. This was carried out through dialogues, meetings, side events and international forums and multi-stakeholder forums (workshops), among others. This strategy was utilised across all categories and scope of implementation. In Nigeria, partner CSOs engaged in direct and indirect L&A at both national and sub-national levels, including holding a national rally in Abuja to draw the attention of government and other stakeholders on the clean-up of Ogoni land. AFRABU in Burundi used indirect L&A to build an alliance for effective implementation of laws. In Afghanistan, partner CSOs identified influential people within government, ministries, and parliament to engage on critical issues such as health financing and security and access to justice. As a result, the programme saw an increased health budget. Successful L&A in DRC contributed to increased budgetary allocation and establishment of mechanisms to ensure accountability for mutual health insurance funding. In South Sudan, both direct and indirect L&A were employed to persuade relevant government institutions to act on disbursement of oil revenues to communities and states and to address oil pollution. CEPO also held L&A meetings with government officials to push for the implementation of Family Law.

Table 7: Table of direct and indirect L&A strategies

<b>Country</b>	<b>Contribution of L&amp;A strategy on outcomes</b>
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Following trainings on understanding the UNEP report and managing conflict and fragility, the Forum of Ogoni Councillors engaged HYPREP quarterly</li> <li>- Cordaid advocated for implementation of the UNEP report on the clean-up of Ogoni land.</li> </ul>
South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CSO partners lobbied MPs to put pressure on government to honour 2% and 3% oil revenue sharing with States and communities.</li> <li>- CEPO held L&amp;A meetings with government officials to push for implementation of the Family Law.</li> </ul>
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Thanks to Cordaid and AFRABU's advocacy activities, Ministry of Communication and Media has set up a committee to monitor the charter on media conflicts.</li> </ul>
Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- AHO along with other CSOs had lobby meetings with MoF and MoPH for increase budget in insufficient areas like medical staff salaries.</li> <li>- AHO and other CSOs conducted lobby meetings with MoPH officials for approval of the alternative healthcare financing strategy.</li> </ul>
DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Increased budgetary allocation and establishment of mechanisms to ensure accountability for mutual health insurance funding in DRC.</li> <li>- Vice-President of North Kivu Provincial Assembly joined and pledged to conduct advocacy to the Governor regarding the non-payment issue involving policemen.</li> </ul>

Although L&A proved to be a successful strategy in the programme, it was not without challenges. This included turnover of government officials especially in highly fragile states like South Sudan. Some partners also indicated that L&A is an expensive endeavour and sometimes requires substantive resource investment to pursue important stakeholders at local, national and international levels. There were also those who argued that L&A requires time, especially work related to policy influencing due to the complex nature of policymaking processes – further complicated by fragility. As such, for some respondents, the decision to terminate the programme in countries like Nigeria and discontinuation of some trajectories in some countries may undermine some of the L&A gains that needed further follow up. Also, some respondents argued that as much as there were efforts to increase linkages and coordination between local, national and international L&A work, more could be achieved when there is joint strategising, collaborative advocacy that is more systematic.



- **Research and Evidence Generation**

Implementing partners conducted research and knowledge development for evidence generation to inform advocacy and awareness creation on key issues affecting communities across the five trajectories. This was carried out through consultations, surveys and data collection on the specific topics of interest. According to partners, research and evidence increased credibility of their L&A work; enhanced traction and increased attention that promoted progress and compelled policy makers to act. For instance, SUDD Institute in South Sudan conducted research on oil revenues management and transparency in the extractives sector to support advocacy measures by CSOs and to inform policy on implementation of 2% & 3% revenue allocation. AMA and UNYDA used findings from this research for L&A. In CAR, partners conducted a situational analysis in the form of a baseline study on community access to justice that facilitated adoption of measures for general improvement of access to justice in the country. Cordaid Country Office in DRC also conducted studies, which they published on their social network platforms for awareness creation and L&A. Also, partner CSOs conducted qualitative surveys to gauge the people’s level of appreciation of the activities, and to identify needs of the people in terms of UHC. Effective L&A was conducted based on evidence obtained through research within the specific implementation countries. Table 8 below further highlights some of the examples where partners effectively utilised research and evidence generation to achieve reported outcomes.

Table 8: Table on Research and Knowledge Development Strategy

<b>Country</b>	<b>Contribution of Research Strategy on Outcomes</b>
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Partners conducted surveys, including a baseline survey on UNEP emergency measures and inclusion of women in the clean-up process.</li> <li>– FACE Initiative carried out surveys on the link between oil spill and livelihood options and trends in selected communities in the Niger Delta.</li> </ul>
South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– SUDD Institute conducted research on oil revenues management and transparency in the extractives sector to inform policy on implementation of 2% &amp; 3% revenue allocation.</li> <li>– SUDD Institute researched transparency in the oil sector; AMA and UNYDA received findings of the study from SUDD Institute and used it for evidence-based L&amp;A.</li> </ul>
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– SP Programme partners collected data on the progress made in relation to “La TDC” and implementation of advocacy plans drawn up by community organizations involved.</li> </ul>
Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Afghan women activists developed a position paper led by AWN and shared with France Parliament and US Congress on participation of women representatives in peace talks.</li> </ul>
DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Conclusions on research done on the National Strategic Policy for Community Health Care were integrated in the implementation of inclusive health trajectory in the country.</li> </ul>
CAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Presentation of data collected by AVED, MINUSCA Human Rights Division committed to working with CSO partners (LCDH and AVED) to improve situation of victims.</li> <li>– Bambari humanitarian actors used data from listening centres to improve their interventions.</li> </ul>

- **Stakeholder Engagement and Collaboration amongst CSOs**

This entailed a general approach to collaborative work amongst stakeholders that enabled actualisation of outcomes and results. Engagements were conducted through multi-stakeholder policy dialogues, community dialogues and one-on-one meetings with key stakeholders. For instance, CSO partners conducted joint L&A work on conflict minerals targeting different stakeholder groups in Brussels. In South Sudan, CSOs formed a coalition that pushed for ratification of the Maputo Protocol.

There was also multi-stakeholder dialogue on extractives that included formation of local committees (comprising local authorities, community leaders and oil companies) to monitor exposure to oil spills. In Afghanistan, CSOs signed MoUs with relevant government entities that helped improve relations with institutions of government. There was also multi-stakeholder dialogue (organised by HRRAC) on mining – National Conference on Mining and Sustainable Development involving MoMP and NEPA. In Burundi, CSOs and government agencies engaged in collaborative work to promote youth and women participation in peace and security processes and to steer implementation of Resolution 1325 and Resolution 2250. Also, CSOs and relevant government entities worked closely in the peace and reconciliation processes in CAR, leading to inclusion of LCDH and victim associations in the APPR-RCA Executive Monitoring Committee and better representation of voices of GBV victims. Table 9 illustrates some examples of this.

Table 9: Table on Stakeholder Engagement & Collaboration

<b>Country</b>	<b>Contribution of Stakeholder Engagement &amp; Collaboration strategy on outcomes</b>
Nigeria	Synergycare Development Initiative, BANGOF and OHEP formed an alliance with Mac-Jim Foundation to initiate sensitisation programmes against bunkering and artisanal refining in several communities in Bayelsa State. CISLAC engaged local gatekeepers and councillors on conflict prevention.
South Sudan	A coalition of partner CSOs engaged the Law Reform Commission and the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare to push for ratification of the Maputo Protocol.
Burundi	MFPTI worked together with REJA and ADISCO in setting up the steering committee for the implementation of Resolution 2250 and the development of its action plan. Ministry of Communication and Media and Ministry of Interior, Patriotic Training and Local Development are working with AFJO to establish listening centres.
Afghanistan	Women representatives held consultative meetings with German, US, Turkey and Canada embassies to lobby support for participation in peace talks. MoMP asked CSOs inputs towards amending the mining law.
CAR	Local and traditional authorities, youth organisations and women's organizations created an informal framework for the fight against GBV. National Commission for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CNDHLF) jointly lead with LCDH the advocacy for the redeployment of the Défense and Security Forces in Alindao, Bambari and BRIA cities.

### 3.7. Benefits of the Programme to Women and Youth

The evaluation endeavoured to assess the extent to which the programme – its activities and outcomes – benefited women, girls and young people. It also explored ways in which reported results impacted gender equity (positive, neutral or negative). On this question, the evaluation noted that the programme's overall objective – working towards strengthening the social contract in fragile contexts – substantively addressed needs of women and youth. Women were central to the SP Programme, based on their vulnerability to pollution, fragility and insecurity within the implementation countries. Commitment from the Dutch MoFA and other international organisations such as the AU and IGAD promoted the achievement of gender inclusivity and diversity within the SP Programme. The reporting mechanism of programme outcomes through the Gender, Peace and Security Barometer in DRC and Afghanistan also enhanced inclusion of women's voices within the fragile contexts. Discussed in this section are some of the striking ways in which the programme benefited women and youth, and worked towards improving gender equity.

- **Foremost, the SP Programme contributed to more inclusion of women and young people in government processes (policy, peace and electoral processes).** Through effective L&A strategies, more women and youth were included in programme activities within the five trajectories. For instance, in Burundi, through support from AFRABU, women were included in the Inter-Burundian Dialogue to contribute as actors in the development of the country. In Afghanistan and South Sudan, women and youth became increasingly engaged in peace negotiations. The SP Programme put a special focus in engaging women at the grassroots level, women with disability and the indigenous women (Pygmies) during its implementation in DRC.
- **Secondly, the programme contributed to enhanced capacities of women and youths on some of the key issues dealt with across the five trajectories, enabling them to conduct their own L&A.** For instance, capacity development initiatives in Nigeria empowered women to amplify their voices and engage government and other key stakeholders regarding the clean-up of their communities. The women groups managed to mobilise funding from Global Green Grants Fund to carry out climate change awareness and plant trees in Ogoni land. Youths in Ogoni land were also trained on different clean-up remediation techniques by CEHRD. In Burundi, women underwent capacity building trainings on L&A techniques and non-violent communication strategies. Forums on women, peace and security were launched in South Sudan as a result of capacity development to amplify their peace and security concerns. In CAR, women were also trained on how to report GBV cases. The media provided a platform for women to voice their concerns about themselves, their issues, communities, livelihoods and the changes they envisioned for themselves in the future. Media also reported more about the role of youths and women in peace talks in Afghanistan. Young people in Burundi created a joint venture called “Bethsaida Centre” headquartered in Bujumbura, from where they initiated development projects to create employment opportunities for themselves. This is attributable to capacity development on economic empowerment that they underwent, courtesy of the SP Programme.
- **Thirdly, the programme also led to more initiative from governments within the implementation countries in ensuring gender diversity and inclusion.** There was increased openness and willingness from DRC government officers in promoting gender responsiveness in security services, including inclusion of needs of women with disabilities in PAN1325. The National Secretariat for Resolution 1325 also recognised specific needs of women with disabilities in PAN1325 that is under review, thus aligning the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities with Resolution 1325. In South Sudan, the programme helped women to set up caucuses in the various States, through which they could input existing motions of parliament. Thanks to the SP Programme, women and youths were integrated into political and electoral processes in the implementation countries. This strategy allowed women to participate in the National Constitution Amendment Committee in South Sudan. The government in Afghanistan showed increased openness to engage youth and women in the peace process and negotiations with Taliban, US and international peace actors. Through effective L&A, the electoral code in Burundi was improved to accommodate women and youth. As a result, the number of women elected to parliament rose from 36% in 2015 to 39% in 2020. Also, the rate of women positions in important positions went from 25% to 33% over the same period. In South Sudan, there was significant progress made in implementation of the 35% gender rule that facilitated more representation and inclusion of women in government/policy making processes. Also, in DRC, political parties became more willing to review statutory documents to respect rights of women and integrate political awareness raising into their programmes on Resolution 1325. As a result, CEHAJ 1325 supported 25 women political leaders, among them 10 candidates in the provincial and national legislative elections; out of whom three were elected as national and provincial deputies.

- **Fourthly, the programme contributed to awareness creation and empowerment of women and youth to demand and defend their rights.** Women in the implementation countries were made more aware of their rights through trainings and advocacy meetings. Sensitization of women at community level in Nigeria enabled women to actively participate in remediation activities in Oguniland. As a result, women came together and formed movements such as the Niger Delta Women's Day of Action for Environmental Justice, where they met to discuss strategies to combat climate change. Programme partners in Wau (South Sudan) worked with community women associations to fight against early marriage. They did this by informing communities on the dangers of early marriage and reporting cases of forced marriage to the Ministry of Gender and human right association groups in South Sudan. Through awareness training sessions in Burundi, women and youths were able to participate and win elective seats in the 2015 elections. Specifically, 148 young men and 47 women were elected from the municipal councils, 39 young people including 21 men and 18 women in the CECIs. In addition to this, seven young people, including three men and four women vied for the position of MP, with two of the young men elected. In Afghanistan, youth groups and coalitions conducted social media campaigns and engagements with HPC and Provincial Council to increase youth participation in the peace process.
- **Finally, the programme also led to creation of safe spaces for GBV victims (most of whom are women and girls) and inclusion of minority women groups.** The creation of listening centres in CAR provided safe spaces for GBV victims and safe referral mechanisms for addressing GBV cases. Trauma therapy was also provided to these victims, who mostly constituted women and girls, in some of the listening centres such as the AVED listening centre in Bangui. The programme ensured increased voice of minority groups of women and youth such as those with disability and the elderly. For instance, CERCLE, a partner CSO in CAR, working on implementation of projects on GBV, fought for rights of elderly women who are usually regarded as witches due to old age.

### 3.8. Conclusions on Results of L&A

Considering the overall goal, the evaluation found evidence that the programme indeed made significant contributions towards strengthening the social contract in all the six country contexts. This was demonstrated by progress in: i) developing the capacities of CSOs to organise and engage their communities and conduct effective lobby and advocacy; ii) improving relations between civil society and institutions of government that saw more coordination and inclusion CSOs in public policy, electoral and peace processes, and iii) sponsoring and/or promoting policy, legislative and institutional development or reform across all five trajectories that were argued to portend well for rights and needs of citizens across all six countries. These results (discussed in detail in section 3.2) represented significant progress towards ensuring that citizens feel more included in their governments (ensuring that they are responsive to their needs) and more willing to give up their rights and freedoms to be governed. This represented progress towards repairing or strengthening the social contract.

It was notable, nonetheless, that there was significant influence of issues linked to the contexts of fragility that impacted conduct of programme implementation and outcomes. These included: i) conflict and insecurity that presented a threat to the safety of partners and execution of programme activities; ii) restricted civic space; iii) fluid political environment and iv) discordance between priorities of government and programme objectives and interventions among others. These were complicated especially in the final year (2020) by the Covid-19 pandemic that limited activities especially policy influencing that were planned for the last year. Whilst some of these contextual challenges were anticipated like the inherent weaknesses of the social contract, constricted civic space and fluid/volatile political environments, others like the Covid-19 pandemic could not have been expected. The programme, did well in planning and implementing mechanisms for addressing anticipated contextual issues as much as many of them still impacted the quality and number of outcomes and still remain unresolved. The programme's ToC emerged as an effective mechanism for facilitating reflection, planning and adaptation that allowed partners to manage and reduce impacts of fragility on results.

It was however notable that there was a lack of clarity and common understanding (among partners) on the idea of social contract. The evaluation also noted that the structure and scope of the programme was ambitious and complex. This is in the sense that it targeted six countries, working at sub-national, national and international levels across four thematic areas. This may have split thin effort and resources available and also made it difficult to document progress.

Ultimately, the results, taking into account implications of the contextual realities in the six countries, demonstrated that this was a good programme, targeting to address relevant needs of communities and vulnerable groups in fragile states. The evaluation thus isolated the following as some of the key issues emerging:

- There was evidence of substantive progress made by the programme on strengthening social contract across all the three categories of the ToC and thematic areas.
- The partners demonstrated ability to learn and adjust to adapt to the changing contexts hence improving the quality of outcomes. The programme's ToC sufficiently provided room for response to the rapidly changing and unpredictable contexts. This enabled the partners and programme at large to realign and readjust accordingly in response to these contextual challenges.
- Through effective L&A strategies, more women and youth were included in programme activities within the five trajectories.
- There was room for improvement of the overall structure of the programme – to make it more reasonable in scope and less complex. And more could have been done, in terms of capacity development to get partners to develop a common understanding of some key concepts like the social contract.

## SECTION FOUR - LEARNING CAPACITY AND ADAPTABILITY

### 4.0. Introduction

The evaluation was tasked to assess progress made towards improving L&A, capacity development, and monitoring, evaluation and learning. This was aimed at developing an understating the strengths and weakness of the chosen approaches in order to draw useful lessons for future programming. In this section we discuss findings of the evaluation on: i) efficacy of frameworks for planning, reporting, monitoring and evaluation; ii) Space for learning and infusion of lessons into the programme; iii) The Mid-Term Review and its implication on programming; iv) Capacity for gender-sensitive programming among SP partners; and v) ToC and its suitability for learning and adaptability.

### 4.1. Frameworks for Planning, Reporting, Monitoring & Evaluation

The key question here was - How effective were the frameworks employed for planning, reporting, monitoring, evaluation and learning? The evaluation established that the programme had sufficient built-in mechanisms for Planning, Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation (PMEL) that partners across the 6-implementation contexts considered largely useful and effective. Key elements of the PMEL framework included: i) quarterly review meetings, ii) annual planning and review meetings, iii) quarterly and annual reporting, and iv) direct MEL linkages between partners, Cordaid country office's MEL officer and SP Programme MEL coordinator at the global office. According to partners, these mechanisms included tools developed for collecting data and documenting outcomes, capacity assessment for M&E targeting partners, and resources for facilitation of MEL functions across all programme levels – Cordaid Global Office, Cordaid Country offices and within the partner organisations. Discussed below are some major observations regarding the programme's PMEL framework.

- **Collaborative nature of planning, including all partners and relevant external stakeholders ensured ownership, strengthened partnership and enabled success of the programme.** From conversations with partners and other relevant external stakeholders involved in the SP Programme, it emerged that the collaborative quarterly and annual planning review meetings provided sufficient space for partners to contribute ideas on the type and scope of activities based on their knowledge of the contexts. The inclusive meetings also aided identification and pursuit of synergies among partners. The collaborative planning also provided opportunity for continuous assessment and adjustment of the ToC to conform to the changing political economy contexts. Partners felt adequately consulted and appreciated the efficiency of planning processes of the programme. Whilst some partners indicated that they appreciated the participation of the Dutch MoFA in their planning processes, others, especially in countries without a strong RNE (like CAR) indicated that they missed the contribution and role of the MoFA (who they considered a critical partner in the programme) in their planning processes.

[Yes, during the quarterly workshop, we discussed the progress report, and also the financial report. What is progress and what are the challenges? What's the issue in the case of the finance and also, in case of the programme implementation? Where are we going? How is the context because, as you know, in countries like Afghanistan, it is very unstable, and it's fragile, and sometimes based in a quarter, in a month the context is changing, and we need to respond to this in the context.]

[Having quarterly meetings to reflect on progress and discuss outcomes, I think has been very much appreciated by both the country offices and local partners. It has given them a structure to work together and to think strategically. That has not always been easy and it's still sometimes for demos or struggles be like I said, strategic.]

[The drafting process of the final proposal to the ministry was really a co-creation with officials of the ministry.] – Cordaid Global Office

- **There were significant variabilities in partners' capacities on PMEL that may have impacted uniformity of planning, documenting progress and infusion of learnings into the programme.** Throughout the programme, substantive efforts and resources were channelled into enhancing capacities of partners in PMEL. These included i) annual capacity assessments, ii) capacity building workshops by Cordaid and external consultants, and iii) technical support by in-country Cordaid M&E staff. According to most of the partners, these contributed to substantive improvement in their capability to perform PMEL functions. However, despite these gains, it was notable that there still remained variations in capacities for M&E among partner organisations; some appeared strong in their understanding of PMEL mechanisms and processes (like working with ToC and Outcome Harvesting) while others appeared to need further support. These variances were observable, especially among smaller partner CSOs that lacked strong M&E departments and focal officers. The evaluation noted cases (like in South Sudan and Afghanistan) where programme officers doubled up as PMEL officers, which may have not only reduced focus on PMEL but also limited their effectiveness in direct programme activities. Most of the respondents attributed this to: i) resource challenges that limited ability for smaller partners to recruit and retain M&E staffs, ii) staff turnover within partner CSOs that resulted in reversal of capacity strengthening efforts invested in by Cordaid, and iii) off boarding of some partners; particularly in CAR. There was consensus among most of the respondents that the programme could have achieved more in terms of PMEL with increased budget allocation for MEL activities and efforts channelled towards supporting partners to establish internal M&E departments, with a focal M&E officer.
  
- **Despite being an effective tool for advocacy programmes, overreliance on Outcome Harvesting Technique may have limited opportunity for collecting quantitative data to augment documentation of progress and programme outcomes.** The evaluation established that outcome harvesting was utilised and relied upon as the main approach for documenting progress and outcomes of the programme. Outcome Harvesting is a useful tool for programme evaluation as it provides real-time and continuous collection and documentation of programme outcomes while drawing appreciation of the programme's attribution to the attained results and the contextual issues that influenced their attainment. It is also a useful model for evaluating outcomes for programmes with subjective measures of success and broad non-linear goals such as policy influencing, enabling environment and capacity development as in the SP Programme. As such, the evaluation established that this technique proved useful for documenting programme's successes, evaluating degree of progress and assessing its effectiveness. It was notable that there was an overall appreciation of this technique by partners as it allowed for comprehensive review and documentation of all outcomes and plotting them against the ToC, establishing plausible connections between the outcomes and the processes, and also capturing nuances that are useful for planning and strategising in advocacy interventions. However, there was room for integrating complementary mechanisms for collecting quantitative data that would have benefited the programme by providing data for more rigorous linkage of activities and key strategies in the ToC to the overall goal of strengthening the social contract. Also, the evaluation noted that some respondents felt that the processes for outcome harvesting, as a mechanism for monitoring and documenting progress, overly focused on documentation of achievements of the programme and may have not facilitated effective interrogation of the internal processes that impacted conduct of the programme and shaped outcomes. Some also indicated that this could sometimes be daunting.

[I feel that the qualitative reflection, which I emphasized on, has been better developed, but also been very useful and appreciated, like you say, so I'm happy with that. The quantitative could be stronger]  
 – Cordaid Global Office

Integrating quantitative approaches would have been useful in assessing significance of changes/outcomes attained and the degree to which they are attributable to the programme. For instance, incorporating a before-and-after analysis into the design of the programme would be helpful in assessing results achieved in capacity strengthening and enabling environment. Nonetheless, it is notable that there were instances where some partners utilised surveys. For instance, in CAR, partners used surveys to collect data on GBV for evidence-based advocacy. In South Sudan, SUDD institute utilised quantitative data in conducting research on oil revenue management and transparency to aid it advocacy efforts. However, such instances remain limited across the programme. As such, it would be beneficial to develop quantitative indicators and extend the use of quantitative surveys to develop baseline data on key programme indicators and for continuous quantitative assessment of these indicators, process effectiveness, partners appreciation of the programme and its design, and tracking of outcomes harvested against outlined objectives. Additionally, statistical analysis of quantitative data would be useful in enhancing cross-country learnings, particularly in comparing similar interventions across trajectories.

#### 4.2. Space for Learning and Infusing Lessons into the programme

Given the fluid political economy contexts in the various countries where the programme was implemented, it was useful for the programme to establish frameworks for regularly drawing out and infusing lessons into its design and activities. The evaluation therefore explored extent to which the programme provided or allowed suitable space for learning, and whether programme partners demonstrated ability to learn from practice and adjust L&A strategies to the various contexts. To guide this assessment, the evaluation sought to answer two main questions: i) Has the programme provided suitable space for learning, according to programme partners? AND ii) Have programme partners shown ability to learn from practice and to adjust L&A strategies in the various contexts? **The evaluation noted that overall, the programme had built in mechanisms that provided space for learning and facilitated adaptation, adjustment of strategies/approaches and infusion of lessons into subsequent stages of implementation.** The following discussion covers some of the major observations of the evaluation regarding space for learning.

- **Quarterly and annual reflection meetings provided ample opportunity for learning and were critical for adjusting strategies, infusing lessons and new ideas into the programme.** The evaluation established that the collective quarterly and annual reflection and review meetings provided suitable space for partners to interrogate their approaches in pursuing results, review and share experience and learn from one another on how to adapt to the changing contexts. Also, through intra-trajectory reviews of programme activities, the programme benefitted from more focused learning. For instance, in Burundi, partners in the inclusive and engendered peace trajectory – ADISCO, REJA, AFJO and AFRABU – indicated that they had biweekly meetings for sharing experiences. In addition, there were inclusive programme-wide cross-trajectory learnings, which also allowed partners implementing different themes to share experiences and learn from one another. There was consensus among partners that through these joint quarterly and annual meetings, Cordaid ensured ample open space for partners to raise issues and provide feedback (on lessons - best practices and areas for improvement) that were respected and given adequate attention.

[There was space for learning, definitely, and it happens. There were many workshops and adaptations of the programming countries etc., and there was always flexibility when it comes to new activities, new ideas, research directories, etc., so that happens.] – Cordaid Global Office

[I will say that learning at international level was very good because we had the spaces where we could review the plan, re-plan, share, speak about the challenges and see how we adjust, to be able to push for specific issues.] – CSO Partner, International

- **Partners singled out the ToC as an important PMEL mechanism in the programme that significantly facilitated learning.** Partners indicated that routine annual review of the ToC created suitable opportunity for them to reflect on their experiences and learn from one another - partners



implementing the various trajectories in different contexts. This was particularly useful for improving effectiveness of L&A strategies. It was notable that learnings drawn from the annual ToC review exercises informed adjustment of strategies, adaptability to context and increasing relevance of programme activities. Some notable examples include: partners in Burundi who adjusted strategy by aligning programme activities with government efforts and plans in order to reduce resistance from government, allowing more room for L&A. In Nigeria, Centre LSD and Community Outreach for Development and Welfare Advocacy (CODWA) identified the Office of the Vice President as a high influence position for lobbying and advocacy. They also targeted the Federal Ministry of Environment in their advocacy. These resulted in enactment of EIA law, integrating human rights. A more detailed account of the relevance of the ToC to learning and adaptability is discussed in **Section 5**.

- **Cross-country exchanges organised through the programme facilitated learning among partners in different country contexts and enriched implementation.** The evaluation noted that there were various opportunities for partners to learn and share experiences across countries and at the international level. These took the form of country visits, and workshops, seminars and conferences. For instance, partners from Afghanistan got to engage with officials in New York and India, and with partners from the other implementing countries in Africa. Also, partners from the extractive trajectory in South Sudan benefited from an exchange visit to Nigeria. There was also a conference organised by the Burundi Cordaid Country office that congregated CSOs from across nine countries including CAR, DRC, South Sudan and Burundi. There was a general appreciation by partners that these opportunities facilitated important learning opportunities that enabled them to appreciate different strategies and approaches and experiences of their colleagues in the other countries. It was however noted by a good number of respondents that the programme would have achieved a lot more in the areas of cross-country learning especially considering that this was a multi-country programme. Many argued that the programme would have deliberately embedded some specific objectives on cross-country joint or collaborative work to facilitate more learning.

Table 10: Cross-Country and International Learnings

<b>County</b>	<b>Cross Country Exchanges and Learnings</b>
Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- International seminars and conferences in New York, USA and India.</li> <li>- Interactions and engagements with partners in Africa.</li> <li>- Trainings by international expert and technical staff from Cordaid.</li> </ul>
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Some partners attended a workshop in Nairobi, Kenya that congregated key programme stakeholders, including officials from Dutch MoFA.</li> <li>- Exchange visits by partners from DRC and South Sudan</li> <li>- International meetings, conferences and workshops in Ethiopia, and at the Cordaid Global office in The Hague by Cordaid Country offices staff.</li> </ul>
CAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Partners attended a workshop in Burundi held in 2019</li> <li>- Exchange visits with partners in Burundi and DRC</li> <li>- Trainings by international expert and technical staff from Cordaid.</li> </ul>
DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Exchange visits to Burundi, Uganda.</li> <li>- Workshops at Cordaid Global Office in The Hague</li> <li>- Trainings by international expert and technical staff from Cordaid.</li> </ul>
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Exchange visit with partners from South Sudan</li> <li>- Trainings by international expert and technical staff from Cordaid.</li> </ul>
South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Exchange visit to Nigeria by partners working under the Extractives trajectory</li> <li>- Visit to Nairobi by partners in Women, Peace and Security</li> </ul>
International	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Engagements with international institutions and agencies, including United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), The ICJ Law</li> </ul>

- **There was more room for learning between country level and international components of the programme that may have not been optimally exploited.** Having being conceived as a multi-level approach involving interrelated L&A work at country and international levels, the evaluation sought to explore the extent to which learnings followed suit. It noted that the programme expected international lobbyists to facilitate learnings between its national and international components. Respondents indicated that there was some level of information sharing between advocacy done at country levels with work done by international lobbyists, and some efforts towards joint strategising (especially in the Engendered Peace trajectory). Nonetheless, the general feedback was that linkages, and therefore learnings, between international and national work, may not have been sufficiently explored and exploited. Whilst a lot of learning took place within the annual and quarterly joint meetings, they missed contribution or participation of international lobbyists and CSO partners operating at international level, through which active linkages could have been developed. Some respondents attributed ties to limitations in coordination but also to lack of specific objectives targeting to facilitate such linkages and learning. **See Section 6.3 for a related discussion on synergies.**

#### 4.3. The Mid-Term Review

Cordaid invested substantively in conducting a Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the SP Programme as a mechanism for monitoring, evaluation and learning. As such, this end term evaluation sought to assess the extent to which the MTR benefited the programme during its second phase of implementation. The evaluation also assessed the conduct of the MTR and extent to which it captured progress in the first phase of programme implementation.

- **Conduct of the Mid-Term Review: According to partners, the MTR was not sufficiently inclusive in its consultations, which may have limited its comprehensiveness and relevance of its conclusions and recommendations.** Whilst the MTR reportedly covered most of the countries (Afghanistan, South Sudan, Nigeria, DRC and CAR), it did not include Burundi. It also did not involve some relevant stakeholders (like government officials and communities) who would have been useful in providing insights for better understanding and appreciation of the programme.
- **Approach to the MTR may have limited rigorous and comprehensive assessment of progress hence denying the programme a critical opportunity for learning.** Many respondents were of the opinion that the MTR failed to conduct a proper assessment of all results attained and thus provided limited appreciation of the SP Programme and outcomes attributable to activities by partners. While there was a significant number of outcomes realised by the programme by 2018 the Mid-Term review focussed on a few outcomes (only 31) in its analyses and highlighted 10 outcomes that cut across all levels of implementation, as most significant. Congruently, the management response to the MTR was also critical of some of the approaches employed in conducting the MTR. For instance, it argued that the MTR did not do justice to the programme given only 31 outcomes were analysed out of 105 harvested outcomes. Secondly, it was of the opinion that the application of the COM-B Model in assessing the programme's interventions was not effective for analysis of L&A outcomes, given activities for the SP Programme were mainly targeted at lobbying authorities. Further, the model failed to appreciate the variance in different contexts and how they influence the attained outcomes. Lastly, it argued that there was limited analysis of the programme's processes and strategies, with more emphasis on substantiation of outcomes. The review failed to critically and systematically analyse the interventions, approaches and the strengths and weaknesses of the programme.

[I don't think they had a good understanding of what the program was, as they focused much more on service delivery and that was not the point of the program... this review didn't get into the core of the program. Also that the lessons learned didn't apply to the program as such] – Cordaid Global Office

[I don't think it was a very good report that made strong recommendations to improve the program. I think in practice; it did not lead to substantive changes in the actual program. I think there was quite some support to leave out some trajectories and to make much more content, but it didn't happen. It remains a very broad and comprehensive, but also not very well aligned, program from beginning to end.] – Cordaid Global Office

- **Nonetheless, the MTR provided some important recommendations that some partners, especially at Cordaid, indicated were useful learnings that they endeavoured to utilise and infuse into the programme.** The MTR process culminated in a list of recommendations aimed at improving the conduct of the programme during the second phase of implementation. However, appreciation of the usefulness of the MTR process varied significantly among partners and stakeholders consulted. Some partners expressed appreciation of the MTR indicating that they found some of its recommendations useful to their work. For instance, CAJ1325 and Dynamics of Women Lawyers of the Democratic Republic of Congo indicated that the process helped enforce and correct certain aspect of their operations. However, most partners consulted were critical of the process and had little appreciation of the MTR report. Table 11 below summarises some of the recommendations as outlined in the MTR that respondents indicated they found useful.

Table 11: Top line recommendation from the MTR

On Outcomes and Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Use of synergetic models</li> <li>- Continue with dialogue, be art of alliance, collect evidence and advocate for civic space</li> <li>- Connect trajectory-specific international L&amp;A to ToCs</li> </ul>
On Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Keep flexibility of the programme (ToCs) and facilitate annual updates</li> <li>- Continue with main capacity development instruments</li> <li>- Keep regular progress meetings</li> <li>- Differentiate between PMEL methods for L&amp;A actions.</li> <li>- Address grievances related to operational issues.</li> </ul>
On partnership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Keep annual partner meetings</li> <li>- Improve communication and collaboration between Cordaid and Dutch MoFA</li> </ul>

Overall, it emerged that, despite the MTR being a critical tool for assessing effectiveness of the programme and a learning guide, respondents did not appear to appreciate its usefulness. Many argued that it did not provide critical lessons to improve conduct of the programme. This was largely because: i) the process failed to consult all critical stakeholders; both programme partners and external stakeholders; ii) the review approach failed to critically analyse design of the programme and the processes employed, and iii) it did not provide sufficient country-specific recommendations for partners. As such, the evaluation noted that the SP Programme may have missed out on a critical opportunity for learning from the MTR, which may have impacted the outcomes attained, particularly during the last phase of programme implementation.

#### 4.4. Capacity for Gender Sensitive Programming

As a component of learning, the evaluation interrogated the programme to understand extent to which implementers demonstrated capacity to carry out sufficient gender sensitive programming and infuse lessons on integration of gender into activities. The key question here was - Do Cordaid staff and programme partners demonstrate sufficient capacity for gender sensitive programming?

Based on conversations with programme partners, it emerged that there were substantive efforts made by the programme to integrate the gender component into its activities. It was notable that across the six countries and at international level, partners made substantive efforts towards integrating voices of women, men and youth in their activities. For instance, Kebetkache Women Development Foundation in Nigeria was particularly instrumental in demanding for women inclusion in the clean-up process. In DRC, RRSSJ and BEST incorporated gender analysis into their programming, while SOS IJM established a special programme named “*Mwanamuke na Sheria*” that aimed to promote women’s rights. In Afghanistan, AWN

was instrumental in advocating for inclusion of women in the national peace processes. Additionally, there was a significant number of outcomes throughout the programme depicting progress and successes achieved in gender empowerment. Table 12 below illustrates some notable gender-related activities by partners in the various contexts.

Table 12: Examples of Gender-related Activities by Partners

County	SP Partner	Description
Afghanistan	Afghan Women Network (AWN)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- L&amp;A work targeting top government institutions for inclusion of women and youth in peace process</li> <li>- Capacity building for activists and groups in L&amp;A</li> <li>- Contributed to production of recommendations and policy briefs for the NATO Warsaw Conference and Brussels Conference on Afghanistan</li> </ul>
	TLO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Established internal gender policy, organised gender trainings and workshops for staff.</li> </ul>
Burundi	AFRABU	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Facilitated inclusion of women in the inter-Burundian dialogue for contributions on country development</li> <li>- Conducted advocacy activities, which resulted in amendments of electoral code to integrate positions favourable to women.</li> </ul>
Nigeria	KEBETKACHE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Used media engagement to push HYPREP to integrate demands of women during the clean-up process</li> <li>- Trained women on livelihood skills</li> </ul>
CAR	CERCLE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Fought for the rights of elderly women regarded as witches due to old age, as part of its GBV projects</li> </ul>
DRC	Dynamique des Femmes Juristes (DFJ)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Conducted advocacy in an effort to ensure inclusion of women in decision-making.</li> <li>- Capacity building for women, particularly in comprehending Resolution 1325</li> </ul>
	CEHAJ 1325	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Supported 25 women political party leaders, among them 10 candidates in provincial and national legislative elections; out of whom, 3 were elected as national and provincial deputies.</li> </ul>
	SOS IJM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Has a radio programme named "<i>Mwanamuke na Sheria</i>" that aims to promote women's rights</li> </ul>
South Sudan	STEWARDSWOMEN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Facilitated commencement of the mobile courts initiatives, particularly in Torit, to ensure easy access to justice for women.</li> </ul>
	CEPO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Facilitated formation of a national coalition to fight SGBV</li> </ul>
	EVE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Established a taskforce in Muniki and Gudele to monitor SGBV and demand justice with legal institutions, using community dialogues and roundtable discussions</li> </ul>
	South Sudan Law Society (SSLS)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Taught traditional leaders the Bill of Rights, especially on women rights</li> </ul>
	SUDD Institute	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ensured gender considerations and women representation in sampling and generating data for their research work</li> </ul>

Notably, the evaluation established that there were capacity building and strengthening efforts for partners facilitated by Cordaid that aimed to improve capacity for partners in gender-sensitive programme. Most outstanding are the trainings on use of the Barometer instruments to capture stories of women and girls in DRC, CAR and Afghanistan. However, some respondents at international level and Cordaid global office indicated that whilst some investment was put into trainings on gender integration there had been limited efforts to measure improvements in capacities of partners in this regard and follow up how capacities were infused into programme activities at national level.

**Regarding the question on how gender integration in programming could be improved**, respondents had various suggestions related to design of the programme, PMEL and capacity. For instance, some respondents argued that perhaps gender-sensitive programming would be better attained if the gender component was embedded into the structure of the ToC. Others called for inclusion of a gender expert to oversee and provide technical guidance on gender-sensitive programming for the partners. There were also those that argued that from a PMEL perspective, having clearly defined objectives (with corresponding indicators) on gender sensitive programming to measure progress throughout implementation would be useful. Lastly, some respondents also stressed the need for investment (budget allocation) continuous gender capacity assessments and capacity development targeting partner staffs implementing the programme.

#### **4.5. Conclusions on Learning and Adaptability**

The evaluation established that the programme had sufficient built-in mechanisms for planning, reporting monitoring and evaluation. The collaborative approach to PMEL emerged as an important component for learning and adaptability. The quarterly and annual congregation of partners at country level across trajectories for reflections and planning emerged as one of the key strengths of the programme. This was further aided by the flexibility of the ToC, which allowed partners to adjust their plans and strategies based on the evolving contexts. The evaluation also established that the SP Programme provided sufficient space for learning, which facilitated adaptation and adjustment of strategies and approaches, and infusion of lessons into subsequent stages of implementation. While in-country learning remained strong, opportunities for cross-country learning were not fully exploited. On the aspect of gender-sensitive programming, the evaluation established that partners made substantive efforts towards incorporating voices of women and girls into their programmes and activities. Consequently, several outcomes were attained demonstrating the programme's focus and benefits to women and girls. Further, there were efforts by Cordaid towards strengthening capacities of CSOs in this aspect. However, the evaluation did not find evidence to support the claim that partners demonstrated increased capacity for gender-sensitive programming. This may have been due to absence of defined indicators on gender programming and limited technical guidance for CSO partners.

The evaluation thus isolated the following as the major issues regarding Learning and Adaptability:

1. The programme had sufficient mechanisms for planning, reporting, monitoring and evaluation. The collective planning and review meetings allowed for continuous reflection on programme results and interrogation and adjusting of processes and approaches to interventions.
2. The ToC and Outcome Harvesting Tool were useful in documenting progress and measuring outcomes attributable to the programme. Outcome Harvesting allowed partners to plot attained results against the ToC – thematically and per category. However, there was room for integrating complementary methods to collect quantitative data to enrich and increase rigour in documentation and assessment of outcomes.
3. The programme provided sufficient space for learning and facilitated adaptation and adjustment of strategies and approaches through subsequent stages of implementation. However, opportunities for cross-country learnings remained limited and were not fully exploited.
4. On gender sensitive programming, there were substantive efforts by partners across the 6-implementation context to integrate the gender component into their programme activities. There were also notable efforts by Cordaid aimed at improving capacity for gender-sensitive programming among partners. However, there was limited evidence to support the claim that partners had improved capacities in gender-sensitive programming.

## SECTION FIVE - APPLICATION OF THEORY OF CHANGE (ToC)

### 5.0. Introduction

The SP Programme integrated and relied substantively on the use of ToC as an integral component of the overall framework for planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and learning. As such, the evaluation interrogated extent to which programme partners demonstrated capacity to work with ToC/ToAs and how its application impacted conduct of the programme and shaped its outcomes.

### 5.1. Capacity of Partners to work with ToCs

There was a general agreement amongst partners that the ToC as a tool was an important mechanism for planning, implementation, measuring progress, and reflecting on experience. Partners argued that working with the ToC was one of the major things that distinguished the SP Programme from other interventions implemented before with support from other development partners. It was however notable that many of the partners had minimal experience and expertise in utilising the tool during initial stages of implementation (especially in 2016 and 2017). This may have limited effectiveness of PMEL activities in these initial stages. For instance, some partners found it a challenge adapting, with some partners mixing the ToC with the other PMEL techniques they were accustomed to.

Nonetheless, Cordaid provided capacity development that began with needs assessments or capacity scoping. Partners indicated that they presented capacity development needs every year that informed design and delivery of trainings and capacity development activities. Although initial stages (2016 and 2017) saw slow progress in capacity development, partners interviewed indicated that the trainings generally improved their ability to understand the ToC as a PMEL tool and to effectively integrate and utilise it in implementation. Partners reportedly improved capacities with trainings and reflections on its efficacy every quarter over the years. The trainings involved practical work during which the consultants, Cordaid Country office coordinator and partner staffs worked to build the key elements in the ToC – the outcomes, breaking down the outcomes into specific indicators.

[We used the ToC as the engine of the programme. When we started, it was a new phenomenon in South Sudan. Along the way, we did some capacity building initiatives supported by consultants and experts from the HQs]. – CSO Partner, South Sudan

[In 2016 & 2017 it was not easy. But today in 2020, we are skilled and brilliant in elaborating the Theory of change. It helps us analyse ourselves. We look for our strength and weakness. We really are thankful on the training we received on this subject.] – CSO Partner, Burundi

[We kept receiving support from Cordaid through its staff in charge of capacity building on theory of change issues and that is the main planning tool we used. We are very satisfied with the capacities we developed thanks to the SP program] – CSO Partner, DRC

[At the beginning, it was difficult but after several trainings with the Cordaid team, we were able to integrate this theory of change and now we use it for our projects with other donors that we currently have] – CSO Partner, DRC

Some partners stated that they found the use of the ToC qualitative and suitable for assessing and tracking change in a policy advocacy programme like the SP. They also indicated that working with ToC enabled them to seize opportunities for L&A, as it guided analysis and mapping of key influential actors to pursue. The ToC allowed and facilitated partners to effectively adjust to changing political economy context in order to achieve most outcomes and take advantage of L&A opportunities. This reinforced learnings, and facilitated harvesting of outcomes and joint planning.

[First, it was something new in our organization since 2016. Before 2016, we have never piloted a project elaborated following the theory of change. I can tell you that it's really interesting, it shows exactly what we really want to see as change on a global view. It starts with what we want to see as change/impact. It helps us to analyse what we call immediate change till we get to what we call a global change. We get to see a clear picture of what we want and how we will get there and who will participate in this process] – CSO Partner, Burundi

[With the Theory of Change, it was really flexible that we could make adjustments even during implementation. For example, if we have not finished this year's activities we can continue during the other year.] – CSO Partner, DRC

[Without the Theory of Change, I think we would have serious difficulties achieving results. Security and justice sectors are sensitive, since we have state actors who think they have the monopoly of their service. The ToC assisted us to identify interesting and influential partners to work with, and how to engage them effectively] – CSO Partner, DRC

However, the evaluation noted that despite the trainings, there remained gaps in understanding mechanisms of ToCs/ToAs that may need to be addressed for future interventions. For instance, it was evident from annual progress reports that partners (and some Cordaid staff) still found it quite challenging to formulate assumptions and learning activities, as this requires a more conceptual view than formulating interventions. This was especially in making connections between activities and outcomes, and explaining contribution of the programme to observed changes in outcomes. It was also notable that partners still struggled with coding outcomes – how to group them in terms of categories in the ToC (capacity development, enabling environment and policy influencing). Also, in some cases, like in South Sudan, turnover of PMEL staffs in partner organisations meant that capacity developed by the programme was not retained and utilised during implementation, hence affecting documentation of progress. There was general feedback from most of the respondents that there is still need for further capacity development for both partner organizations and country level Cordaid staff – especially on working with ToCs and rigorous documentation of outcomes rather than output.

[There's high staff turnover on the partners' side. So, you find that one partner who has been taken through the training, leaves the organization. It is difficult to start with the new person that comes on board] – CSO Partner, South Sudan

## **5.2. Efficacy of the Bottom-up Approach to developing ToC**

The evaluation noted that the programme invested substantively in an inclusive model of congregating partners to work together routinely to develop ToAs built up from country level and feeding into the overall ToC of the programme. It thus sought to interrogate the extent to which this approach suited the programme and its context and how much it assisted programme partners to effectively guide their interventions.

Notably, the programme organised and facilitated partners to work together on an annual basis to review and revise pathways in the ToAs that guided implementation in subsequent years. Quarterly meetings were also convened to assess progress, based on the specific ToCs for different trajectories. Feedback from partners indicated that they found the bottom-up approach to the ToC quite enabling for implementation and pursuit of outcomes. Most of the respondents argued that working with this approach helped them to identify and pursue pathways of change and annual sequence of outputs/outcomes that made things very systematic. Some partners also argued that the ToCs were instrumental in giving direction to the L&A strategies and identifying prominent lobby targets.

[It was quite useful because, it assisted us to define pathway of change, sequence of outcomes each year for five years. Also, we had stakeholder analysis and risk analysis and activity plans. It helped us map the stakeholder, who is in which location, and which strategy we need to use to influence these actors or these government bodies. I think the Theory of Change was quite useful for the programme] – CSO Partner, Afghanistan

In terms of suitability and effectiveness, most of the partners interviewed argued that the bottom-up approach helped them effectively guide their interventions in four main ways: i) ensuring inclusion and meaningful participation of everyone in shaping conduct of the programme; ii) increasing relevance of the programme to its intended beneficiaries; iii) ensuring flexibility and facilitating adaptation to context; and iv) developing a good understanding of key stakeholders and how they impacted the programme and its outcomes. These are succinctly discussed below.

- **Inclusion and Ownership:** Some partners indicated that the bottom-up approach allowed them space to brainstorm ideas to contribute to annual planning and drafting the ToA. It allowed them to inform the shape of the programme each year, enriching it with contextual information being the ones who work closely with the community. Also, it contributed substantively to acceptance, buy-in and ownership of programme interventions, by beneficiary communities and key stakeholders – like relevant institutions of government. This is because the bottom-up approach, by design, facilitated capturing ideas and contextual information from partners that worked directly with communities, institutions of government and other stakeholders. Others also argued that it was effective in ensuring that resources were invested where they were most necessary and that activities of the programme are relevant to immediate needs of the countries where it was implemented. Partners maintained that Cordaid involved them substantively in development of the TOCs/ToAs that not only promoted their ability to understand the pathways to change but also how to use the tool to review progress. Overall, since the ToC was put together in a participatory manner with the involvement of partners, the ToC/ToA development processes worked to ensure ownership of the achieved L&A outcomes.

[We who work on the ground have the right knowledge of the realities. The partner [Cordaid] gives us opportunity to express ourselves, talk about activities, and put ideas together. Ideas are not imposed unilaterally. Even in budgeting, we work out things together] – CSO Partner, Afghanistan

[Every year, we review the theory of change in a participatory and inclusive way, so everyone has their own point of view. Each partner will propose activities and if proposed by yourself, it is validated] – CSO Partner, Afghanistan

- **Relevance:** Partners also argued that the bottom-up approach provided a mechanism to periodically return to assumptions of the programme and test them to assess whether they still hold, and to document changes in the context that necessitated adaptation. They indicated that through annual review and planning processes (workshops) partners worked with the ToC to interrogate conduct of the programme to ensure that it remained relevant to different stakeholder groups and took cognisance of developments in policy, legal and overall political economy of the country contexts. Also, through outcome harvesting, partners collected information on progress and utilised this to re-orient the ToAs. As such, the bottom-up approach assisted in guiding the processes of planning - considering lessons and benchmarking new targets based on the previous year's achievements. It allowed them to inform the shape of the programme each year, enriching it with contextual information, being the ones who work closely with the community in ensuring that the programme remained relevant over the implementation period. Most of the partners interviewed appreciated the fact that developing the ToAs from bottom up meant their activities and objectives were not imported from Cordaid or Dutch MoFA but based on relevant needs, cognisant of the context in the six countries where the programme was implemented.

[ToC allows freedom and flexibility as you operate. It's not linear and logical where you have A, from A you need to move to B, C, and D, like that. So, you can still meander around and manoeuvre for as long as you are moving in the right direction.] – CSO Partner, South Sudan

[The theory of change is not static but dynamic. It has helped us understand that in implementing a programme to achieve a set goal, we use several paths. We can go here and there, left and right. You can change strategy according to the realities on the ground] – CSO Partner, Afghanistan

- **Adaptation to context:** Partners appreciated the iterative and flexible nature of the tool, allowing for adaptation and adjustment considering the context, especially in such fragile and difficult contexts. This was reportedly because of its allowance for assessing progress, effects of context on outcomes and general adaptability. The evaluation noted examples where partners could pinpoint aspects of their work that were adjusted, improved or changed as a result of the iterative process of reviewing the ToC and considering the context.



The country level annual review of the ToC allowed space to consider unexpected outcomes and issues in the operating context to be integrated into programme management and the pathways of change. Some notable examples of how the bottom-up approach to working with ToCs assisted the programme to adapt to changing contexts include: an outbreak of violence in South Sudan in 2017, necessitating a review of ambitions and strategies. This led to reorienting the programme to have some activities carried out at local level rather than nationally in order to be able to continue work with government actors. Also, the extractives trajectory in South Sudan, shifted focus toward addressing environmental problems caused by oil spills. In Nigeria, the extractives trajectory increased its efforts for participatory management of the clean-up in the Niger Delta.

Theory of change has been helpful to us. It enabled us to see our course of change which should lead us to our vision. The context was changing; each year we reviewed the theory of change and updated it to ensure we remained on the right path] – CSO Partner, Afghanistan

- **Stakeholder analysis and mapping:** Through the use of ToC, partners embarked on stakeholder analysis and power mapping at country level that helped them understand influence, interest and positioning of relevant actors that they needed to pursue in their L&A work. Some partners also indicated that the process of elaborating the ToC was critical for understanding positioning of major stakeholders and identifying strategies to apply to achieve desired L&A outcomes. For instance, in DRC, some partners indicated that identification of *Chambre des Mines* was possible as a result of stakeholder analysis facilitated by review of the ToC in 2017.

There was, however, feedback related to funding of plans – with some partners arguing that there were times when plans were made based on the bottom-up approach of the ToC, but Cordaid determined most decisions on funding activities, sometimes dropping them or limiting their funding. There were also indications from some partners that the annual iterative process of reflecting and adjusting pathways and key elements of the ToCs was sometimes daunting and made it difficult for partners to focus and maintain the logic flow of the ToC.

### 5.3. Impact of Strategies in the ToC on Programme Outcomes

Further, the evaluation interrogated suitability of the ToC and its capability to guide the programme towards desired outcomes. This included an examination of how much the programme's focus on the three categories - capacity development, enabling environment and policy change – shaped outcomes. The following discussion reflects on the implications of each of the three categories on conduct of the programme and reported outcomes.

- **Regarding capacity development,** the programme aimed to enable partner CSOs to carry out L&A activities through capacity development. In all six countries, capacity development plans were formulated together with partners that facilitated trainings and other practical capacity development activities that involved learning-by-doing and coaching. Capacity development activities also involved local communities, institutions of government and other CSOs among other stakeholders in areas ranging from awareness creation (across all four trajectories), to technical competencies and improved participation in decision-making. The evaluation noted that this strategy substantively suited the contexts (fragility). There was a good number of CSOs involved in the programme that were already doing work related to L&A but needed further capacity development to achieve more, especially in engaging government. The programme supported partners to focus on evidence-based advocacy more oriented towards softer approaches such as stakeholder engagement and multi-stakeholder collaboration rather than activism and confrontational approaches like protests. This enabled them to have more constructive dialogue with policy makers at national and sub-national (State, provincial, districts and community) levels.

Also, many respondents indicated that capacity building work done through the SP Programme contributed substantively to better linkages with institutions of government and promoted more collaborative work. It was also notable that capacity development improved capabilities of stakeholders to collect evidence at national and community levels that was useful in L&A work, community sensitisation and engagement that increased buy-in and ownership of outcomes. As such, this component of ToC appeared to be relevant throughout implementation. In fact, as illustrated in Table 13, analysis of harvested outcomes indicated that a substantive proportion (242 outcomes representing 32%) of achievements of the programme were related to capacity development.

Table 13: Analysis of Harvested Outcomes per Category

Trajectory	Categories			
	Capacity Development	Enabling environment	Policy influencing	Total
Inclusive & engendered peace	96	117	52	<b>265</b>
Security & access to justice	57	103	69	<b>229</b>
Extractives	65	51	48	<b>164</b>
Inclusive health	19	18	27	<b>64</b>
Civil Society Space	5	9	18	<b>32</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>242 (32%)</b>	<b>298 (40%)</b>	<b>214 (28%)</b>	<b>754</b>

- **Regarding enabling environment**, the programme aimed to create openings for CSOs and communities to influence decision-making. As a component of the ToC, it involved supporting CSOs to: i) develop structural dialogue and engagement with government institutions and other important stakeholders relevant to achieving intended changes across all the four trajectories; ii) identify and influence international multi-stakeholder platforms for L&A; and iii) ensure that major stakeholders at country level (both national and sub-national) support the role of civil society and voice of communities in policy dialogue. Feedback from partners and other respondents indicated that this was an important component of achieving the desired change as it represented the next level of utilising capacities to begin participating in policymaking spaces. Without a favourable and enabling environment for CSOs to work, it would be difficult to influence policy. Many respondents indicated that the political economy environment of the countries where they worked was quite fluid and difficult to navigate as a result of conflict and fragility. As such, support with capacities, L&A advantage (from international level) and receptiveness of government was critical for success. It was reportedly an important area to work on this context for partners – more so to repair adversarial relations between CSOs and government, to enhance collaborative work between government and CSOs and get commitments from government on recognition of the complementary role of CSOs. The relevance and utility of this component of the ToC is evidenced by the high number of harvested outcomes (298 outcomes representing 40%) related to improvements in the enabling environment for CSOs. See table 13.
- **Regarding policy influencing**, the programme aimed to enable CSOs and communities to impact policy reform processes, policy formulation and implementation. The evaluation noted that the programme appeared to have performed not as well in policy influencing (change) as in capacity development and enabling environment. The leap from capacity development and enabling environment to policy influencing appeared not to have been optimal. This was evidenced by partners reporting fewer harvested outcomes (214 outcomes representing 28%) related to influencing policy compared to capacity development and enabling environment. There were however examples of policy influencing outcomes that included: i) operationalisation of HYPREP and review of EIA Law in Nigeria; ii) establishment of the SPU and iii) disbursement of oil revenues to state and communities in South Sudan and, iv) inclusion of women in peace processes and increase in health budget in

Afghanistan among others. Some respondents argued that the limitation in progress on policy influencing pointed to challenges obtaining from the political economy contexts and time limitations that assumptions in the ToC may have not significantly factored in. Whilst the evaluation acknowledges that policy influencing can not only be judged based on major policy shifts/changes, it is of the opinion that considering contexts of fragility, perhaps expectations in terms of translating capacity into policy change could have been tempered with contextual realities. In CAR and Nigeria, partners indicated that the programme needed more time to sustain progress made in capacity development and enabling environment to translate into tangible policy influencing outcomes – as such, terminating the programme would undercut some of the netted outcomes. In other countries like South Sudan, where violent conflict and peace processes coincided with the programme, gains in policy influencing were sometimes offset or slowed down by turnover of government officials or focus on other issues besides those advocated by partners.

#### 5.4. A Complex ToC for the Programme

There was feedback from most of the respondents indicating that **whilst the ToC remained relevant and sensible, its level of ambition (covering five trajectories in six countries focused on three strategies – implemented at country and international levels) and disjointedness may have also impacted implementation, outcomes and measurement of progress.** Many respondents argued that there was limited clarity as to whether the ToC of the programme was focused on the three elements (capacity development, enabling environment, and policy influencing); or delivery of outcomes on the four trajectories. Others also argued that taking on five trajectories may have increased complexity of the programme and denied it capability for focus. Some respondents also argued that this was further complicated by the fact that some of the trajectories were implemented in countries where Dutch MoFA (as a key partner) lacked substantive presence and strategic focus. Others maintained that perhaps the limited experience of Cordaid in L&A work in some of the trajectories may have also impacted outcomes despite soundness of the ToC. This pointed to lapses in the initial programme design.

I think one of the issues that I identified when coming into this program is that we haven't really developed compelling, very brief, and concise explanation of exactly that Theory of Change... I think there are a lot of concepts that you need to understand before you can really get a good strong picture of what we're trying to achieve – Cordaid Global Office

I think focus would have helped the program better as it would have been easier for all the trajectories to link to each other. Also, we saw in the countries where all of the trajectories were implemented, that there was never focus on all four of the trajectories. The focus was still a bit missing and I think it would have really helped the program – Cordaid Global Office

#### 5.5. Implication of Assumptions on Programme Outcomes

The evaluation sought to examine assumptions of the programme (in the ToC), exploring extent to which they were realistic and justified considering the contexts within which the programme was implemented. As such, the evaluation interrogated each of the assumptions, reflecting on feedback from partners and programme documents with information regarding the implementation contexts in the six countries. It noted that overall, the assumptions appeared suited to the intended outcomes and realities in the specific contexts within which the programme was implemented. It noted that most of the assumptions of the programme were substantively relevant, realistic and justified, considering the contexts within which the programme was implemented. There was perhaps one assumption (no 4) on which the evaluation felt may have required more contextual knowledge and rethinking, as indicated in Table 14 on reflections on relevance of assumptions. Partners indicated that they had elaborate processes for routine discussions and review of the ToC that included assessment of assumptions. This reportedly ensured that assumptions remained relevant to the contexts but also to the logic of the ToC. However, many respondents argued that it would have been more beneficial to have contextualised country specific assumptions considering the different realities rather than working with one overall set of assumptions for the entire programme.

Table 14: Table on Reflection on SP Programme Assumptions

SP Programme Assumptions	Reflections on relevance of assumptions
<p>(1) The social contract can be strengthened on different levels: community level, district or provincial governance level, national level or international level. In fragile contexts, the community level is often a good entry point when political space for civil society is limited. Thus, legitimate CSOs with strengthened L&amp;A capacities can become powerful forces of change even in contexts where political space for civil society is limited.</p>	<p>The evaluation found this assumption substantively relevant. There was evidence of progress made by the programme on strengthening social contract at sub-national levels (community, state, districts).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– In Nigeria, involvement of women and community leaders in the clean-up process in Niger Delta increased awareness and understanding of the role of government; pressure on government for remediation. Role of grassroots women’s organisations like Kebetkache showed that legitimate CSOs with strengthened L&amp;A capacities can become powerful forces of change.</li> <li>– In South Sudan, reduction of tensions between army and civilians improved security and confidence in government, reinforcing the social contract</li> <li>– In DRC, development of mechanisms for local dialogue (Local Council for Proximity Security) also improved security and contributed to better relations between citizens and security forces.</li> </ul>
<p>(2) Taking the needs and voices of local communities as an entry point for L&amp;A builds ownership of policy change agendas; it contributes to community capacity to strengthen the social contract at local level; and it generates an evidence base and legitimacy for interventions at a higher level.</p>	<p>The evaluation noted that where CSO partners maximised messaging on community needs, there was significant progress in L&amp;A – legal, institutional and or policy reform. For instance:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– In South Sudan, evidence developed by SUDD Institute on oil pollution reflecting circumstances of women and local communities in oil producing areas was useful in L&amp;A for EIA and commitment of petroleum sector stakeholders to implement Petroleum Act</li> <li>– In Burundi, situational analysis through baseline study conducted by SP partners enabled adoption of measures to improve access to justice; which were discussed in parliament</li> <li>– In DRC, collection of evidence on contribution of non-payment of police to insecurity, promoted advocacy and commitment by top officers in North Kivu to advocate for payment of police officers; civil society actors dialogue with PNC decision-makers on payment of police personnel.</li> <li>– In CAR, inclusion and participation of victims in mediation between government and 14 armed groups.</li> </ul>
<p>(3) CSOs can support communities better if they are organised and capacitated to build agendas that inclusively reflect and represent needs and priorities of all members. This requires empowerment and active engagement of women, youth and marginalized members of communities. <b>Women and youth are in the best position to voice the impact of fragility and to set positive change in motion starting from their own realities and are powerful and essential agents of change in fragile and conflict affected contexts.</b></p>	<p>The evaluation did not find substantive evidence to support relevance of this assumption. Whilst there was significant effort to build capacities of youth and women and involve them in peace, electoral and policy processes, it was not apparent that they are in the best position to voice the impact of fragility and to set positive change in motion. Some of the reasons include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Influence of patriarchy, actively limiting participation and voices of women in most contexts</li> <li>– Exclusion of young people from policy processes</li> <li>– Due to fragility, limitations in literacy and education impact active engagement of young people and women</li> </ul> <p>There were however, some cases like in CAR where young people in university were instrumental in anti-GBV work. Also, in Afghanistan, there was evidence of online engagement of youths, though the extent to which these engagements led to significant L&amp;A outcomes was not apparent.</p>

<p>(4) In countries where space for civil society is limited, multi-stakeholder processes are an effective L&amp;A approach. By bringing stakeholders together in dialogue platforms, trust is built, knowledge is shared across stakeholders, and the capacity to communicate and cooperate is built across stakeholders. This contributes to capacity to cooperate in the interest of the common good.</p>	<p>The evaluation found multiple cases, where partners pursued and created multi-stakeholder forums through which activities especially capacity development and L&amp;A was done. Going by feedback from partners, such multi-stakeholder arrangements helped increase traction and prominence of some issues. Some examples included joint work between CSO partners and various institutions of government:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In the justice sector in Burundi, for provision of legal aid,</li> <li>- In Afghanistan, monitoring of court procedures</li> <li>- In South Sudan, engagement of local leaders, community, CSOs and government on establishment of mechanisms for mobile courts to increase access to justice</li> <li>- Traditional leaders' work with CSOs, local government in Imatong State (South Sudan) on tackling GBV; Community GBV taskforces (including traditional leaders, religious representatives, women leaders and the youth leaders) formed to conduct community dialogues on GBV and facilitate recording of cases</li> </ul>
<p>(5) Negotiation power and policy influence of organised civil society is strengthened if representative networks of CSOs on national level are formed and strengthened, including, strengthening local CSO members of national networks and ensuring that local community's needs and agendas are reflected in national level lobby and advocacy.</p>	<p>There was evidence of creation of coalitions of CSOs, working closely with institutions of government that increased success of L&amp;A initiatives and outcomes of the programme, giving credence to the assumption that CSOs have more influence when working together. Some examples include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In South Sudan, creation of a peer-to-peer network between women in politics and CSOs – facilitates sharing ideas among women leaders; voicing their concern and review progress and push for meaningful implementation of 35% affirmative action</li> <li>- In Nigeria, coalition of journalists reporting clean-up process,</li> <li>- In South Sudan, coalition of CSOs and creation of PWYP-South Sudan and</li> <li>- In DRC on extractives</li> </ul>
<p>(6) Pressure from international stakeholders influences national stakeholders, especially governments, to change policies and practices. Using locally built evidence and including voices of civil society in fragile contexts strengthens legitimacy of international stakeholders' influence on national stakeholders.</p>	<p>There was substantive evidence backing the relevance of this assumption:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In Burundi, pressure from international actors supported national CSOs to push back on implementation of laws aiming to further limit and shrink civic space</li> <li>- In Afghanistan, influence from international stakeholders increased support for inclusion of women and youths in peace processes</li> <li>- In CAR, there was support from EU institutions for reasonable exit of MONUSCO - EU appreciated Congolese CSOs' call for phasing out MONUSCO and prioritization of development and security support to the Congolese government.</li> <li>- In DRC, commitment to action by policy makers (DG DEVCO; COMECE; EPRM; OECD) on conflict minerals regulation and improvement of lives of miners and communities supported L&amp;A by national CSOs.</li> <li>- In South Sudan, CEPO briefed UNSC on peace process and women participation; IGAD, AU and Troika supported the South Sudan peace process by ensuring inclusivity and diversity of parties in conflict and stakeholders</li> </ul>

## 5.6. Conclusions on Application of Theory of Change (ToC)

There was a general agreement amongst partners that, despite initial challenges with understanding and applying it, the ToC as a tool had been an important mechanism for planning, implementation, measuring progress, and reflecting on experience. Partners indicated that they found the use of the ToC qualitative and suitable for assessing and tracking change in a policy advocacy programme like the SP. They also indicated that working with ToC enabled them to seize opportunities for lobby and the advocacy as it guided analysis and mapping of key influential actors to pursue. The ToC allowed and facilitated partners to effectively adjust to changing political economy context and take advantage of L&A opportunities. Partners appeared to favour the bottom-up approach arguing that it helped them effectively guide their interventions in: i) ensuring inclusion and meaningful participation of everyone in shaping the conduct of the programme; ii) increasing relevance of the programme to its intended beneficiaries; iii) ensuring flexibility and facilitating adaptation to context; and iv) in developing a good understanding of the key stakeholders and how they impacted the programme and its outcomes. Nonetheless, there remained gaps in understanding of the mechanisms of ToCs/ToAs that may need to be further addressed for future interventions.

Whilst the ToC remained relevant and made sense, the programme's level of ambition (covering five trajectories in six countries focused on three strategies - implemented at country and international levels) and disjointedness may have also impacted implementation, outcomes and measurement of progress.

Overall, the assumptions appeared suited to the intended outcomes and the realities in the specific contexts within which the programme was implemented. However, the programme would have benefitted from more contextualised country specific assumptions considering the different contextual realities rather than working with one overall set of assumptions for the entire programme.

Some of the major issues that emerge from the discussion on utilisation of the ToC are as follows.

1. Partners found the bottom-up approach to the ToC quite enabling for implementation and pursuit of outcomes. It promoted inclusion and ownership, relevance of the programme, adaptation to context and deeper understanding of the programme's key stakeholders – especially having been focused on L&A.
2. Partners found the use of the ToC suitable for assessing and tracking change in a policy advocacy programme like the SP. Working with ToC enabled partners to seize opportunities for lobby and the advocacy as it guided analysis and mapping of key influential actors to pursue.
3. There was a general lack of clarity on the operational terms like 'Social Contract' and linkages between interventions (activities) and intended outcome – strengthening of social contract. This hampered commonality in understanding of the programme among partners.
4. An ambitious programme - its level of ambition (covering five trajectories in six countries focused on three strategies - implemented at country and international levels) and disjointedness impacted implementation, outcomes and measurement of progress.
5. Assumptions of the programme were largely relevant – but perhaps too high level. The programme may have benefitted from contextualised assumptions at country level that are regularly reviewed.

## SECTION SIX - PARTNERSHIP

### 6.0. Introduction

In the SP programme, the main partners were Cordaid (HQ and country offices), the Dutch MoFA (including RNE in the SP countries) and CSO partners, all recognising that they play different roles and each of them fulfils its role with varying intensity. The evaluation was tasked to assess partners' appreciation of the nature of the strategic partnership. In this section, we present an analysis of partner' reflections on the conduct of the partnership. It covers the extent to which it: i) strengthened capacity of CSO partners at country level and affected ownership of L&A interventions; ii) facilitated synergies amongst CSOs, iii) established mechanisms for accountability amongst partners, v) laid a framework for ensuring sustainability of outcomes.

### 6.1. Impact of Programme on CSOs' L&A capacities and partnership with Dutch MoFA

It emerged, from conversations with partners and other external respondents that through initiatives of the SP Programme, partners were exposed to capacity development activities (trainings) that many argued improved their technical capabilities to carry out L&A work and increased their effectiveness and reach. Some respondents also indicated that the programme facilitated high-level engagements (international and regional engagements and networking meetings), through which partners were mentored and coached on high level L&A. Others argued that the programme worked a lot to improve and strengthen their engagements and partnership with other civil society actors at national and international level. They argued that this was useful in galvanising support, increasing their voice and gaining traction on some important issues that required solidarity like: i) push-back on shrinking civic space in DRC, South Sudan, Burundi and Afghanistan, ii) advocacy for government remedies on oil pollution and oil revenue management in South Sudan, iii) advocacy for operationalisation and accountability in Niger Delta clean-up process in Nigeria; and iv) advocacy for increments to health budgets in Afghanistan. Some also indicated that they got immense support from Cordaid at national level and Dutch MoFA diplomatically that added weight to their L&A work, gave prominence to the issues they were raising, and created more support and international solidarity.

Table 15: Some notable outcomes illustrating improvement in L&A capacity of partners

Country	L&A success stories contributed to by SP Programme partners
<b>South Sudan</b>	Operationalisation of SPUs; disbursement of 2% and 3% oil revenues to States and Communities; progress on affirmative action (35% women in public service); progress towards ratification of Maputo Protocol
<b>DRC</b>	Inclusion of CSOs in UHC policy (strategy) development; promulgation of laws in mining sector; promotion of MUSA; transhumance conflict management policy; monitoring of status of detention centres; improvement in court procedures and provision of legal aid; accountability from mining companies
<b>Burundi</b>	Push-back on restriction of Civic space; institutionalisation of provision of legal aid; implementation of Resolution 1325 and 2025;
<b>Afghanistan</b>	Increments in health budget; inclusion of women and youth in peace process; implementation of court processes; monitoring of justice sector
<b>Nigeria</b>	Operationalisation and funding of HYPREP; review of EIA Law;
<b>CAR</b>	Inclusion of CSOs in the peace process; GBV response

In DRC, some respondents indicated that the programme facilitated pursuit and attainment of synergies among CSOs that previously did not work together – due to territorial tendencies and leadership wrangles by learning how to appreciate strengths of various CSOs.

In Afghanistan, there were examples of CSO partners that respondents believed had substantively grown their L&A capacity over the five years of the SP Programme to the extent that they could be regarded as international NGOs. Respondents indicated that SALAH, for instance, had been empowered to carry out L&A even at international levels. They indicated that the programme had built their capacity and confidence and introduced them to international level policy spaces. Also, AWN was supported and empowered to present at international platforms like the UNSC in New York. In Burundi, respondents indicated that the programme sponsored partners to participate in engagements at international levels (at the AU, Brussels, The Hague, and UN), through which they got exposure, and improved their ability to engage, lobby and advocate for their issues. Partners were also linked with other CSOs and networks outside Burundi for learning, confidence building and strengthening L&A skills. Some partners maintained that the work they did through the SP Programme tackled a very difficult subject – improving the confidence level within CSOs, considering the political economy environment in Burundi. As such, support from Cordaid and the Dutch MoFA/Embassy was instrumental. Many respondents argued that the SP Programme had facilitated capacity development that created experts in techniques of lobbying who shall continue to be reference persons in this area. In CAR, partners argued that the programme supported them to gain national and international recognition as they worked on transitional justice issues. Many noted that through the programme, they got opportunity to meet and dialogue with national and international players from embassies and development partners. This contributed towards capacity building, technical and financial support that promoted their work on peace and justice in CAR. This, enabled inclusion and participation of victims in peace processes.

[We are primarily a research organisation in South Sudan. The SP Programme benefited us a lot. It helped us network, enhance our capacity in terms of L&A and learnt from experiences from the Netherlands and given us some insights on how to advocate and lobby] – CSO, South Sudan

[The SP Programme had a range of trainings for partners, which helped forge expertise. Because at the beginning these were difficult areas to tackle. It was just through this programme that I learned to work with the theory of change and when we went into discussions with our partners, we applied this theory of change] – CSO, Burundi

[Thanks to this programme, we have had information that we did not have before. We have strengthened our administrative, technical and financial capacities. We have managed to accompany victims and develop their abilities to advocate on their own] – CSO, CAR

[The programme connected us with other human rights organizations such as Central African League for Human Rights, Central African Human] – CSO, CAR

[Beyond financial support from Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is the solidarity to be able to try to make the audience more aware of what we are doing and I think it is that climate that has helped us to move forward] – CSO, Burundi

[Before, there were a lot of leadership wars between women's associations; thanks to this program, we understood that each had its own specificity. Which helped us to see how to walk together for the same cause] – CSO, Burundi

[I appreciate Cordaid, they conducted useful and effective trainings for us on how to increase awareness and sensitize people. I learned how to create networks and how to inform people about their rights. Also, besides these the lobby and advocacy trainings, we got financial training, financial management, and office management] – CSO, Afghanistan

[Everyone at Cordaid helped us. Even the Dutch Ambassador and employees welcomed us in their residences. This is a great sign that we really had a good partnership. The level of collaboration I would give 4 out of 5 marks] – CSO, Burundi



## 6.2. Strengthening Partnership between CSOs and Dutch MoFA

To better understand impact of the programme on the partnership, the evaluation explored ways in which it strengthened and improved relations between Dutch MoFA, Cordaid and local partners in the six countries as well as the international partners.

The evaluation noted that the partnership had built-in mechanisms that allowed space for partners to contribute ideas and share experiences during implementation that were perceived by partners to have improved relations and strengthened the partnership. Most local partners at national level indicated that the SP Programme was quite unique in its approach to implementation as it allowed space for partners to contribute ideas and share experiences during planning, implementation and reviews. They argued that unlike other interventions implemented with resources from other donors/development partners, the partnership with the Dutch MoFA in the SP Programme was substantively inclusive and gave them the impression that there was always room to make contributions (in terms of ideas, contextual information, and capabilities) to the conduct of the programme. They noted that routine effort was made by Cordaid to gather and consider ideas and recommendations from partners in shaping the conduct of the programme. For instance, partners indicated that Cordaid consulted all major stakeholders from inception on key elements of the programme – like objectives, ToC and scope.

We further discuss, in detail, four major observations of partners regarding the conduct of the partnership as follows.

- **Cordial nature of relations, flexibility and internal democracy in the programme (among CSO partners) contributed to a stronger partnership:** Partners indicated that the SP Programme was substantively flexible allowing space for shared power. Such important decisions like planning, reflections and progress review were done together amongst partners with coordination from Cordaid. Notably, the programme allowed partners to assign responsibility for each trajectory to a leading organisation amongst themselves. This nurtured internal ‘democracy’ in the programme and facilitated a sense of equality and ownership amongst partners. Most of the partners argued that they viewed the programme as an effective partnership based on meaningful involvement of major actors. They indicated that relations with Cordaid and Dutch MoFA, during implementation remained largely cordial and constructive, allowing for strengthening of capacities of each of the partners. It was notable that relations between partners were improved by regular meetings (quarterly and annual) through which partners had the opportunity to vent, add their voice in plans and strategy, and have physical contact with leaders/managers of each of the partner organisations, Cordaid and representatives of the Dutch MoFA. There were also some partners that felt that due to the long history of work in some of the implementation countries like South Sudan, Cordaid had brought into the partnership substantive experience and contextual knowledge that facilitated interventions, allowed for efficient adaptability and effective partnership building.

[There are partners who openly tell you, the hand that gives is always superior to the hand that receives. Cordaid saw us as equal partners. Cordaid put in the resources and we worked with the populations. Cordaid respected us. Everyone respected their contractual obligations for well-defined periods] – CSO, South Sudan

[I think our relationship with Cordaid was very much on equal terms. I had to deal with multiple Cordaid country directors for example, in these five years - several country directors were changed. I had very good working relationship with majority of them. The meetings, atmosphere is very friendly. We were never spoken down upon. Of course, there were sometimes project delays, things going back and forth, but nothing I could say where they discriminated against us] – CSO, Afghanistan

[Frankly, I would say it's a winning partnership. It was a partnership where we were treated as equals, because first at the planning level, we did it together. Also, at the monitoring level, we jointly worked with Cordaid] – CSO, DRC

[the governance structure of the team was good. Cordaid and Dutch MoFA were providing funds, they had a bit of leverage, but they never took decisions alone. They always consulted us on several things. If they came up with new ideas, they always made sure that we were involved. If we came up with new ideas, we all always made sure that Cordaid was involved in it] – CSO, Afghanistan

[I would qualify this partnership as inclusive because it wasn't like others where they come with projects already done and NGOs take care of the execution part. From the start, we were involved in the planning. This partnership between CORDAID, MoFA and CSOs is great] – CSO, Burundi

[We were really on the same footing of equality; even in the planning of activities we were together [...] I can confirm again that there was a balance. There was no partner treated better than the other. we had the same advantages; our contributions were considered in the same way] – CSO, Nigeria

[This is a programme I really liked; where there's a collaboration of equals to equals. When there is a problem, we contact Cordaid directly and find solutions together on how to move forward and there are no barriers between us. Personally, this has built me up in such a way that I don't want to migrate and I think I have a lot to do and learn from the Dutch. we are only two women doing M&E, and in Burundi fewer women are doing M&E. I'm very happy to be able to work with them] – CSO, Burundi

[I think the most memorable thing that happened and where the partnership worked well together with the Dutch embassy was, for example, Burundi, where new laws were imposed and Cordaid together with the embassy and other CSOs refused to comply with these rules and regulations. On the other hand, we heard some positive news from our colleagues in Congo, where Cordaid was successful in lobbying for new laws regarding health financing]. – Dutch MoFA

- **Power relations still stiffed against local partners; can be more balanced to strengthen partnership:** The evaluation noted that though effort was made to include country level partner CSOs in some programme design and management decisions (like planning and review), they still felt that the balance of power, especially on critical areas as contracting, disbursement of funding and accountability, still tilted away from them, yet they did the actual work and had more strategic knowledge of the context. They argued that important decisions on shape and form of the programme were largely determined by Cordaid Country Offices, Cordaid Global Office, and Dutch MoFA with minimal leverage for CSO partners who had experience in the context. Also, some CSO partners felt that some Cordaid country offices were less flexible on some things. This is in the sense that some decisions did not effectively recognise unique constraints and challenges encountered by some partners that needed more flexibility. For instance, some partners indicated that contractual processes sometimes made it difficult for partners to receive funding on time, which in turn, affected implementation of activities and had the potential of straining relations. However, respondents from some Cordaid country offices argued that the programme had substantively strengthened capacity of partners and opened up space to the level that partners could challenge decisions made by Cordaid and/ or Dutch MoFA when they were unfavourable. As such, power relations were not overly lopsided in their view, and partners were able to argue their case and influence programme management decisions where necessary or deal with implementation challenges where they arose.

[Some trajectories that Cordaid and Dutch MoFA has decided to drop; it was not our decision. I think the priority has changed and it's not a bigger priority. It was the perception and the decision that happened at the international level not at country level] – CSO, Afghanistan

[Well, as I told you that we only did 2 years in the project. In year two, overall funding was reduced without consulting the implementing partners. We were surprised to see that. They just say: This year, we will just support you on such and such an activity. Without asking ourselves, are these activities relevant? It was done unilaterally. It is this aspect that we deplore. They should have, they really should have contacted us] – CSO, CAR

[There was an annual planning workshop, based on the workshop we submitted the next year plan to the donor, based on the work plan, we had an annual contract with implementing partners. At the beginning of the project in 2017 and 2018, yes. It had affected partners [CSOs] because it takes time to sign the contract and then to transfer the funds because they are not financially stable. I think it had an effect on the implementation of the programme] – Cordaid Country Office, Afghanistan

[Yes, it will be claimed by partners because it's a cross checking procedure that push partners for better implementation when we say that, if you don't submit a better implementation strategy, the chances of winning the new year or the coming year contract is less. If you don't have good implementation activities, if you don't put like the real realistic output in Theory of Change, you will not be able to win or to go for the next year] – Cordaid Country Office, Afghanistan

[Although we were involved in development of the proposal, we still look like recipients of aid. Not necessarily partners. Cordaid still determines a lot of the key processes] – CSO, South Sudan

[Improvement can come from standardizing funding. Since there is always a gap between the arrival of funding and the start of activities. This means that there is a strong pressure for the partnership to succeed 100% but processes fail and contributed to misunderstandings] – CSO, Nigeria

- **Local partners can do with more strategic leverage and room for manoeuvre considering the contexts of fragility:** The evaluation noted that despite improvements in programme design and management style that allowed more space for CSOs to participate in programme management, CSOs in the partnership could do with more strategic leverage. This could allow flexibility for adjusting to context especially where L&A opportunities emerge and require swift decisions and speedy adjustments of strategy. Respondents noted, for instance, that the practice of annual contracting was daunting and had negatively impacted the programme in the initial stages (2016 and 2017). Cordaid subjected partners to signing annual contracts, despite this being a five-year strategic partnership. This may have created additional challenges in programme management at partner level, and avoidable extra effort. Some partners felt that this was daunting and sometimes distracted continuous flow of programme activities. They argued that being a partnership, the programme could allow partners to have three-year or five-year contracts which are more effective to work with – and more empowering to partners to make implementation decisions based on how the context changes and L&A opportunities play out. Other respondents argued that in order to give CSOs more strategic leverage, there is need to localise programme management; to shift more responsibilities and authorities from the global office to the country offices – to allow as much decisions and programme management processes that can be done at national level to be done there. This way, partners can get feedback on decisions faster and have more localised solutions that respond faster to changing contexts.

[But for other strategic decisions, we were not consulted enough. As an example, we learned that the SP project would be renewed, but at the strategic level, we had not been consulted to see to what extent certain trajectories were going to be renewed given that there are needs. As there we learned that there are trajectories that will be rejected but we in the healthy trajectory, were not consulted. This is why I say that for strategic decisions we have not always been consulted] – CSO, Afghanistan

[Last year, we had some issues that nearly led our organisation to withdraw from the partnership. Some of these issues arose from misunderstandings with Cordaid country office staffers – sometimes resolved by communication] – CSO, South Sudan

[One of my concerns is Cordaid flexibility. Cordaid is so rigid sometimes. It takes time to get approval for some time-bound decisions. Sometimes we see an opportunity to alter things and deliver results. But because of the bureaucracy of approval, securing consent from Cordaid headquarters and Dutch Ministry of Foreign affairs; by the time they give a go-ahead to adjust plans, the context has already changed, the situation has changed and we have missed the opportunity] – CSO, South Sudan

[I was quite surprised when I heard that Cordaid annually contracts their local partners. We were flexible towards Cordaid and they were very strict towards their local partners] – Dutch MoFA

- **Involvement of Dutch MOFA: There were mixed perspectives on involvement of Dutch MoFA in the programme and its implications on strength of partnership.** According to programme documents, Royal Netherlands Embassies in all six countries were important partners; intended to provide support in policy influencing at the national level and as well as guidance on linkages to the international level. Most respondents from Cordaid indicated that Dutch MoFA had been a valuable partner, especially for activities at the international level, and that they normally had open and productive interactions with DSH staff. Amongst CSO partners, there was considerable variability in appreciation of the involvement of Dutch MoFA in the programme. Whilst some respondents, especially

in countries with Dutch Embassies (Burundi, Nigeria and Afghanistan) indicated that they enjoyed and benefited from close coordination and collaborative support from MoFA directly or through the Embassy, others, especially in South Sudan and CAR, indicated that they missed the strategic backing and support/involvement of MoFA that may have propped their work. For instance, in Afghanistan, there was consensus among respondents that there had been significant involvement of the Dutch Embassy in Kabul and the Dutch MoFA, which was considered useful. Partners indicated that they had close coordination and regular meetings with the embassy through which they provided updates about progress, changes and challenges. Similarly, in Burundi there was substantive involvement of the Dutch MoFA in planning and review forums represented by the Ambassador who attended some planning meetings. According to partners, the embassy contributed ideas and different viewpoints that were infused into strategies and plans during implementation. This reportedly gave partners the confidence that the MoFA was involved and participating in the programme as a partner. There was space for partners to engage the Embassy and provide updates on progress. The Embassy was also reportedly very instrumental in supporting direct L&A work done by partners. For instance, some partners indicated that success in influencing the justice sector (in Burundi) to include CSOs was made possible with support from the Embassy that informed their strategies on how to best engage the Ministry of Justice in Bujumbura and to show the relevance of an inclusive commission.

[We struck a good relationship with them. Anytime we went to The Hague, we were invited by the colleagues from the Dutch MoFA shared how we are doing, and the challenges we faced. They encouraged us to continue talking with the Dutch embassy in Burundi because they received good feedback that we are involving them] – CSO, Burundi

On the other hand, there were also partners that felt that the involvement of the Dutch MoFA, as a partner, was not as adequate as they had expected. They indicated that their interaction with the Ministry or through the Embassy was limited. Unlike in Burundi and Afghanistan where the presence of a Dutch Embassy was more felt, partners indicated that the programme could have benefited more from support and backing of a present Embassy and more involvement of the MoFA in their L&A work. In some countries like Nigeria, there was significant engagement between local CSOs in the programme with the Dutch Embassy. However, partners felt that there lacked more rigorous and technical engagement due to limitation in staffs with technical knowledge of the trajectories or themes that they were implementing. In others like CAR and South Sudan where there was no Embassy, or where there was no active involvement of the embassy, partners indicated that they missed opportunities for engagement and strategic backing of the Dutch MoFA in L&A work at country level.

[This is also due to distance of the embassy. Maybe we could have had more engagements and better partnership relations, if there was an Embassy in CAR. It is not easy, but at least we tried two times and we talked about the program] – CSO, CAR

Most of the respondents (especially at Cordaid and Dutch MoFA) shared the opinion that the intention to have MoFA participate more actively in the programme as a partner was prudent – especially in providing strategic backing and support to CSOs in fragile contexts. However, involvement of MoFA perhaps needed a more comprehensive and strategic approach in order to find mechanisms for balancing their participation with capacity limitations. Some respondents noted that the Dutch MoFA had more than 20 Strategic Partnerships that it needed to be involved in, which presented a challenge in terms of capacity to engage meaningfully. For instance, some indicated that in the initial stages of the programme, due to frequent staff changes and the limited time availability of both embassy and Cordaid staff, establishing links and clarity about the ambitions of the SP Programme and forging good relationships was a challenge. There was also discordance in ideas (between Cordaid and Dutch MoFA) about the added value of the SP. Whilst Cordaid emphasized the strategic value of the partnership the Dutch MoFA and Embassies stressed its practical added value. Cordaid reported in 2016 and 2017 that frequent staff changes in RNEs and multiple responsibilities as well as time constraints of relevant RNE staff made it challenge to maintain regular contact and develop a strategic relationship.

[I think it is fair to say that it didn't always play out as well as we intended. Especially if we don't have an embassy, like in the Central African Republic, then the Strategic Partnership is handicapped from the start because our involvement is bound to be very limited. That was a design flaw I think in hindsight, that maybe, despite the fact that Cordaid is active there, and that the European Union is active there, I think, if you aspire to be strategic partners, you shouldn't focus on a country where there's no embassy or where the embassy is super small. Because then there's no real potential for a partnership, right?] – Dutch MoFA

[Everybody feels like they (Dutch MoFA) have good intentions to be partners but they haven't been a partner in this Strategic Partnership, in a sense that they can also have, that they were active implementers of the program] – Cordaid Global Office

Further, some respondents argued that perhaps it would have been more prudent for the MoFA and Cordaid to pursue partnerships and implementation in countries where there already existed an Embassy with substantive capacity to support local partners. That way, it would have been possible to effectively and meaningfully participate in programme activities. Other respondents also argued that there is need for adequate alignment of the programme activities with MoFA priorities in the countries elected for implementation. This, they argued would ensure that the programme is implemented where MoFA has strategic focus, with technical staffs that can reinforce the work of CSOs. As argued in 2019 annual report, intensive and strategic collaboration proved to be easier in countries where SP and RNE priorities overlap, such as in Nigeria where the oil exploitation in the Niger Delta is also a priority policy area of the RNE. However, the evaluation is of the view that such kind of alignment would not do justice to the independence and experience of Cordaid and partner CSOs in the different country contexts, i.e., limiting work to priorities of the Dutch government may not always align with interests and needs of communities and other groups that Cordaid may want to address.

- **Duration of the programme could have been longer to facilitate stronger relations and allow space for L&A work to bear fruit:** Some partners also indicated that the period of the partnership could have been lengthened to allow more concerted and prolonged L&A work to sustain changes and outcomes attained. In such countries as Nigeria, where the programme was terminated, and in others where certain trajectories would be dropped, partners felt that to build strong and effective partnerships in influencing policy and sustaining outcomes requires longer-term arrangements – more than five years. As such, decision to discontinue the programme may not have reinforced sustainability of relations, capacity and partnerships built through the programme.

### 6.3. Achievement of Synergies during Implementation

On the question on the extent to which programme partners working at local, national and international level observed synergy, the evaluation noted that generally, SP Programme partners endeavoured to pursue various collaborative and joint work during the implementation period. This included work in such areas as direct L&A work, planning and progress reviews. Synergies were reportedly reinforced by regular quarterly programme reflections meetings at country level that facilitated joint reflection, collegiality and space for exploration and pursuit of joint work among partners. There were also trajectory meetings during which partners working on the same trajectory could meet and reflect and their experiences on implementation and identify areas for synergy.

According to most of the interviewed partners, they pursued various collaborative arrangements that helped maximise opportunities for L&A, reduced discordance and duplication of activities. Collaborations also helped fill capacity gaps as partners were able to complement and learn from each other. Further, partners also indicated that joint activities related to L&A reinforced outcomes achieved especially considering the relatively limited civic space in most of the countries where the programme was implemented. Partners took advantage of good relations, clout and influence of some big CSOs to increase traction. Most of the respondents indicated that whilst there were notable variances amongst CSOs in terms of size and strengths, this was not necessarily viewed as disadvantage to the partnership. For instance, in Nigeria some big CSOs like CISLAC and MOSOP provided strategic leverage for national level engagements that

required clout while smaller CSOs provided community and grassroots level access and relevance. Also, in some expansive implementation countries like DRC, partners indicated that joint or collaborate work helped cover otherwise extensive geographical scope. They indicated that different partners and their affiliates sometimes worked to cover different areas of the republic. For instance, various CSO partners worked to deliver different elements of the programme in South Kivu pooling efforts. WADAF for instance worked on issues of peace building dialogues, RRSSJ on issues of access to security, SOS on issues of proximity justice. They all pooled efforts despite working in different geographical areas.

Some partners also argued that the synergies achieved through the SP Programme enabled work outside the framework that in some cases galvanised support, increased voice and traction on issues pursued. Further, some partners indicated that synergies achieved were a critical element for reinforcing sustainability of the programme's outcomes. Collaboration with other organisations and institutions of government contributed to sustainability of some of the programme outcomes. For instance, in Burundi, OAG worked directly with the Ministry of Justice; AFRABU worked closely with government ministries, elected officials and the communities and Cordaid and the Ministry of Justice in Burundi signed an action plan that aided collaboration between the government and CSOs.

Table 16: Evidence of Synergies

<b>Country</b>	<b>Some examples of synergies pursued/achieved by Partners</b>
South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SUDD Institute and AMA worked together to petition South Sudan National Dialogue Steering Committee to include CSOs in Conference for Upper Nile region to raise oil pollution and revenue issues to the National Dialogue Conference.</li> <li>- Partner CSOs collaborated to initiate a chapter of Publish What You Pay Africa in South Sudan. This created Civil Society Coalition on Natural Resources in South Sudan chaired UNYDA</li> </ul>
CAR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Joint work between the national victims' organization and CSOs involved in the strategic partnership (like RJDH)</li> <li>- Collaborative activities by the national forum of victims that included different institutions and organisations and even government partners, including MINUSCA.</li> <li>- Annual Victims' Memorial Day during which victims, victims' organisations, other CSOs worked collaboratively to successfully organise the events.</li> <li>- SP partners in CAR worked with OFCA and National Youth Council on capacity building sessions and on the 16 days of activism.</li> </ul>
DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In 2018, OS IJM in Bukavu mobilized human rights CSOs to petition Senate and protest draft law that sought to increase civic space in the DRC</li> <li>- During review of the mining code, SP partners in Lubumbashi mobilized CSOs to draft amendments to the mining code, advocating for inclusion of their views.</li> <li>- In health, POMUCO – worked at national level; CNOS – at local level as a grassroots mobiliser; and AHUSADEC – at provincial level on memorandum submitted to Parliament and Presidency.</li> <li>- In extractives, CSO partners in Kinshasa worked with those in Bukavu and Lubumbashi targeting communities for advocacy on the mining code and regulations.</li> <li>- In security and access to justice, ADEPAE worked with others in deploying PNC in Bukavu; Panzi foundation, UNJHRO and UCJP on advocacy for funds for justice; and CARITAS Development Bukavu in the context of fight against torture for police officers;</li> <li>- CAJ work with other organizations on the concrete case is the 1325 National Action Plan presented to the Council of Ministers and validated.</li> </ul>
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- BBA collaborated with CSOs working with paralegals on effective strategies to influence MoJ leading to development of paralegal guide and national legal aid plan.</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- AFG worked with REJA in capacity building trainings, utilizing leadership expertise at REJA to moderate debates on leadership.</li> <li>- REJA and AFJO worked together on a campaign to involve young people in electoral processes and on security and justice policymaking forums.</li> <li>- OAG (working with community leaders and paralegals) and BBA (working with the MoJ together advocated for mechanisms for increasing legal aid to the vulnerable.</li> <li>- BBA partnered with CSOs outside the partnership on GBV on creating referral mechanisms for assisting victims of GBV and other serious fundamental rights violations to get legal aid</li> </ul>
Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ENIM network congregated CSOs exploiting abilities and capacities of the diverse membership to monitor the environment and natural resources.</li> <li>- AHDS used the network of AWN to influence policymakers and set the lobby meetings with Parliament, Ministry of Finance, the President and First Lady.</li> <li>- TLO and Salah consortium worked together on joint lobbying and advocacy sessions.</li> <li>- SALAH worked with AWN on the role of women in peace and security</li> <li>- AWN and TLO organised a conference on civil society and media.</li> </ul>
Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CEHRD and CISLAC held a series of protests;</li> <li>- FACE Initiative and Kebetkache did joint research; and</li> <li>- MOSOP provided a gatekeeping and entry-point role in community engagements for many partners.</li> </ul>

- **Missed opportunities for cross-country synergies:** The evaluation however noted that whilst the SP Programme was a multi-country intervention, it might have missed ample opportunity for cross-country synergies between, and among, partners especially CSOs that were implementing activities within the same trajectories. Some partners argued that more joint work between CSOs in different countries was conceivable and attainable – learning from experiences and lessons from the different contexts. For instance, in the extractives sector, there was a lot that could be done together between CSOs in Nigeria, South Sudan and Afghanistan that may not have happened. Nonetheless, partners indicated that they managed to organise some cross-country learning events between DRC and Burundi, and between Nigeria and South Sudan that they found useful for partners working on the same trajectory to benefit from knowledge and experience transfer. They also argued that such cross-country work presented opportunity for improving the partnership that the programme should have done more to exploit and leverage for more and stronger outcomes.

[We need to have some exchanges as well between different countries to know exactly what's going on in the field. Not only to hear it from one person from the office but to see it out in the communities that we approach and how these communities stand for their rights and how they are working. We have somehow missed that one in SP here] – CSO, CAR

- **Weak linkages in terms of synergies between national and international partners and lobbyists and experts:** The programme was designed as a multi-country and multi-level intervention involving work at national and international levels that were meant to be mutually supporting. Embedded in the programme was the idea that achieving change at national level often requires policy changes at the international level – that international actors can be instrumental in influencing national level policy processes. Equally, international policy debates can benefit from input from the countries where they will have an impact. As such, the evaluation explored the extent to which synergies were pursued between national CSOs and international lobbyists.

It noted examples of engagements and joint work between national level CSOs and international CSOs and lobbyists in the programme. According to some partners, this facilitated information sharing between advocacy done at country levels with work done by international lobbyists in The Hague.

Some respondents also indicated that there was some form of joint strategising, division of labour, and updates about policy developments and L&A opportunities. Table 17 below illustrates some notable examples of synergies between national and international L&A.

Table 17: Links between National and International L&A

Country	Links between National & International L&A
South Sudan	In 2018, CEPO from South Sudan addressed the UN Security Council on various occasions. Grace John briefed the UNSC on the peace process and women's participation in South Sudan through video tele-conferencing.
Burundi	A network of women in and outside Burundi has been established with the aim of securing a voice at the national dialogue on the political crisis in Burundi, which took place in Arusha. A few women were directly involved in the dialogue process, and the roadmap prepared for the last official session incorporates some of their views. Furthermore, they organized advocacy meetings with the AU, the East African Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to seek their support. Through WO=MEN we facilitated an expert discussion on the situation in Burundi and the role of women in the peace process during UNSCR 1325+18 week in October.
CAR	Nadia Fournel from AFJC shared several stories on (S)GBV at a well-attended side event during the UNSCR 1325+18 week, hosted by the Dutch embassy. The event attracted positive attention as policymakers in New York do not often have the chance to exchange experiences face-to-face with women from fragile countries. The exchange enabled representatives to go into negotiations for the new MINUSCA mandate well informed when it came to gender, peace and security.
Afghanistan	Inclusion of women and youth in Afghan peace process - borne out of L&A at national level linked with international lobby for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 2250.
DRC	BEST participated in the OECD Forum on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains in Paris. In the subsequent workshop in Goma, the OECD's due diligence guidance was discussed and different initiatives for responsible mineral chains were analysed, resulting in an agenda for action by national and international stakeholders.

Nonetheless, **there was general feedback that the programme may not have sufficiently taken advantage of synergies between CSOs at national level and the work done at international level through international lobbyists, partners and technical staffs at the Cordaid Global office.** L&A activities at national and international levels were not sufficiently interconnected and mutually supportive in such a way that synergies could be exploited and maximised to benefit the programme. The fact that few of the harvested outcomes at country level could not be easily linked to international L&A work, demonstrated limitations in concrete linkages and synergies. Some respondents attributed this to lack of adequate coordination between international and national work while some linked it to flaws in the design of the programme that did not strongly embed necessary linkages. It was notable in the annual plans for 2016, 2017 and 2018 that the programme endeavoured to strengthen cooperation between in-country SP teams and international lobbyists and to build capacity to ensure they fed into each other. The programme relied on thematic experts, as international lobbyists to bring together international and national perspectives, especially to strengthen the capacity of SP partners and country teams to grasp the essence and relevance of policy discussion at the international level. Nonetheless, many respondents indicated that there was room for more progress in this area.



#### 6.4. Sustainability of the Programme

The evaluation examined whether implementing partners were capable and sufficiently prepared (in terms of capacity, resources, partnerships and networks) to sustain positive outcomes of the programme.

On this question, there was a general observation amongst most of the respondents that the component of sustainability was not consciously and sufficiently built into the design of the SP Programme. As such, whilst some activities and outcomes appeared to be, and could be construed to be, reinforcing sustainability, it was not necessarily achieved in the strict sense.

In implementation, measurement of progress and reflections, partners could have done more to integrate mechanisms for ensuring sustainability of the change achieved through their work. The design of the programme did not consciously allow for resources, tools and techniques to be targeted deliberately at ensuring sustainability. The evaluation noted, however, that there were some cases and outcomes that could be regarded as reinforcing sustainability. Some of the examples of areas where the evaluation noted progress towards sustainability are highlighted in Table 18 below.

Table 18: Examples of sustainability mechanisms

Country	Some mechanisms mentioned by partners as reinforcing sustainability
South Sudan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- SUDD Institute’s working relations with Parliament and Ministry of National Resources, Environment and Forestry for research and policy advocacy related to extractives.</li> <li>- Creation of Civil Society Coalition on Natural Resources in South Sudan</li> <li>- CEPO working on a strategy for collaboration with Ministry of Interior; and advocacy for budget allocations for Special Protection Unit to sustain SGBV response</li> <li>- Active engagements with multi-stakeholder sector working groups like the – SGBV cluster, Individual and Community Safety and Security cluster</li> </ul>
DRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capacity development strengthening ability of local communities to demand for more security, interpret the mining code and make claims from mining companies</li> <li>- Setting up of the Commission for Mutual Health Insurance</li> <li>- Some partners developed exit strategies - pursued new partnerships with other donors to continue work on mining code; implementation of strategy for artisanal mining.</li> <li>- Promulgation of Mutual Health Insurance Law; basis for creation of MUSA companies</li> <li>- Local branches of the National Council of NGOs set up at the grassroots level</li> <li>- Advocacy for budget allocation for CLSP by Decentralized Territorial Entities</li> <li>- Signing of memorandums between communities and companies in the extractives sector. Communities negotiate with companies on their own.</li> <li>- Establishment of monitoring centres for young academics for monitoring and reporting SGBV</li> <li>- Neighbourhood forums set up as part of the community</li> <li>- National strategic plan for universal health coverage; which will guide the sector until 2030.</li> </ul>
Burundi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capacity building and involvement of local actors and beneficiaries during implementation enhanced ownership and shall enable them to do L&amp;A on their own;</li> <li>- Laws and policies developed as a result of SP Programme work shall continue to impact lives (monitoring their implementation needs work); Also guides for operation of Legal Assistance Committees developed by the programme sustain further work;</li> <li>- Community engagement platforms set up like” Umuhimvu w’Imboneza” shall continue to facilitate collaboration among elected women leaders and promote role of women in electoral, security and justice policy making processes;</li> <li>- Partnerships and collaborative arrangements with government institutions like municipalities and courts of residence can continue to facilitate access to justice;</li> <li>- Paralegals can continue to work through supervisory magistrates for technical support and municipalities structural support such as providing offices and other equipment.</li> <li>- There were efforts to create a fund managed by Ministry of Justice with involvement of CSOs to ensure sustainability of gains made on provisions of legal aid.</li> </ul>

Afghanistan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Awareness creation amongst local communities enabled community groups to identify issues and carry out their own advocacy and engagement of local authorities</li> <li>- Platforms established that different actors are communicating with each other negotiating on different parts and they are working to see how they can contribute further to health or increasing the health budget allocations.</li> <li>- Justice networks created in five provinces continue working on court case monitoring</li> <li>- Social media platforms for engagement of youth and women controlled by local communities in the provinces continue to facilitate awareness creation on issues regarding the justice sector.</li> <li>- Youth Coalitions and Youth Peace Builder Committees formed at the district level.</li> </ul>
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Nonetheless, in order to explore and establish extent to which the programme facilitated implementing partners to sufficiently prepare to sustain the positive outcomes, the evaluation interrogated conduct of the programme along four key elements related to sustainability: i) capacity, ii) resources, iii) partnerships and iv) networks. These are succinctly discussed below.

- **Capacity:** The evaluation noted that the programme facilitated capacity development that improved capabilities of partners to decide, design and implement activities useful for sustainability and ownership of outcomes. For instance, there was general improvement in capacities of CSOs to carry out L&A work towards enhancing the extractives policy, laws and processes. At the international level, CSO partners conducted joint L&A work on “conflict minerals” targeting different stakeholder groups in Brussels. In South Sudan, improved capacity in L&A amongst partner CSOs increased commitment and action from government to address oil pollution and facilitate prudent sharing and management of oil revenues, especially disbursement of 2% and 3% oil revenues to communities and States. It also contributed to more willingness by petroleum stakeholders to implement provisions of the Petroleum Act 2012 and address oil pollution. In DRC, awareness creation and capacity development activities (in the form of trainings) improved ability of local communities to demand more security; interpret the mining code and make claims from mining companies. In Burundi, capacity building and involvement of local actors and beneficiaries during implementation enhanced ownership and empowered them to do L&A on their own. In Nigeria, capacity development reportedly increased awareness of communities in the Niger Delta on: impact of oil pipeline vandalism, bunkering and artisanal refining; alternative livelihoods; implementation and monitoring of emergency response measures; and integration of ESHRIA and biodiversity audits. In DRC, this contributed to increased awareness amongst communities on extractives sector processes – like mining cycle and facilitated local communities to set up development committees, harmonise Local Development Plans, and set up bank accounts for ETDs for managing resources from royalties. In South Sudan, this facilitated community groups in Melut to: engage the Governor on establishment of a Community Development Committee (CDC); dialogue on issues facing local communities as a result of oil exploitation; document disease incidence related to oil pollution; raise awareness on oil pollution and report community grievances to County and State Authorities (in Unity and Upper Nile).

There was also capacity development targeted at institutions of government relevant to the various trajectories in the SP Programme. For instance, capacities of government agencies in DRC and Afghanistan were developed on design and implementation of UHC; as well as training of police on human rights in South Sudan. These reportedly increased L&A success and set the stage for further work as it facilitated norm changes regarding inclusion and creating an enabling environment for CSOs. Some partners also argued that improved capacities of government institutions or officers would be useful for sustaining outcomes and generally strengthening the social contract.

- **Resources:** The evaluation noted that in terms of resources, the programme did not appear to have invested in strategy and resource mobilisation for continuing activities beyond the life of the SP Programme. Unlike other programmes, where effort is put into designing and pursuing sustainability reinforcing objectives, little or no deliberate attention appeared to have been paid to how

to sustain outcomes, partnerships and traction gained. Most of the partners interviewed indicated that further technical and financial support was still necessary to establish mechanisms for sustaining outcomes. Many maintained that although there were some strong CSOs (like CSILAC, CEHRD, MOSOP, Kebetkache, in Nigeria; SALAH and AWN in Afghanistan; and SUDD Institute, Steward Women and SLS in South Sudan among others), without resources or budgetary and technical support, it was not apparent that interventions and outcomes would be sustained after the programme period elapsed. Nonetheless, some partners indicated that they had begun developing exit strategies - pursuing new partnerships with other donors to continue work on mining code; implementation of strategy for artisanal mining.

[Without donors these CSOs can't do anything. Support of the programme has allowed us to reach the victims so without the support really, it is not possible. Cordaid should not pull out now] - CSO, CAR

- **Partnership and collaboration:** The evaluation noted that partners endeavoured to engage and establish partnerships and collaborative arrangements with institutions of government to not only facilitate L&A work but also allow monitoring and continuous support for implementation of laws, policies and institutional changes as a result of programme initiatives. Many respondents argued that some of the strategic partnerships developed through the programme would be useful in future to continue L&A work for more/further change. They would also be useful for opening doors for future engagements.

**Nonetheless, the evaluation noted that whilst CSO partners pursued some partnerships with relevant institutions of government, many of them appeared weak and dependent on resources invested through the programme, and as such could not be relied upon to support sustained work in the future without Cordaid's support.** This was partly frustrated by the volatile political environment that led to frequent changes in government with officers making engagements very difficult. Some of these linkages were supported by MoUs, though they were not necessarily structurally sound collaborative arrangements that were mutually supportive and could withstand institutional changes and political dynamics in the country's volatile environment. Such engagements as with HYPREP and NOSDRA in Nigeria may not necessarily withstand time without an active programme running. This was evident in the inability of partners to engage and get officers from these institutions to participate in the evaluation.

**It was also notable that through joint work and synergies achieved, partners began collaborative work expected to reinforce coalition building and networking that could be relied on to continue some of the work done or started during the SP Programme implementation.** For instance, development of the Civil Society Coalition on Natural Resources in South Sudan, was a process borne out of work by Cordaid and national partners in the SP Programme. It provides a framework through which further work on extractives can be continued even beyond the life of the programme. This could be useful in future for partners to develop coalitions and implement relations on their own. The evaluation also noted substantive efforts by CSO partners to pursue collaborative work and partnerships with other CSOs outside the programme for greater reach, complementarity, voice and more traction.

Overall, some partners still maintained that sustaining L&A results may not be easy, as it would require continuation of activities and some level of financial and technical support in the mid-term. They argued that L&A, especially for policy change requires a lot of patience. As such, the five-year duration of the programme was not sufficient for attaining strong durable outcomes especially considering the volatile political economy and fragile context in most of the implementation countries.

## 6.5. Mechanisms for Accountability

To strengthen the partnership between CSOs and the Dutch MoFA, it was necessary that mechanisms are put in place to ensure accountability to key stakeholders (Cordaid, CSO partners, MoFA, relevant institutions of government at federal/national and sub-national level), and targeted communities, among others). The evaluation thus explored and examined mechanisms built into the programme to ensure accountability and their effectiveness.

On this question, the evaluation noted that there appeared to be significant internal accountability between partners and Cordaid. There were notable efforts by partners to account to each other during implementation that may have reinforced the partnership. Some of the mechanisms mentioned by respondents included: i) quarterly joint review meetings during which partners reflected on progress and their obligations; ii) regular reporting to Cordaid (through country offices to global); iii) engagements with institutions of government (relevant MDAs); iv) engagements with the community leaders/actors; v) field visits; and iv) general public engagements.

Whilst considered a partner in the SP Programme, there appeared to be no direct links between partners and Dutch MoFA (or through the embassy) in terms of accountability, especially reporting. Beyond engagements during annual planning meetings, it was not clear what inbuilt mechanisms in the programme were available for ensuring that Cordaid and Dutch MoFA account downwards to partners – like on issues to do with capacity development; execution of contract; disbursement of resources, among others.

Overall, partners felt that there were sufficient mechanisms built in the programme, designed and pursued individually by implementing partners that facilitated accountability among partners, to Cordaid and Dutch MoFA, to relevant institutions of government and to communities (beneficiaries) among other stakeholders. Respondents expressed confidence that they effectively utilised these mechanisms to routinely inform major stakeholders of the conduct of their work. This contributed to better relations, opened doors for L&A work, facilitated attainment of buy-in and receptiveness of programme activities especially at community level. Some argued that these accountability endeavours were reinforcing for sustainability and also worked to galvanise support from other CSOs and external players outside the framework of the programme that was useful for attainment of outcomes reported.

Some of the specific mechanisms that partners indicated they employed at individual organisational level to ensure accountability are discussed below.

- **Engagements with institutions of government (relevant MDAs):** It was notable that partners endeavoured to get into partnership agreements and to establish some forms of MoUs with relevant institutions of government. For instance, in CAR, some CSO partners entered into partnership with Ministry of Education and Minister of Social Affairs; Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Planning, Ministry of Territorial Administration, Ministry of Public Security and National Defence through which they shared information on their interventions, progress made and areas of synergy. In Burundi, BBA organized exchanges with influential personalities and MDAs in the justice sector to facilitate better understanding of the challenges in access to justice. In South Sudan and Afghanistan, government required CSOs to provide regular updates and sign MoUs with relevant line ministries as compliance rules that were considered by partners as mechanisms for accountability with government. Partners also indicated that they rendered annual returns/reports of their activities to such relevant MDAs as the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) in South Sudan and Ministry of Economy in Afghanistan, existing laws required CSOs to report to the Ministry of Economy. In DRC, some partners indicated that they began signing MoUs with customary chiefs, a burgomaster or a chief of sector to get support and buy-in. This provided opportunity for them to appraise government on the conduct of their programmes, progress and funding sources. Overall, partners indicated that such engagements with MDAs facilitated cordial relations with government and allowed a favourable environment for L&A work to thrive and bear fruits.

- **Media engagements:** Some partners also indicated that they utilised media to increase awareness of their interventions and outcomes. In CAR, for instance, some partners indicated that through frequent media engagement, and working with journalists, they got opportunities to sensitize communities, government and international players on the conduct of their work, thus reinforcing accountability.
- **Stakeholder presentations and community sensitisations:** Some partners indicated that they organised meetings in which they presented to beneficiaries (communities) the progress of their work. For example, in DRC, after the reform of the mining code, some CSO partners embarked on exposition of their work related to the process. This increased awareness of the issues in reforming the mining sector. Elsewhere, CSOs like CENCO indicated that they routinely invited government officers and community leaders to their activities as a means of accountability. In addition, through annual surveys and interviews with beneficiaries, some partners indicated that they gathered views of local communities and included their voices in the conduct of their interventions. Others in DRC also indicated that they regularly made presentations to key stakeholders including the Minister of Public Health and beneficiary communities to appraise them of about activities and progress. Some partners also indicated that they utilised a participatory approach to planning and budgeting for activities that in their view promoted accountability to beneficiaries as they disclosed programme documents to make local partners and beneficiaries aware of the conduct and scope of work.
- **Reporting through IATI:** Some partners indicated that they provided routine reports on IATI. They argued that reporting through IATI facilitated accountability as they published data about the programme, funding and activities, which allowed other partners and key stakeholders to know what they were doing.

## 6.6. Conclusions on Partnership

The evaluation observed a general improvement in capacities of CSOs to carry out L&A work as a result of capacity development activities sponsored by and/or carried out by Cordaid. The partnership provided mechanisms and opportunities for meaningful involvement of all stakeholders that allowed partners to contribute ideas and share experiences during implementation that were perceived by partners to have improved relations and strengthened the partnership. There was notable cordial relations, flexibility and internal democracy in the programme (among CSO partners) which contributed to a stronger partnership. Nonetheless, power relations appeared to be still stiffed against local partners; these can be more balanced to strengthen partnership and recognise that CSO partners do the actual work and have more strategic knowledge of the contexts. This is especially in programme management areas as in contracting, disbursement of funding and accountability to ensure local partners get more strategic leverage and room for manoeuvre considering the contexts of fragility.

There was a general understanding that support from Dutch MOFA was crucial for policy influencing at the national level. Some partners indicated that they benefited from strategic backing from international players especially Dutch embassies that helped to bridge priority gaps. The influence of linkages between national and international advocacy was useful in making government to take interest in some of the programme's thematic areas. Nonetheless, it was evident that involvement of MoFA in the programme did not meet expectations of partners. This needed a more comprehensive and strategic review in order to find mechanisms for balancing their participation with capacity limitations.

The programme missed out on opportunities for cross-country synergies and linkages between international and country level L&A work that may have impacted quality and number of outcomes. This is despite the programme being designed as a multi-country and multi-level intervention involving work at national and international levels that were meant to be mutually supporting. Nonetheless, some partners argued that some collaborative work done galvanised support, amplified voices of CSOs and increased traction on issues pursued.

Lastly, the component of sustainability was not consciously and sufficiently built into the design of the SP Programme. As such, whilst some activities and outcomes appeared to and could be construed to be reinforcing sustainability, it was not necessarily achieved in the strict sense. There is need to address this in order to achieve durable impact.

The main issues that emerged under partnerships are as follows:

1. The programme strengthened capacities of partners to conduct L&A and supported them to insert in crucial policy making processes that generated significant outcomes in policy, legislative and institutional development across all five trajectories. Further support can increase influence of partners in engaging at international level; linking international level and country level L&A.
2. Cordial nature of relations, flexibility and internal democracy in the programme (among CSO partners) contributed to a stronger partnership. Nonetheless, power relations still stiffed against local partners. Local partners can do with more strategic leverage and room for manoeuvre considering the contexts of fragility.
3. Intention to have MoFA participate more actively in the programme as a partner was prudent – especially in providing strategic backing and support to CSOs in fragile contexts. However, involvement of MoFA needed a more comprehensive and strategic review in order to find mechanisms for balancing their participation with capacity limitations.
4. The SP programme missed out on opportunities for cross-country synergies and linkages between international and country level L&A work that may have impacted quality and number of outcomes. There was room for more and meaningful engagements between CSO partners and other civil society actors – across countries and between country and international levels.
5. Component of sustainability was not consciously and sufficiently built into the programme design.

## **SECTION SEVEN - LESSONS FOR DUTCH MoFA, CORDAID & PARTNERS**

### **7.0. Introduction**

In this section, we conclude the evaluation report highlighting key issues that emerge along the three main questions on results, learning and adaptability and partnership. It also includes a qualitative grading of overall programme performance in the evaluation and some recommendations for Cordaid, Dutch MOFA and CSO partners to consider for future interventions.

### **7.1. Conclusions**

#### **7.1.1. Regarding results of L&A**

Considering the overall goal, the evaluation found evidence that the programme indeed made significant contributions towards strengthening the social contract in all the six country contexts. This was demonstrated by progress in: i) developing the capacities of CSOs to organise and engage their communities and conduct effective lobby and advocacy; ii) improving relations between civil society and institutions of government that saw more coordination and inclusion CSOs in public policy, electoral and peace processes, and iii) sponsoring and/or promoting policy, legislative and institutional development or reform across all five trajectories that were argued to portend well for rights and needs of citizens across all six countries. These results (discussed in detail in section 3.2) represented significant progress towards ensuring that citizens feel more included in their governments (ensuring that they are responsive to their needs) and more willing to give up their rights and freedoms to be governed. This represented progress towards repairing or strengthening the social contract. It was notable, nonetheless, that there was significant influence of issues linked to the contexts of fragility that impacted conduct of programme implementation and outcomes. These included: i) conflict and insecurity that presented a threat to the safety of partners and execution of programme activities; ii) restricted civic space; iii) fluid political environment and iv) discordance between priorities of government and programme objectives and interventions among others. These were complicated especially in the final year (2020) by the Covid-19 pandemic that limited activities especially policy influencing that were planned for the last year. Whilst some of these contextual challenges were anticipated like the inherent weaknesses of the social contract, constricted civic space and fluid/volatile political environments, others like the Covid-19 pandemic could not have been expected. The programme, did well in planning and implementing mechanisms for addressing anticipated contextual issues as much as many of them still impacted the quality and number of outcomes and still remain unresolved. The programme's ToC emerged as an effective mechanism for facilitating reflection, planning and adaptation that allowed partners to manage and reduce impacts of fragility on results. It was however notable that there was a lack of clarity and common understanding (among partners) on the idea of social contract. The evaluation also noted that the structure and scope of the programme was ambitious and complex. This is in the sense that it targeted six countries, working at sub-national, national and international levels across four thematic areas. This may have split thin effort and resources available and also made it difficult to document progress. Ultimately, the results, taking into account implications of the contextual realities in the six countries, demonstrated that this was a good programme, targeting to address relevant needs of communities and vulnerable groups in fragile states.

#### **7.1.2. Regarding Learning & Adaptability**

The evaluation found sufficient built-in mechanisms for planning, reporting monitoring and evaluation in the programme. Collaborative planning and review - quarterly and annual meetings congregating partners emerged as a key strength of the programme. It was evident that the programme provided sufficient space for learning; which facilitated adaptation to context and adjustment of strategies and approaches to suit programme objectives. Despite initial challenges with understanding and applying it, the Theory of Change (ToC) emerged as an important mechanism for planning, implementation, measuring progress, and

reflecting on experience. Partners found the use of the ToC suitable for assessing and tracking change in a policy advocacy programme like the SP. Working with ToC enabled partners to seize opportunities for lobby and advocacy as it guided analysis and mapping of key influential actors to pursue. The ToC also facilitated partners to effectively adjust to changing political economy context in order to effectively pursue outcomes and to take advantage of L&A opportunities. The bottom-up approach was favoured by partners as it: i) ensured inclusion and meaningful participation of everyone in shaping the conduct of the programme; ii) increased relevance of the programme to its intended beneficiaries; iii) ensured flexibility and adaptation to context; and iv) facilitated better understanding of the key stakeholders and how they impacted the programme. Nonetheless, there remained capacity gaps regarding application of the ToC that need to be further addressed for future interventions. Whilst the ToC remained relevant and made sense, the programme's level of ambition (covering five trajectories in six countries focused on three strategies and implemented at country and international levels) and disjointedness frustrated implementation, attainment of outcomes and measurement of progress. Overall, the assumptions appeared substantively relevant, realistic and justified considering the contexts within which the programme was implemented. However, the programme would have benefitted from more contextualised country specific assumptions considering the different contextual realities rather than working with one overall set of assumptions for the entire intervention.

### **7.1.3. Regarding Partnership**

The evaluation observed a general improvement in capacities of CSOs to carry out L&A work as a result of capacity development activities sponsored by or carried out by the SP programme. The partnership provided mechanisms and opportunities for meaningful involvement of all stakeholders that allowed partners to contribute ideas and share experiences during implementation that were perceived by partners to have improved relations and strengthened the partnership. There was notable cordial relations, flexibility and internal democracy in the programme (among CSO partners) which contributed to a stronger partnership. Nonetheless, power relations appeared to be stiffed against local partners; these can be more balanced to strengthen partnership and recognise that CSO partners do the actual work and have more strategic knowledge of the contexts. This is especially in programme management areas such as in contracting, disbursement of funding and accountability to ensure local partners get more strategic leverage and room for manoeuvre considering the contexts of fragility. There was a general understanding that support from Dutch MOFA was crucial for policy influencing at the national level. Some partners indicated that they benefited from strategic backing from international players especially Dutch embassies that helped to bridge priority gaps. The influence of linkages between national and international advocacy was useful in making government to take interest in some of the programme's thematic areas. Nonetheless, it was evident that involvement of MoFA in the programme did not meet expectations of partners. This needed a more comprehensive and strategic review in order to find mechanisms for balancing their participation with capacity limitations. The programme missed out on opportunities for cross-country synergies and linkages between international and country level L&A work that may have impacted quality and number of outcomes. This is despite the programme being designed as a multi-country and multi-level intervention involving work at national and international levels that were meant to be mutually supporting. Nonetheless, some collaborative work done galvanised support, amplified voices of CSOs and increased traction on issues pursued. Finally, the component of sustainability was not consciously and sufficiently built into the design of the SP Programme. There is need to address this in order to achieve durable impact in future interventions.



## 7.2. Qualitative Grading of Programme performance in the evaluation

Evaluation Area		Qualitative Grading
Results of L&A		
Learning & Adaptability		
Partnership		
Programme Design & management		
LEGEND		
Green		– Effective performance; with some room for improvement
Amber		– Satisfactory performance; with significant limitations; require to be addressed
Red		– Weak performance; with substantive limitations that threatened success; require to be addressed

## 7.3. Recommendations

Ultimately, the results, taking into account implications of the contextual realities in the six countries, demonstrated that this was a good programme, targeting to address relevant needs of communities and vulnerable groups in fragile states. However, it could have achieved much more with a better design (cogent ToC and reasonable scope in terms of trajectories and countries) and more effective and efficient framework for programme management.

Moving forward, the evaluation urges that Cordaid, Dutch MOFA and the partner CSOs at country level consider addressing the following to achieve more with future interventions.

Emerging Issues	Recommendations
<b>Programme design and management</b>	
– The programme lacked strong leadership in programme management; – this hampered coordination of the six country teams and commonality in understanding of the focus of the programme; and weakened linkages between international and country work.	1. Ensure recruitment of strong programme management capacity dedicated to the programme (with experience in multi-country policy influencing, L&A interventions) to facilitate coordination and exposition of programme design and structure and ensure partners understand roles and expectations.
– An ambitious programme - its level of ambition (covering five trajectories in six countries focused on three strategies - implemented at country and international levels) and disjointedness hampered effective implementation and measurement of progress.	2. Conduct an inclusive process during design of the subsequent programme – to have a common understanding among partners (Cordaid, MoFA and country level CSOs) on what it seeks to achieve (in terms of ToC, choice of trajectories and selection of countries).
– The programme management structure gave prominence to Cordaid global office and Dutch MoFA, disempowering partners at country level despite being pillars of the programme and with more contextual knowledge	3. Review programme management structure to increase opportunity for devolved programme management and decision making to allow more leverage for country offices to determine shape and form of the programme.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The programme lacked a strong component of internal review of programme management processes that impacted implementation despite its complex, multifaceted and multi-layered nature.</li> </ul>	<p>4. Infuse rigorous review of internal processes into quarterly and annual review meetings to provide space for interrogation of how programme management processes impact the programme; and require progress reports to include feedback from partners on programme management.</p>
<p><b>Learning &amp; Adaptability</b></p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The programme had sufficient mechanisms for collaborative planning, reporting, monitoring and evaluation, which allowed for continuous reflection on programme results and interrogation and adjustment of approaches applied.</li> </ul>	<p>5. Continue with and strengthen collaborative approach to PMEL and further build capacity of partners on PMEL</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The Theory of Change (ToC) emerged as an important mechanism for planning, implementation, measuring progress, and reflecting on experience. Partners found the bottom-up approach to the ToC quite enabling for implementation and pursuit of outcomes as it promoted inclusion and ownership, relevance of the programme, adaptation to context and deeper understanding of the programme's key stakeholders.</li> </ul>	<p>6. Conduct further capacity development work to build capability of partners to utilise ToC as a central mechanism for PMEL and retain and strengthen use of the inclusive bottom-up approach to developing and working with ToC.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Outcome Harvesting was useful in documenting progress and measuring outcomes. However, there was room for integrating complementary methods to collect quantitative data to enrich and increase rigour in documentation and assessment of outcomes.</li> </ul>	<p>7. Consider and infuse alternative tools and mechanisms (preferably quantitative) to complement Outcome Harvesting to allow more rigorous analysis.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Opportunities for cross-country learnings remained limited and were not fully exploited.</li> </ul>	<p>8. Increase opportunities for cross-country learning among partners – especially those implementing same trajectories.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Whilst partners made substantive effort to integrate gender into their activities, the evaluation did not find evidence to support the claim that the programme improved capacity of partners on gender-sensitive programming.</li> </ul>	<p>9. Review role of gender expert to ensure they provide technical support for gender sensitive programming (especially at country level) across all trajectories and conduct regular monitoring (quarterly or annually) of improvement in capacities of partners on gender-sensitive programming.</p>
<p><b>Partnership</b></p>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The programme strengthened capacities of partner to conduct L&amp;A and supported them to insert in crucial policy making processes that generated significant outcomes in policy, legislative and institutional development across all five trajectories. Further support can increase influence of partners especially in accessing and engaging at international level; linking international level and country level L&amp;A.</li> </ul>	<p>10. Conduct further capacity development and provide technical support to partners on L&amp;A especially on accessing and engaging at international level; linking international level and country level L&amp;A work.</p>

<p>– Cordial nature of relations, flexibility and internal democracy in the programme (among CSO partners) contributed to a stronger partnership. Nonetheless, power relations still stiffed against local partners; can be more balanced to give local partners more strategic leverage and room for manoeuvre considering the contexts of fragility</p>	<p>11. Explore more mechanisms for empowering CSO partners to participate meaningfully in management and decision making in the programme (– like a steering committee AND Consider reviewing contractual arrangements to make agreements more long term (like 3 years of five years mirroring the life of the programme) rather than annual contracting</p>
<p>– Intention to have MoFA participate more actively in the programme as a partner was prudent – especially for providing strategic backing and support to CSOs in fragile contexts. However, involvement of MoFA did not meet expectations of partners; needed a more comprehensive and strategic review in order to balance their participation with capacity limitations.</p>	<p>12. Dutch MoFA to consider appointing consultant technical experts or focal persons to act as links with Cordaid and partners to increase presence of MoFA in programme (planning, reviews and learning)</p>
	<p>13. Encourage RNEs to play more active role in the programme – Dutch MoFA to facilitate more partnerships and stronger cooperation between RNEs and local partners at country level.</p>
	<p>14. Dutch MoFA and Cordaid to pursue more strategic discussions on design and structure of subsequent programme – to have a common understanding on what the programme seeks to achieve and roles and expectations of partners.</p>
<p>– The SP programme missed out on opportunities for cross-country synergies and linkages between international and country level L&amp;A work that may have impacted quality and number of outcomes. There was room for more and meaningful engagements between CSO partners and other civil society actors – across countries and between country and international level thematic experts.</p>	<p>15. Strengthen and increase opportunities for cross-country work among partners – especially those implementing same trajectories AND increase monitoring of coordination between international and country level work (especially linkages between thematic experts and country level CSO partners).</p>
<p>– Component of sustainability was not consciously and sufficiently built into the design of the SP Programme. Whilst some activities and outcomes could be construed to be reinforcing sustainability, it was not necessarily achieved in the strict sense.</p>	<p>16. Develop a programme strategy (and specific country or organisational strategies) for ensuring sustainability; include an objective on sustainability in programme design</p>
	<p>17. Dutch MoFA and Cordaid to consider longer, continuous implementation periods, building on outcomes of the 1st phase in subsequent partnerships AND institute mechanisms for supporting CSO partners in countries dropped from the partnership to ensure outcomes are not lost.</p>

**Annex**

- Detailed Synthesised & substantiated outcomes
- Evaluation Criteria
- Theory of Change
- Portfolio of programme partners

## **ANNEX 1: Summary of SP Programme Synthesised & substantiated outcomes (All trajectories)**

### **Security & Access to Justice**

- 1. Increased access to justice especially for women and vulnerable groups facilitated by operationalisation of mobile courts, improvement in court procedures, provision of legal aid and deployment of more judges.** In South Sudan, the programme contributed to operationalization of Mobile Courts and capacity development for paralegals (women, men, youth chiefs and CSOs); increased number of cases referred to legal aid clinics in Torit; Capacity development for lawyers, judges and magistrates supported mobile courts (in Nimule and Magwi) to handle more cases; backlogs reduced; Community representatives regularly report cases of injustice to justice providers; Formation of new family court system in Magwi; handled 48 cases, facilitated development of a referral pathway with High Court Torit. In DRC, this included contribution to increasing budget (by 30%) for provision of legal aid for vulnerable groups in South Kivu; increase court hours – (starting hearings at 9:00 am in Kalehe, Kabare and Bukavu); deployment of more judges/magistrates leading to faster delivery of judgements (in Bukavu, Kadutu and Bagira). In Burundi, MoJ signed the National Legal Aid Strategy with recommendations for implementation of legal aid law; Increased budget takes into account legal aid and action plan; progress toward revival of Legal Aid Commission; MoJ implementing the National Legal Aid Strategy's and set up legal and judicial support structures for vulnerable groups. In Afghanistan, it contributed to enhanced capacity of judges to improve performance of court procedures (in Balkh, Kunduz, Nangrahar, Kandahar and Khost); monitoring of court sessions by CSOs, media and community representatives to record human rights violations; and establishment of complaint boxes. Inclusion of women judges and women prosecutors.
- 2. Policy and institutional reform facilitated by L&A work of SP partners increased access security through establishment of more mechanisms for policing by better mapping, deployment and funding of police, and establishment of feedback mechanisms for handling complaints.** In DRC, this included: improved mapping, deployment and funding of police in Kadutu, Bagira, Ibanda, Kabare; Capacity development for police in drafting of victim hearing minutes; observance of legal police custody hours and faster delivery of judgements. In South Sudan, this contributed to establishment of a squad of informed police officers willing to address human rights violation, increased outreach through community policing (in Bor); improved documentation and reporting of cases for evidence (in Imatong); Commissioners, Chiefs and other officials drafted a bill on community mediation; establishment of more police posts in critical areas (Mururai, Ifanyak and Iluhum in Torit); passing of a bill on small arms control to regulate illegal carrying, use and movement of fire arms Jonglei state legislative assembly (in Jonglei).
- 3. Legal reform to promote access to justice facilitated by SP partners.** In DRC, partners contributed to promulgation of Decree N ° 13/041 of 2013 that facilitated creation of CLSP (Local Council for Proximity Security). In Burundi, there was substantive progress towards enactment of law on the code of ethics for magistrates. This included a roadmap for the implementation of the adopted code of ethics.
- 4. Establishment of mechanisms for community dialogue improved relations between citizens and security actors a result of L&A work and awareness creation by CSOs in the partnership.** In DRC, partners contributed to establishment of CLSPs; joint operations between CLSP and security service; endorsement of decrees establishing Local Council for Proximity Security funds (FCLSP); establishment of village forums - Kalehe, Uvira and Fizi; development of Local Council for Proximity Security plans followed by ETDs; commitment by Commissioners to implement CLSP plans that promote collaborative local dialogue among community members on security and justice issues; and development of policy on CLSP fund and sharing of constituency security data by PNC territory commissioners. In South Sudan, local communities in Baselia, Bagari and Bazia interact with security actors more confidently; Major

General Joshua with Division Five visited areas occupied by the army to prepare them for return of IPDs; Free movement of opposition in Wau Town and the Army to the opposition areas.

5. **Increased monitoring and reporting on the state of Human Rights and detention in DRC.** UNHC integrates recommendations on detention in DRC submitted by CSOs (SOS IJM); African Commission adopted DRC's resolution (proposed by NGO Forum including SOS IJM) with regard to prison conditions and electoral process; CSOs highlighted poor state of detention facilities and pushed for improvements and better administration; United Nations Committee Against Torture integrated recommendations on prosecution of perpetrators of torture cases of HRDs, pro-democracy activists and political opponents in report; DRC government committed (after 10 years) to present Human Rights Report to the United Nations Committee Against Torture in Geneva, every two years.
6. **Substantive progress towards Ratification of Maputo Protocol in South Sudan.** There was strengthened coordination through network of Judiciary officials and lawyers; with commitment to implement Maputo Protocol upon ratification. A CSOs' coalition for ratification of Maputo Protocol was established; coalition engaging with Law Reform Commission and the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare to push for the ratification; 40 CCORPS engaged parliamentary women caucus to demand accountability on Maputo Protocol.
7. **More actions and commitment by government towards enabling peace and reconciliation processes in CAR, including more involvement of victims and providing necessary support.** This was evidenced by: participation of victims in mediation between government and 14 armed Groups; CVJRR steering committee incorporating partner CSOs (LCDH) and victim associations (AVED and AVUG); inclusion of victims in drafting a memorandum to Minister of Humanitarian Action and National Reconciliation, calling on government to ensure security of property and persons in the provinces affected by the crisis in CAR; provision of trauma therapy to victims by AVED (Bangui) listening centre; and referral of victims by outreach centres for registration as well as material and psycho-social care. The Prime Minister pushed for development of Draft Bill on the implementation process of CVJRR and reaffirmed government's commitment to bringing perpetrators to justice and set up a fund to compensate victims; Attorney General and Ministry of Justice increased pursuance and processing of cases - victim files and provision of witness protection insurance; National Assembly adopted Law N° 18.010 of 2 July, 2018 on Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Criminal Court; and Central African Armed Forces are deployed in BAMBARI and BRIA cities to keep peace.
8. **Improved Coordination among CSOs and between CSOs and justice sector actors (especially government) facilitated L&A towards improvement of security and access to justice.** Cordaid collaborated with ODI, IDLO and other justice partners through the Pathfinders/ Task Force on Justice, TAP Network, WFUNA, and other alliances relevant to SDG16.3 and the justice agenda. Missions to the UN in New York were organized, involving local partners from DRC and CAR; CSO partners were facilitated to participate in exchange workshop on approaches and best practices to improve accountability and quality of funding for security, justice and local governance actors. In Afghanistan, a new network/platform of CSOs facilitated more engagement of justice actors and CSOs for collaboration and sharing cases' information with CSOs and media on cases of human right violations. In South Sudan, CSOs organised an engagement meeting with TGoNU and discussed review of laws (Police Act, National Security Act, Prisons Act); Law Review Commission pledged to incorporate civil society recommendations shared with the Ministry of Justice and Members of Parliament. In Burundi, this facilitated formation of a network of paralegals working on provision of legal aid to vulnerable groups (in Bubanza, Bujumbura and Mwaro provinces) and Burundi Bar Association developed links with international advocacy platforms for improving access to justice (RIFAV: International Network of Women Lawyers). In CAR, increased coordination and collaborative work

amongst CSOs and government saw inclusion of SP partner LCDH and victim associations in the APPR-RCA Executive Monitoring Committee; that facilitated advocacy for redeployment of Défense and Security Forces in Alindao, Bambari and BRIA cities; and development of common working framework with Begoua community leaders and the eight districts of Bangui to facilitate victim identification.

9. **Research (and consultations) by SP partners generated evidence that informed L&A work on security and access to justice.** Research by SIPRI facilitated multi-stakeholder engagements on security and access to justice in CAR and DRC. SP Programme co-financed data collection/research focused on local perceptions of international non-governmental organizations and United Nations' peace operations in the provision of security and justice. Cordaid-ODI Report on Customary and Informal Justice harvested insights from three countries (Afghanistan, DRC and South Sudan) and translated them directly into policy-relevant recommendations to SDG16.3 stakeholders. Presentation of the everyday justice research strengthened relations with NL embassy in Kinshasa; and facilitated strong coordination between Cordaid and partner CSOs in Afghanistan and DRC. This created opportunities for voices of women and local communities to be heard by key policymakers at national and global levels. In South Sudan, research on the backlog of cases reported and not handled informed planning for Mobile Court that improved handling of cases; CSOs' policy recommendations generated through community consultations; shared during round-table dialogues with justice actors. In Burundi, research, public engagement and consultations on challenges to access to justice for all provided insights for MoJ on how to act. This included media engagements by MoJ through Radio Nderagakura; report of community challenges to access to justice developed through dissemination sessions discussed in parliament. In CAR, authorities developed pilot reference document on victims' situation based on evidence developed by CSO partners; victims were actively engaged by CSO partners (AVED, ANAF, AVUC) in grassroots consultations on implementation of CVJRR.
10. **Partners in CAR and DRC improved their capacities in security sector reform, justice reform and conducting security and justice sector assessments through training facilitated by ASSN.** In DRC, this facilitated reinforcement of front-counter staff's capacity in assisting litigants; legal talks between magistrates and lawyers explore challenges to increasing access to justice. This also facilitated enlisting of support from EU institutions for reasonable exit of MONUSCO. EU delegation and representation appreciated Congolese CSOs' call for phased exit of MONUSCO and prioritization of development and security support to the Congolese government. EU policy makers emphasised they do not support a hasty departure of MONUSCO.
11. **CSO partners facilitate establishment of mechanisms for transhumance conflict management in DRC.** Farmers, breeders and local authorities reached agreement to improve transhumance conflict management; Establishment of a monitoring committee for peaceful management of transhumance; endorsement of draft decree (Decree n ° 19/008 / GP / SK of 02/14/2019) on livestock regulations and transhumance management in South Kivu; alignment of draft transhumance decree with budget session in 2018; organization of a national symposium on enactment of livestock law in DRC; commitment to implement decree on transhumance by authorities (provincial inspector).

## **Engendered Peace**

- 1. Establishment and implementation of mechanisms for dealing with GBV.** In South Sudan, establishment of Police Special Protection Unit in Juba worked to reduce GBV cases; community taskforce to report sexual violence incidents established in Munuki, Gudele, Lirya, Gbudue; free psychosocial support and legal aid service provided to GBV victims with support from the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare, Ministry of Interior and UNIMISS Human Rights Division; institutional changes for handling GBV initiated - continuation of family courts and training (Paramount) chiefs in handling GBV cases (including child marriages and child compensation); monthly GBV Working Group meetings initiated to provide update to the Ministry of Gender; Wau State adopted UNSCR 1325 which is the National Action Plan, CEDAW and Girl Child Act; Imatong State Government developed gender sensitive policies interlinking the customary laws to existing national framework; Working Group on UNSCR1325 established a team of experts on conflict related sexual violence at national level. In CAR, creation of Listening Centres provided opportunity for pursuing, reporting and handling of GBV cases. This facilitated increased access to crucial safe spaces for GBV victims and referral mechanism for dealing with GBV cases. Listening centres increased awareness; improved the quality of publicly available information on GBV and enabled victims to acquire knowledge on their rights and confidence to report violations. In DRC, promulgation of a new law (N° 18-195) that outlines role of key government departments charged with responsibility of GBV; Parliament discussing Legal Aid Bill to provide care for GBV victims; Magistrates and judicial police officers working on victims' blocked files in their jurisdiction; Establishment of a working group to proofread discriminatory clauses relating to the Family Code; Senior Ministerial Executives committed to ensuring respect of Women's Human Rights in their respective ministries; and justice sector actors installing coordinators to facilitate joint work on GBV within their ministries and with other MDAs, and also included provision of legal aid and capacity development on surveillance and documentation of Sexual violence. Partnership Protocol through its college of experts from AVIFEM and CEHAJ 1325, provided legal aid for victims of sexual violence. In CAR, increased awareness about GBV facilitated by outreach, capacity development and advocacy work done by CSOs in the partnership. These included: outreach activities organized by GBV survivors in Berberati; units of Défense Force awareness-raising sessions on GBV; and young religious leaders and youths from different churches awareness campaigns on the fight against GBV; youths in Bangu and; Bambari developing action plans to fight sexual and gender-based violence; BE-TA-OUALI women representatives developing action plans for fight against GBV; Lobaye community leaders setting up community-based observers and gender advisers to serve as early warning tools to mitigate GBV; and setting up of MAISON PRISCA to organize joint advocacy actions against GBV to local authorities. These facilitated community dialogue and work towards breaking the silence of victims, denouncing GBV and referral of GBV victims to listening centres. In Afghanistan, capacity development and coordination of meetings for knowledge and awareness creation among communities - women and youth on peace processes. MoWA organized peace symposium in South region (Kandahar); Local community capacitated to do advocacy for violence against women in the peace process; Afghan women activists developed a position paper by lead of AWN and AWN shared it with France Parliament and US Congress for role and participation of women representatives in peace talks.
- 2. More inclusion CSOs in government policy making processes on promoting youth and women participation in peace and security.** In Burundi, MDAs designated focal points to support CSOs in activities on youth and women empowerment, peace and security and decision-making processes based on Resolution 1325 and 2250. AFJO included in Resolution 1325 Steering Committee; MFPTI worked together with REJA and ADISCO to set up Resolution 2250 implementation steering committee. Women parliamentarians and women representatives of CSOs developed operational strategy to encourage participation of women in election and peace and security processes; AFRABU invited to National Assembly during plenary on the adoption of new electoral code during which four articles were amended



in favour of women; AFJO partnering with MC&M; MIPTLD on development of listening centres; AFRABU works with EALA and EAC towards integration of regional tools favorable to women and youth participation in the country's policies and laws; and National Communication Council signed a partnership agreement with AFJO in which it undertakes to integrate gender dimension into media monitoring grid. In South Sudan, there were more joint initiatives between institutions of government and CSOs that tackled GBV. This was evidenced by inclusion of CSOs in the National Technical Committee for the fight against GBV; Establishment of the Joint Rapid Intervention and UMIRR that reinforced State-CSO partnership on handling GBV cases. In CAR, joint work with CSOs enabled government agencies to mobilise and engage different actors to provide care for GBV victims; enabled local authorities and community leaders in Bangui to effectively identify and refer victims to listening centres. Outreach centres run by CSO partners provided crucial support (for care and counselling) to GBV victims; More victims identified through mobile outreach centres in remote communities.

- 3. Dutch Government and other missions commit to promote inclusion of women and youths in peace and security processes in DRC, Burundi, South Sudan and Afghanistan.** The Dutch permanent representative at UNSC used coordinated input of Dutch NGOs for debates and renewal of mandates concerning Resolution 1325 in fragile countries. The Permanent Representative of Norway committed to support and promote an inclusive mediation process in Burundi. Dutch government committed to promote role of women in Afghan peace process. UN Women WPHF retained Burundi as a focus country. EU adopted the Council's conclusions on the role of young people in building a secure and cohesive society following inputs by the EU- Young Advocacy Team. Council of Europe approved a resolution by Parliamentary Assembly for appointment of a rapporteur to prepare a report on importance of UNSC 2250. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2419 (2018) with which the UNSC reaffirms commitment to the comprehensive implementation of UNSCR 2250. The African Union's openness to partnership and collaborative work on promoting women's inclusion in peace & security. AU representative indicated openness to work with young women in DRC, South Sudan and Burundi after CSOs in GNWP group during CSW. Office of the AUC Special Envoy on WPS regarding UNSCR 1325 advocacy at regional level has strengthened partnership with programme partners WIPC; a valuable step in facilitating access for other women's organisations to access regional platforms and advance WPS agenda at regional levels. GIMAC (2019) recommendations called for support for displaced women to occupy leadership positions in decision-making in IDP and refugee camps.
- 4. SP partners conducted research and generated evidence on women's circumstances in fragile states, which was utilized to inform/shape L&A work.** A tailor-made inquiry is now in place that supports the collection of stories and additional data on daily safety in the community. DRC and Afghanistan are actively implementing the Barometer process. UN Security Council members participated in two open debates on WPS, during which the results of the WPS Barometer concerning sexual violence and conflict in South Sudan were presented. SP partner WIPC hosted a side event on the margins of CSW 63 where they presented findings of a study by WIPC with Universities of Tilburg, Makerere and Mbarara on the cost-benefit analysis of social protection schemes such as cash transfer programmes and post-trauma services for the empowerment of women in post-conflict Northern Uganda. A baseline study of the EU's capability gaps to support youth participation in peacebuilding has been carried out. A policy paper and symposium report with compendium of best practices and lessons learnt from youth inclusion in negotiation and implementation of peace agreements. In CAR, surveys and data collection on the fight against GBV; Ouango women leaders in Bangui making propositions for fighting GBV using evidence; and Bambari humanitarian actors using data from listening centres to improve their interventions.
- 5. Increased government initiative and commitment to promoting participation women and youth in peace and security processes. In DRC, SP partners contributed to establishment of mechanisms**

**for implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325/2000 on Women, Peace and Security (PAN/R 1325).**

Creation of synergies between government agencies for implementation of NAP on PAN/R 1325; Collection and integration of grassroots women's aspirations in NAP 1325; Inclusion of needs of women with disabilities in PAN1325; Commitment by government officials to incorporate PAN 1325 in budget for fiscal year 2020; Revival or establishment of local PAN 1325 committees - FARDC; Local government stakeholders developed plans to integrate PAN 1325 II into their activities; Allocation of media space on state media (TV and radio) for dissemination of PAN1325. In Burundi, a permanent unit was charged with daily monitoring of the implementation of 1325 Resolution; Eight (8) MDAs validated Resolution 2250 translated in Kirundi; MIPTLD integrated youths in Joint Commission of Human Security; National Assembly amended articles 173 and 213 of the Constitution to favor women participation; A gender-sensitive charter established by MC&M. Journalists scheduled new stories on the theme "women, youth, peace and security; Public media leaders embraced gender-sensitive media charter; a pool of well-trained journalists in L&A set up; Radio soap opera "Umuhivu" and a music contest on the role and place of women and youths in peace building and security. In Afghanistan, there was increased inclusion of women and youths in meaningful engagements around negotiations for peace. Increased openness of government to engage youth and women in the peace process - government invited women to participate in peace negotiations with Taliban, US and international peace actors in Doha, Islamabad and Moscow; Increased political commitment to engage youth - Deputy Minister for Youth arranged public awareness campaign on youth participation in peace process committed to implement the youth policy; Youth groups; coalition conducted social media campaign and engagements with HPC and Provincial Council to increase youth participation in peace process; Government (including President and First Lady) and High Peace Council committed to include youth in peace talks and women; Minister of Peace promised and committed to include women and youth representatives in the government negotiation delegation in peace talks with Taliban; Media broadcasted more about role of youths and women in peace talks. In South Sudan, increased inclusion of women in peace process facilitated by Women Peace and Security Forums; EVE Organisation developed the women political strategy for participation in National Constitution Amendment Committee; CEPO briefed UNSC on peace process and women participation in South Sudan. At international level, youth leaders through SP Programme, CSOs engaged key stakeholders on inclusion of youth in peace processes in Afghanistan, Nigeria, Burundi. Youth leaders (from Afghanistan, the Netherlands, Libya and Iraq), governments officials and International NGO's discussed challenges and lessons learnt on youth inclusive peace processes during the 4th anniversary of UNSCR 2250. Youth leaders (from Cameroon, Nigeria, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Egypt, and UNOY representatives from the international secretariat) carried out a lobby mission to the AU, out of which GIZ expressed interest to work with UNOY Peace Builders & the Post Conflict Reconstruction & Development department of the AU to develop curriculum for youth sensitive training to strengthen peace keeping missions. In cooperation with two youth organizations (members of UNOY) a youth, peace and security programme on localizing UN Resolution 2250 in Burundi has been launched with support from the SP Programme and the UNPBF program.

6. **Increased inclusion and active engagement of women and youths in policy making and electoral processes.** Formation of networks of youth CSOs; youth CSOs presented memos on a youth support fund to the President; formalized communication channels between youth CSOs and NYC during elections; Communal Water Boards in 62 municipalities integrated 1,152 youths into decision-making bodies and peace and security processes; steering committee formed for information sharing and 18 action plans for improving coordination between CSOs and local administration during electoral period; Youth engagements with political party leaders on their participation in electoral processes; and Provincial platform for dialogue for youths has been established to enhance information sharing and prevent electoral conflicts. In DRC, the programme contributed to capacity development for women to engage in active politics and election; Political parties were open to review statutory documents to respect rights of

women and integrate into their programs political awareness raising on Resolution 1325. Amendment of electoral code promoted improvement of women participation in electoral, peace and security processes; Awareness training sessions on responsible citizenship enabled youths to commit to participating in elections; community capacity building organized by REJA has enabled women and youths to develop advocacy actions and electoral process monitoring plans; Grassroots women used local platforms for L&A activities targeting provincial and municipal electoral commissions (CEPI/CECI) for 2020 elections. In South Sudan, there was progress in implementation of affirmative action (35% gender rule) facilitating more representation and inclusion of women in government/policy making processes. Local government (in Yambio, Gbudue state and Torit) conducted elections for chiefs considering 35% female representation; Constructive consultative meetings in Khartoum and also side meetings in corridors which culminated into the consent of the 35% representation in the agreement; CSO partners (CEPO) facilitated review of political manifestos to incorporate the 35% affirmative action; Increased media coverage of implementation of gender provisions of R-ARCSS; More awareness of communities of 35% affirmative action; Creation of a peer-to-peer network between women in politics and CSOs – facilitates sharing ideas among women leaders; voicing their concern, reviewing progress and pushing for meaningful implementation of 35% affirmative action; Women Working Group formed in Wau on affirmative action as a tool of claiming their political rights.

7. **CSOs increased coordination and collaborative work towards advocacy for national governments to engage youth and women in peace processes and implement policies responsive to needs of women and youths.** In Afghanistan, women advocates (through AWN) organized a lobby network to share women concerns on peace talks with High Peace Council and advocate for role of women peace talks; Women representatives had consultation meetings with German, US, Turkey and Canada embassies to lobby for support. In South Sudan, increased coordination amongst CSOs and community facilitated mechanisms for addressing GBV – increasing reporting of cases; community awareness. CSO network on GBV in Wau developed an action plan to fight GBV that enabled SGBV survivors to share experience and establish a survivors' network to engage the decision makers. In CAR, coordination and collaboration amongst education sector actors increased sensitization and capacity development on tackling GBV. This included creation of AFECA – a collaborative instrument for education sector GBV Actors. In NY CSOs organized to work on common agenda on 1325 to influence implementation agenda and report by UN in 2020. 40 women human rights defenders and organizations from Burundi, CAR, DRC, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Uganda convened and defined a creative common vision and agenda for feminist peacebuilding and collective action. The Grand Bargain Friends of Gender Group and UN Women convened a consultation to discuss how to influence outcome of the Africa regional conference through work stream on localisation, to ensure a gender-responsive localisation and participation. Representatives of the UNOY Peacebuilders representing 80 youth organizations, Cordaid and CSPPS influenced contents of progress study on youth peace and security with recommendations for meaningful youth engagement.

## **Inclusive Health**

1. **Capacities of government agencies in DRC and Afghanistan developed a design for implementation of UHC.** Office of the President and Ministry of Health in DRC requested support from Cordaid to design a roadmap to achieve UHC. In Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health requested support from Cordaid to strengthen its capacity on advocacy and negotiations. SP partners provide technical support for design of national strategy of UHC in DRC. Cordaid organised a workshop on UHC in 2018 and symposium on health financing in 2019. Cordaid and local CSOs in DRC contributed to the design of the national strategy for UHC integrating outcomes of Cordaid study (done by School of Public Health of the University of Kinshasa) on Community Health Insurances or Mutuelles de Sante.
2. **International L&A work by CSO partners promoted implementation of UHC in Afghanistan and DRC.** Cordaid and local CSOs in Afghanistan and DRC contributed to the Devex articles and multimedia feature on Universal Health Coverage in DRC, South-Sudan and Afghanistan. Cordaid joined the delegation of DRC to attend the High-Level Meeting on Universal Health Coverage in New York during the UN General Assembly
3. **Substantive increases in financing for the health sector in DRC and Afghanistan.** In Afghanistan, CSOs lobbied MoF and MoPH, Health and Budget committees of Parliament leading to an increase in 2020 health sector budget. Afghan Midwife Association, National Advocacy Committee (NAC), youth networks, AHO and Private Hospital Association committed to be used as coordination platform for jointly lobbying President, MoF, Parliament and donors. Islamic party leaders committed to raise the issue of increase of health sector budget. In DRC, significant increases in budget (in 2019 and pledges for 2020) subsidies for MUSA in Kivu (North and South) supported by governors and assemblies. CSOs' appeal to HoS to increase budgetary allocations and disbursement to health and social security sectors; Notable support by key government officials for calls for increase the budget allocated to social security – South Kivu (support for \$163,000 social security budget); Regular budget monitoring in order to improve the rate of disbursements of funds allocated to health and social security within the budget voted by the provincial assembly; Commitment by development partners like Swiss Cooperation for MUSA; Establishment of committees and taskforces to advocate for, and influence, Provincial Commission in charge of sector budget analysis to include mutual health insurance in the 2020 budget; Lobby for reimbursement of blocked MUSA funds.
4. **Legislative and policy mechanisms for promoting health financing developed in DRC.** This included review of draft law on health cooperatives (mutuelles de santé) by assemblies – Kivu; Decree on coordination of mutual health insurance mechanisms and constitution of coordination commission (MUSA provincial coordinating commission - like CPCM) in North Kivu, South Kivu; Decree signed by Minister of ELSC permitting POMUCO to mobilize resources for implementation of MUSA; POMUCO invited to Commission on Harmonization of Legal Texts for State Structures for implementation of UHC. National Health Insurance Advocacy Forum conducted (including MoPH, MoLSA, Parliament, Senate, ministries, Health NGOs, International NGOs, UN agencies and media) mobilized support for approval of Social Health Insurance Law; **Development of policy frameworks for increased financing for the health sector.** PPP Law and PP Policy approved by MoJ & MoF; Alternative Healthcare Financing Policy passed by MoPH; Revenue Generation Strategic Framework and Social Health Insurance Law approved by Ministry of Public Health.
5. **Inclusion of multiple stakeholders and community members in Mutual Health Insurance (MUSA) in DRC.** Collaborative work and increased participation of multiple stakeholders in promotion of mutual health insurance – clergy, politicians, CSOs, unions, government among others. Establishment of community health insurance schemes - Katana and Walungu, Barumbu, Kikimi, Kingasani, Makala and Mount Ngafula; Advocacy and awareness creation by community leaders on MUSA by RECOs and NOSOMUS partners; Increased number of individuals joining MUSA, pilot insurance companies. Collaborative engagements between health insurance companies, fund managers and government to promote UHC; Development of draft National Strategic Plan on UHC – with participation of CSOs.

## Extractives

- 1. Formulation of Agenda for Action (for different stakeholder groups) on initiatives for responsible mineral chains (in conflict and high-risk areas and their impact on local communities)**
- 2. A general improvement in capacities of CSOs to carry out L&A work towards improvement of extractives policy, laws and processes.** At international level, CSO partners conducted joint L&A work on conflict minerals targeting different stakeholder groups in Brussels. In South Sudan, improved capacity in L&A amongst partner CSOs increased commitment and action from government to address oil pollution and facilitate prudent sharing and management of oil revenues especially disbursement of 2% and 3% oil revenues to communities and States. It also contributed to more willingness by petroleum stakeholders to implement provisions of the Petroleum Act 2012 and address oil pollution. In Nigeria, CSO partners conducted L&A activities and engaged local communities on holding key players in the clean-up process of the Niger Delta accountable. This contributed to increased initiative and commitment from institutions of government responsible for implementation of the clean-up of the Niger Delta; led to more funding and operationalization of HYPREP a key institution in the clean-up.
- 3. Policy makers (DG DEVCO; COMECE; EPRM; OECD) committed to action on conflict minerals regulation and improvement of lives of miners and communities.** EC emphasized responsibility of mining companies for due diligence even when they are part of industry schemes. OECD has increased engagement of civil society in the OECD forum. EPRM revised requirement to partner with private companies for setting up consortia for tenders; agreed to open their tenders in languages other than English. NGO pillar of EPRM propose the formation of a consultation group of local NGOs in producing countries to advise EPRM. Policy makers participating in COMECE workshop show interest in impact of conflict minerals regulation in DRC; implementation of the EC Directive.
- 4. Improvement of the legal framework for extractives sector governance – including considerations on community development, transparency and accountability, and mining taxation.** Successful review of the Environmental Impact Assessment Act in Nigeria. Promulgation of Mining Code - Law No. 18/001 of 2018 in DRC which involved substantive contributions by CSOs and a great deal of awareness creation for community members, miners by local media. Promulgation of the new mining code prompted mining companies (Kipoi, SIMCO and Excellence Minérale, Ruashi company) to start paying royalties directly to the provinces (25%) and decentralized territorial entities (15%) (ETDs). Resources expected to fund community development projects.
- 5. Creation of collaborative arrangements and coalitions amongst CSOs that promoted effectiveness of L&A towards influencing government institutions and other stakeholders in extractives sector processes.** In Nigeria this facilitated implementation of the clean-up process and strengthened work on alternative livelihoods for affected communities. In DRC, increased mobilization, coordination and engagements amongst CSOs and local communities (in Lubumbashi, Likasi, Sakania, Kolwezi and Fungurume) facilitated identification of issues discussed with mining companies and management of funds for community development. In Afghanistan, a network of CSOs established in Parwan Province facilitated monitoring of deviations in labour, social and environmental conditions in the extractive sector. In South Sudan, this contributed to formation of a coalition on oil and natural resources by CSOs working on extractives.
- 6. Increased coordination and engagements between CSOs and institutions of government in extractives for more openness and accountability.** In Nigeria, more joint collaborative work between CSOs and institutions of government around implementation of clean-up activities in areas such as creation

of environmental desks in key MDAs, review of EIA Act and capacity development targeting government offices. In DRC, coordination and engagements between CSOs, artisanal miners, government in capacity building on development of cooperative companies, exposition of the mining law; establishment of register of cooperative societies; establishment of cooperative companies – Lugushwa, Kamituga; demand for commitment by mining companies on CSR, fair compensation and restoration of livelihoods, local development for artisanal and small-scale mining. In Afghanistan, this included signing collaborative agreements between CSOs and government; multi-stakeholder dialogue on mining – National Conference on Mining and Sustainable Development organized by SP partner – HRRAC attended by MoMP & NEPA; and commitments for exchange of information between government and CSOs. In South Sudan, National Legislative Assembly Committee on Petroleum and Energy accepted to work with civil society; research paper by SUDD Institute used as evidence by MPs to summon the Minister of Finance to demand action on allocation of the funds; and Steering Committee of the National Dialogue invited CSOs and MPs to present a paper on 3% and extent of environmental pollution in oil producing states. This was an indicator of improved environment for CSOs to operate and increasing openness of institutions of government to include CSOs in important policy processes.

7. **Strengthened and increased engagement of grassroots CSOs and community groups provided more opportunities for inclusion of women voices.** In Nigeria, this increased awareness of communities in the Niger Delta on: impact of oil pipeline vandalism, bunkering and artisanal refining; alternative livelihoods; implementation and monitoring of emergency measures; conflict management; and integration of ESHRIA and biodiversity audits. In DRC, this contributed to increased awareness amongst communities on extractives sector processes – like mining cycle and facilitated local communities to develop development committees, harmonized Local Development Plans, and set up bank accounts for ETDs for managing resources from royalties. In South Sudan, this facilitated community groups in Melut to: engage the Governor on establishment of Community Development Committee (CDC); dialogue on issues facing local communities as a result of oil exploitation; document disease cases that are related to oil pollution; and awareness raising on oil pollution and reporting community grievances to County and State Authorities (in Unity and Upper Nile).
8. **Evidence generated through research (surveys, policy reviews, assessments, consultations, PEA, baseline studies) utilised to facilitate capacity development of major stakeholders (including government), improvement of policy processes and sensitization and community awareness extractives sector governance.** In South Sudan, research (by SUDD Institute) on oil revenues management and transparency in extractives sector supported advocacy and informed policy on implementation of 2% & 3% revenues sharing with communities and States. In Nigeria, this included: surveys on link between oil spills and livelihood options; ii) FGDs on sustainable livelihoods mapping; ii) participatory surveys on sustainable livelihoods and capacity needs of women in the Niger Delta, and vii) baseline survey on UNEP emergency measures and inclusion of women in the clean-up process.
9. **Increased traction on pursuit of rice farming (and other agricultural ventures) as alternative livelihoods mechanisms among communities in the Niger Delta.**

## **CSO Space**

1. **Dutch MoFA, policy makers and politicians in The Netherlands and other EU countries provided crucial support to CSOs in Afghanistan and Burundi.** Supported course of action agreed upon in the Burundi Platform+ meeting, which included commitment to support INGOs active in Burundi. Debate on Afghanistan in Dutch Parliament in February 2020. Strong engagement by Dutch MFA and embassy in Bujumbura on shrinking space for CSOs. Afghanistan Platform meetings, co-organized by Cordaid and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, attract more and more interest from CSOs, knowledge institutes and officials of both the Ministry and the Embassy in Kabul. Partner CSOs work jointly in L&A to thwart implementation of draft law seeking to limit civic space.
2. **Cordaid included in CPDE Steering Committee.** This facilitated sharpening of content of FCAS tailored monitoring framework which provides evidence and accountability by development partners on progress in implementing effective development co-operation at country, regional and global level. Cordaid contributed to multi-stakeholder preparatory team of the High-Level Session on Fragility and also the formulation of the Beirut Declaration and the CPDE manifesto.
3. **CSPPS continues to play critical role in supporting CSO engagement in FCAS.** CSPPS policy brief and talking points presented in IDPS Steering Group Meeting. CS partners (CSPPS-members) put forward consolidated inputs during revision of the IDPS Peace Vision Document. CSPPS featured in the launch of the Ready to Engage report that provided an introduction for CSOs and other stakeholders on the role of business in fragile and conflict-affected settings. Civil Society partners contributed to the Rome Civil Society Declaration on SDG16+, which was coordinated by CSPPS. CSPPS supported optimal civil society participation for amplifying their voice in policy processes around the VNR. OECD International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) included concerns raised by CSPPS over shrinking space for civil society in their communique.
4. **CSO partners (Cordaid, Hivos and Open State Foundation) promoted awareness on Open Government; Open Data.** Developed data portal - <https://openstate.eu/nl/openmultilaterals> to increase accessibility of information on awarded contracts to the public. Dutch MPs debated and agree to push for more transparency of (contract) data by the World Bank. Transparency of multilateral organizations increasingly discussed; debated by Dutch MPs.
5. **SP Programme partners contributed to advocacy on improved financing for CSOs.** OECD & UNCDF included a complete chapter on blended finance in FCAS (written by Cordaid) in the UNCDF / OECD report on Blending Finance in Least Developed Countries. Traction in gaining support for increase in the Dutch development budget - majority of MPs seek to increase Dutch development budget to 0.7% GDP.
6. **CSO partners contributed to joint advocacy for opening up civic space and creating an enabling environment for CSOs in DRC.** Thwarting proposed reform of the law governing work of national and international NGOs by Congolese parliament. There was improvement in understanding importance of expanded civic space by MPs. Also, CSOs were invited to canvass issues on civic space and enabling environment for CSOs; Major development partners expressed concerns over shrinking civic space.

<b>ANNEX 2: Evaluation Criteria (Matrix)</b>			
<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Questions to be addressed</b>	<b>Data sources</b>	<b>Data Collection methods</b>
<b>Results of L&amp;A</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In which categories (L&amp;A capacity, enabling environment, improved policies and policy implementation) can the programme claim to have contributed to results?</li> <li>- At which levels (local, national and international) can the programme claim to have contributed to results?</li> <li>- How are women, men and youth benefitting from the programme results?</li> <li>- What types of interventions (strategies) have contributed to the observed successes?***</li> <li>- What evidence can be found that the programme contributes to strengthened social contract, expanded the civic space and increased gender equity?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programme documents</li> <li>- Community level CSOs</li> <li>- National CSO Networks</li> <li>- International CSOs</li> <li>- Cordaid Global office technical staff</li> <li>- Cordaid country office staff</li> <li>- Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Desk review</li> <li>- KIIs</li> <li>- EKIs</li> <li>- Outcome Validation forums</li> </ul>
<b>Contextualising</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Which reported results are most significant considering situations of limited civic space, levels of fragility, and political economy contexts?</li> <li>- How did reported results effect on gender equity (positive, neutral or negative)?</li> <li>- Which of the results (based on a selection of most significant results) are substantiated by other stakeholders?</li> <li>- How has the programme responded to the changes – political, social and economic – in the various contexts? How has this influenced the outcomes? ***</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Community level CSOs</li> <li>- National CSO Networks</li> <li>- International CSOs</li> <li>- Programme documents</li> <li>- Other CSOs</li> <li>- Media, academia, experts, other observers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- KIIs</li> <li>- EKIs</li> <li>- Outcome Validation forums</li> <li>- Desk review</li> </ul>
<b>Learning capacity &amp; adaptability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How effective were the frameworks employed for planning, reporting, monitoring, evaluation and learning? ***</li> <li>- Has the programme provided suitable space for learning according to programme partners? ***</li> <li>- Have programme partners shown ability to learn from practice and to adjust L&amp;A strategies in the various contexts? ***</li> <li>- How well has the programme integrated lessons from the MTR and advice of the external reference group? ***</li> <li>- Do Cordaid staff and programme partners demonstrate sufficient capacity for gender sensitive programming? How can gender integration in programming be improved?</li> <li>- What factors – internal and external – were critical in influencing the effectiveness of the programme and the attainment of desired outcomes? ***</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Programme documents: Annual SP reports, Mid-term review final report, Narrative planning reports, donor feedback notes, Country-based outcome harvest documents</li> <li>- Community level CSOs</li> <li>- National CSO Networks</li> <li>- Cordaid Global office technical staff</li> <li>- Cordaid country office staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Desk review</li> <li>- KIIs</li> <li>- EKIs</li> <li>- Outcome Validation forums</li> </ul>
<b>Partnership</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Has support from Cordaid allowed local partners to strengthen their capacity and increased ownership of carrying out L&amp;A interventions? ***</li> <li>- Do programme partners working at local, national and international level observe synergy between programme interventions at these different levels?</li> <li>- Has the partnership between programme partners and the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs been strengthened, and if so, how? ***</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CSOs at local level</li> <li>- National CSO Networks</li> <li>- Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs</li> <li>- Feedback reports from donor</li> <li>- Cordaid Global office technical staff</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Desk review</li> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Electronic key informant interviews</li> </ul>




	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What frameworks were employed to ensure the programme was accountable to the key stakeholders? How effective were they? ***</li> <li>- To what extent are implementing partners (CSOs) capable of sustaining the positive outcomes of the programme? Are they sufficiently prepared to do so (capacity, resources, partnerships and networks)? ***</li> <li>- Are the methods for planning, reporting and sense-making adequate according to the programme partners? Were these the most adequate?***</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cordaid country office staff</li> <li>- Programme documents: Annual SP reports, Mid-term review final report</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Outcome Validation forums</li> </ul>
<b>Reflections on Theory of Change</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were the assumptions of the programme (in the ToC) realistic and justified considering the contexts within which it was implemented? ***</li> <li>- Did programme partners demonstrate sufficient capacity to work with ToC/ToAs? How did this affect the conduct of the programme and the outcomes? ***</li> <li>- Has the bottom-up approach of working with TOCs helped the programme partners effectively guide their interventions? ***</li> <li>- How much did the programme's focus on the three categories - capacity development, enabling environment and policy change shape the outcomes? ***</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CSOs at local level</li> <li>- National CSO Networks</li> <li>- Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs</li> <li>- Feedback reports from donor</li> <li>- Cordaid Global office technical staff</li> <li>- Cordaid country office staff</li> <li>- Programme documents: Annual SP reports, Mid-term review final report</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Desk review</li> <li>- Key informant interviews</li> <li>- Electronic key informant interviews</li> <li>- Outcome Validation forums</li> </ul>

#### Integration of OECD Evaluation Criteria into the Evaluation Matrix

The OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria is a widely accepted framework for evaluating the conduct and outcomes of any development projects/programmes. The criteria focuses largely on 4 key elements regarding the conduct of development interventions; relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability.

1. Its effectiveness and perceived strengths in interrogating progress and outcomes are attributable to its: i) comprehensiveness, ii) simplicity, iii) neutrality, iv) adaptability and v) feasibility.
2. This evaluation of the SP Programme employed this evaluation criteria to enrich the key evaluation questions provided by Cordaid in the TOR (as indicated under **2.1**).
3. The evaluation therefore carefully integrated key considerations in the OECD criteria into the Evaluation Matrix above (**Annex 2**) to ensure robustness of the assessment and to benefit from both evaluation approaches. This is especially in the areas of Learning Capacity & Adaptability, Partnership, and Reflections the Theory of Change.
4. **The Evaluation Questions marked by asterisks (\*\*\*) represent the areas where the OECD criteria has been integrated into this Evaluation Matrix. These questions, whilst originally in the Cordaid TORs, have been adjusted or qualified to be able to facilitate collection of information to interrogate the conduct of the programme based on the OECD criteria.**

**ANNEX 3: Visualisation of SP Programme Theory of Change**



Annex 4: Portfolio of Partners (stakeholder map for selection of respondents) <sup>2</sup>							
Trajectory	Nigeria	DRC	South Sudan	CAR	Burundi	Afghanistan	International
Inclusive and Engendered Peace		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Centre d'Études sur Handicaps Justice et Résolution 1325 (CEHAJ 1325)</li> <li>2. Dynamique des Femmes Juristes (DFJ)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Eve Organisation for Women Development (EOWD)</li> <li>2. Community Empowerment for Progress Organization (CEPO)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Association des Femmes Juristes de Centrafrique (AFJC)</li> <li>2. Réseau de Soutien au Leadership Politique des Femmes Centrafricaines (RESOLEP-FC)</li> <li>3. Le Cercle des Théologiennes (CERCLE)</li> <li>4. Les Flamboyants</li> <li>5. Maison Prisca</li> <li>6. Réseau des Journalistes des Droits de L'Homme (RJDH)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. AFRABU</li> <li>2. AFJO</li> <li>3. ADISCO</li> <li>4. REJA</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Afghan Women Network (AWN)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. UNOY - The United Network of Young Peace Builders</li> </ol>
Security & Access to Justice		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Action pour le Développement et la Paix Endogènes (ADEPAE)</li> <li>2. SOS Information Juridique Multisectorielle (SOS IJM)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Justice and Peace Commission (JPC)</li> <li>2. South Sudan Law Society (SSLS)</li> <li>3. STEWARDWOMEN</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ligue Centrafricaine des Droits de l'Homme (LCDH)</li> <li>2. Association des Victimes des Evènements De 2012 – 2014 (AVED)</li> <li>3. Association des Victimes des Evènements du 29 octobre 2015 et suivant</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Observatoire de l'Action Gouvernementale (OAG)</li> <li>2. Barreau de Bujumbura</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SALAH Consortium</li> </ol>	
Inclusive Health Services		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Action Humanitaire pour la Santé et Développement Communautaire (AHUSADEC)</li> <li>2. Conseil Nationale des Organisations non Gouvernementales de la Santé (CNOS)</li> <li>3. Plateforme des Organisations des Mutuelles de Santé (POMUCO)</li> </ol>				<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Afghan Health and Development Services (AHDS)</li> </ol>	

<sup>2</sup> We envisage that after consultations with Cordaid and partners, this portfolio will expand to include other stakeholders not directly involved in the programme but are useful for triangulation and contextualization. This shall provide room to enrich the sample with a variety of respondents to increase rigour, reliability and credibility.

Extractives	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. African Centre for Leadership, Strategy and Development (CENTRE LSD)</li> <li>2. Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC)</li> <li>3. Kebetkache Women Development &amp; Resource Centre (KEBETKACHE)</li> <li>4. Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CERHD)</li> <li>5. Publish What You Pay Nigeria (PWYP-Nigeria)</li> <li>6. FACE Initiative</li> <li>7. Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)</li> <li>8. MacJim Foundation</li> <li>9. Advocacy Committee</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Commission Episcopale pour Ressources Naturelles (CERN/CENCO)</li> <li>2. Bureau d'Études Scientifiques et Techniques (BEST)</li> <li>3. Plateforme des Organisations de la Société Civile intervenant dans le secteur Minier (POM)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. SUDD Institute</li> <li>2. Assistance Mission for Africa (AMA)</li> <li>3. Upper Nile Youths Development Association (UNYDA)</li> </ol>			<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Organization of Fast Relief and Development (OFRD)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Publish What You Pay (PWYP)</li> </ol>
Civic Space							CSPPS - Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and State building